​The U.S. Supreme Court will soon weigh in on Mahmoud v. Taylor, a case that could reshape the boundaries of parental rights in public education. At stake is a basic but powerful question: Can the state force parents to expose their children to teachings that contradict their deepest moral and religious beliefs? A win for the parents wouldn’t just vindicate religious freedom – it could also throw a lifeline to secular and non-Christian families in red states, where public school curricula are starting to blur the line between education and religious endorsement.

In Montgomery County, Maryland, parents were initially allowed to opt out of new “LGBTQ+-inclusive” texts introduced in 2022. These included books such as Pride Puppy, with some curricula introducing drag queens and leather fetish gear to pre-K students. Born Ready presents gender transition as a personal decision that doesn’t need to “make sense.” Then the school board reversed course, eliminating the opt-out and mandating full participation, even for families whose religious teachings directly conflict with these lessons.

Protect The 1st filed an amicus brief urging the Court to recognize this as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. This case echoes the foundational rulings in Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Wisconsin v. Yoder, in which the Court affirmed that the right to direct a child’s moral and religious upbringing rests with the family – not the state.

What is often missed in media commentary is how a win in Mahmoud would also defend secular families and minority faiths in red states from forced exposure to Christian-centric teachings. Consider Texas. The state’s new Bluebonnet Learning curriculum is approved for adoption in 2025 and incentivized with $60 per student. While it claims to be academically neutral, watchdog groups have documented how some lessons treat the Bible as literal history and ask students to repeat phrases from Genesis​.

Texas Education Agency officials insist these materials are educational, not devotional, and that schools may use or omit parts as they see fit. But once a district accepts this curriculum, parents will be allowed no opt-out for their children. That’s cold comfort to Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, or secular families in districts that decide to lean hard into biblical framing. What’s being described as “contextual” exposure often amounts to uncritical celebration of one religious tradition. At minimum, there is no need to push this curriculum without parental opt-outs for their children.

We ardently agree that you cannot teach American history without appreciating the role of religion, from the Pilgrims to the civil rights era. But you can – and must – do it without crossing the line into indoctrination. The same principle that protects a Muslim family in Maryland from state-imposed gender ideology also protects a secular family in Texas from state-imposed Christianity.
​
A ruling in favor of the Mahmoud plaintiffs won’t just be a win for religious liberty. It’ll be a win for pluralism – ensuring that no matter where you live or what you believe, the public school system doesn’t get to decide what your child’s faith tradition will be.

​It is considered bad form and bad luck to anticipate how the U.S. Supreme Court will decide a given case. But Adam Liptak of The New York Times just went ahead and called it: “The Supreme Court on Monday seemed ready to rule that a Catholic charity in Wisconsin was entitled to a tax exemption that had been denied by a state court on the grounds that its activities were not primarily religious.”

To say that Colin T. Roth, lawyer for the state, had a rough morning would be an understatement. It was Roth’s task to defend the Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission, which found that Catholic charities that serve the poor are not exempted from state unemployment taxes as a religious organization.
 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the flawed reasoning that Catholic Charities – which has provided aid to the disabled, the elderly, and the poor for over a century – is not operated primarily for religious purposes because it provides services to people of all faiths.
 
When asked what it would take for Catholic Charities to be considered religious, Roth replied they might say the Lord’s Prayer when spooning soup. We’ll be sure to pass that advice along to the Catholic lay volunteers, nuns, priests, bishops, cardinals, and the Pope. Thanks, Wisconsin!
 
“Isn’t it a fundamental premise of the First Amendment that the state shouldn’t be picking and choosing between religions?” Justice Neil Gorsuch asked. “Doesn’t it entangle the state tremendously when it has to go into a soup kitchen, send an inspector in, to see how much prayer is going on?”
 
“Some religions proselytize, other religions don’t,” said Justice Elena Kagan. “Why are we treating some religions better than others based on that element of religious doctrine?”
 
Justice Amy Comey Barrett followed up by asking if a Jewish charity would be disqualified given her understanding that Judaism is largely a non-proselytizing religion. Roth replied that such a Jewish charity would have to engage in worship or religious education.
 
What the Wisconsin Supreme Court overlooked is that in Judaism and Christianity, as well as in Islam and Eastern religions, charity is a religious obligation. Jesus said we should feed the hungry, shelter the homeless, and clothe the naked. He did not add, “unless, of course, they’re not members of your congregation. Then they’re on their own.”
 
