Can Courts Restrict the Speech of the Convicted?

​How far can a judge go in imposing speech-related restrictions on a convicted person? That’s the question in U.S. v. Goodwyn, a case that tests the boundaries of judicial authority and the First Amendment.
 
In this instance, Daniel Goodwyn, who was present in the January 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol, found himself subjected to stringent computer monitoring as a condition of his supervised release. This condition was imposed despite his relatively minor offense – being inside the Capitol for only 36 seconds without engaging in the mob’s violence or destruction. A federal judge imposed the condition that software would be installed on Goodwyn’s computer to monitor it for any signs that he is engaging in “disinformation,” or that (being defended by Tucker Carlson on his show) Goodwyn should use digital sites for fundraising on the off chance he might invest funds in future crimes or try to rehabilitate himself on “extremist media.”
 
This situation demands careful reflection on the role of the judiciary in regulating speech, especially speech that is politically charged. The First Amendment guarantees freedom of expression, including the right to espouse unpopular or even controversial (and yes, outright stupid) views. PT1st Senior Legal Advisor Eugene Volokh notes that the imposition of conditions that monitor and restrict speech based on its content raises serious constitutional concerns. Volokh emphasizes that while the judiciary has the authority to impose conditions on those under supervised release, these conditions must be narrowly tailored and must not infringe upon fundamental freedoms.
 
Parallels between Goodwyn’s case and the U.S. v. Burroughs case (2010) further illustrate how far the court overreached. In Burroughs, a federal court rejected a computer monitoring condition for a far more serious offense than Goodwyn’s, one involving sexual crimes against a minor. The D.C. Court of Appeals in that case reasoned that the mere potential for future criminal conduct over the internet did not justify such a broad restriction. If monitoring was deemed excessive in a case involving serious and ongoing criminal behavior, how can we justify a similar condition for an individual convicted of a non-violent, one-time offense like Goodwyn’s?
 
The First Amendment jurisprudence sets a high bar for restricting speech, even when that speech is false or advocates for controversial ideas. The court’s broad prohibition against spreading “disinformation” about January 6th appears to run afoul of these precedents. As Volokh notes, the language of the political arena is often harsh and imprecise, but that is precisely the type of speech the First Amendment is designed to protect.
 
While the events of January 6th deserve appropriate legal responses, we must ensure that these responses do not encroach on the fundamental freedoms that define our nation. The judiciary has a responsibility to balance the need for public safety with the need to protect constitutional rights. In U.S. v. Goodwyn, this balance seems to have tipped too far in favor of restriction. We look forward to further developments in this case.