An adverse ruling for Catholic Charities would enable government inspectors and bureaucrats to decide which religious practices are religious. Based on the tenor of today’s oral arguments, that does not seem likely. This was a good day for religious liberty.

​The mindfulness movement encourages people to focus on the now, to be in the moment as they work, but also as they walk, trim the shrubs, drive the kids to school, and boil the spaghetti.
 
How about mindfulness at the moment of one’s execution?
 
In Buddhism, the practice of Maranasati is to use mindful breathing to reach the deepest level of contemplation. Many Buddhists engage in meditation and other spiritual practices as they actually are dying.
 
One person who sought to do this was the recently departed Jessie Hoffman, 46, a convert to Buddhism who wished to engage in meditative breathing as he died. He was prevented from doing so, however, because of the manner of his death, which happened Tuesday night. Hoffman had been sentenced to be lawfully executed for first-degree murder and became the first person in Louisiana to have a mask strapped on his face to be asphyxiated by breathing nitrogen gas.
 
Hoffman faced the death penalty because he had, at age 18, kidnapped 28-year-old Molly Elliott, raped her, shot her in the head, and left her naked body by a river.
 
After 27 years of appeals, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a stay of Hoffman’s execution, dismissing the claim that death by nitrogen amounted to a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment.”
 
Four Supreme Court Justices, including Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson would have granted Hoffman’s application for a stay. Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote a short dissent explaining his reasoning.
 
Justice Gorsuch noted that no one “has questioned the sincerity of Mr. Hoffman’s religious beliefs.” This is relevant to the application of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which forbids the government from violating a prisoner’s sincerely held religious beliefs. Justice Gorsuch took a lower court to task for issuing its own “find[ing] about the kind of breathing that Mr. Hoffman’s faith requires.”
 
Given the failure of the lower court to fully vet Hoffman’s claim – and the “Fifth Circuit’s unexplained omission” in doing so – Justice Gorsuch announced that he would have granted the stay and vacated the judgment. He would also have remanded the case for the Fifth Circuit to address Hoffman’s RLUIPA claim.
 
This is reminiscent of another case, Ramirez v. Collier (2020), in which the Court ruled in favor of John Henry Ramirez, a man on death row in Texas who petitioned to have his minister lay a hand on him as he received a lethal injection. The Court sided with Ramirez, 8-1. The prisoner’s minister was permitted, in fact, to place his right hand on Ramirez as he died.
 
On its face, the idea of being able to engage in meditative breathing while ceasing to breathe altogether sounds a bit absurd. Prosecutors are always alert to prisoners who manufacture religious objections to extend their lives. Hoffman had requested that he be executed by firing squad, which would, to say the least, have also interfered with his meditative breathing.
 
But Justice Gorsuch reminds us that the free practice of religion, at the most solemn moment of a person’s life, should command sufficient respect to fully explore an RLUIPA claim. At the very least, Hoffman’s claim deserved more consideration, even if it was ultimately rejected.

Ramirez’s attorney, Seth Kretzer, said it best: “The First Amendment applies in the most glorified halls of power and also in the hell of the execution chamber.”

In an amicus brief to the Supreme Court on Monday night, Protect The 1st represented 66 Members of Congress that showed the U.S. Supreme Court why it should reverse a Fourth Circuit ruling in Mahmoud v. Taylor that rejected the First Amendment objections of parents whose children, some as young as three, cannot be opted out of exposure to material on moral issues controversial with many parents. In its brief, the Protect The First Foundation showed that it is unconstitutional to deny parents this choice, and that “federal law has consistently protected parental rights in the educational arena.”
 
Background
In 2022, the Montgomery County school board embraced books that promoted pronoun preferences, pride parades, and gender transitioning for young students. One book tasks three- and four-year-olds to search for images from a word list that includes “intersex flag,” “drag queen,” “underwear,” “leather,” and a celebrated activist/sex worker. 
 
When some Muslim and Christian parents sought to opt out their children from these teachings, one board member told them that claiming these books “offend your religious rights or your family values or your core beliefs is just telling your kid, ‘Here’s another reason to hate another person.’” On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that because there was no evidence of either coercion or a direct penalty on these parents’ religious faith if their children were required to participate in these one-sided portrayals of questions about morality, this case involved no burden on their First Amendment rights.
 
An Absurd Outcome
The Protect The 1st brief demonstrates that there is nothing in federal law or the Court’s precedent that remotely supports the Fourth Circuit’s decision to deny parents the choice to keep their children out of such indoctrinating instruction.

• The Board argued that Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 required it to deny notice or the right to opt out. Protect The 1st told the Supreme Court: “Yet the Board failed to quote or even cite a single provision of Title IX for its claim. Nor could it. The statute’s plain language makes clear that a school’s duty is to not itself discriminate.”

 

• The Fourth Circuit shared the Board’s view that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton controlled this expansive interpretation of Title IX. In fact, in Bostock, the majority – which ruled on whether an employer who fires someone for simply being homosexual or transgender – addressed employer discrimination, not educational policy. The majority did “not purport to address bathrooms, locker rooms, [dress codes,] or anything else of the kind.”

 

• In Bostock, the Court went out of its way to display concern that this opinion did not trample on religious liberty: “We are also deeply concerned with preserving the promise of the free exercise of religion enshrined in our Constitution; that guarantee lies at the heart of our pluralistic society.”

Neither the statute’s text nor Supreme Court precedent support the Board’s claims or the Fourth Circuit’s opinions.
​

• The current opinion stands directly opposed to carefully crafted laws passed by Congress over the past half-century to protect the religious freedom rights of parents. Courts have also regularly applied the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to protect parental rights.

“It seems clear to us that the excuses given by the board and the court, relying on federal law and Supreme Court precedent, border on the frivolous,” said Erik Jaffe, President of Protect The 1st. “Both Congress and the Supreme Court have routinely supported parental choice in matters involving the education of their children. And an opt-out for parents has long been recognized as a non-disruptive remedy that protects the rights of parents.

“We fully expect the Supreme Court to agree.”

​Protect The 1st filed a brief urging the U.S. Supreme Court to hear a case in which a public school teacher was terminated over a search of her old retweets of social media memes. While a seemingly small case, it could have outsized influence over the speech rights of millions of Americans.
 
The case involves a public schoolteacher, Kari MacRae, who was hired by the Hanover High School in 2021. Months before, MacRae had been a candidate for the local school board in this Massachusetts town. At that time, she had shared and liked on her TikTok account several memes and videos poking fun at “woke” ideology. (You can decide for yourself what you think of MacRae’s reposted memes, highlighted in this Boston.com article.)
 
Hanover High learned of the unearthing of MacRae’s old TikTok reposts from local media. It then placed MacRae on administrative leave to conduct a 14-day investigation. The school then fired her.
 
MacRae sued for wrongful termination and the violation of her rights only to lose in federal district court and then on appeal before the U.S. First Circuit. In our view, the First Circuit misapplied a framework that if not reviewed and overturned by the Supreme Court, will leave the speech rights of government employees – 15 percent of the U.S. workforce – at risk.
 
The Supreme Court has already held in Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) that when government “employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public concern,” they “must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.” The First Circuit instead embraced a “balancing” standard between personal rights and public responsibilities.
 
Protect The 1st responds: “Framed in Garcetti’s terms, this case asks whether government employers, to ‘operate efficiently and effectively,’ must have carte blanche to punish their employees not for what they are now saying, but for anything they have ever said – even before they were hired. If the First Amendment means anything in this context, the answer to that question must be no. An alternative holding would silence prospective government employees lest their speech, whenever it was made, could later be cited as a reason to destroy their careers.”
 
We warn that if the First Circuit’s standard were adopted broadly, “fully protected speech could lose its protection with time – an untenable proposition.” Protect the 1st also told the Court:
 
“… that in a world where many people spend their lives online, a rule that anything they say there can later be the impetus for their termination from government employment would impose an unconscionable burden on the right to speak on issues of public concern: It would chill pre-employment speech at the front end and give a modified heckler’s veto to bad actors at the back end.”
 
We urge the Supreme Court, which has taken up few First Amendment cases so far in this term, to grant the petition and reverse the First Circuit’s erroneous ruling.

​This term, the Supreme Court declined to hear at least 16 cases that involved significant First Amendment issues, leaving a number of critical questions unresolved. Among those left on the table were cases touching on free speech, freedom of association, and the extent of religious freedom under the First Amendment. With these denials, the Court missed an opportunity to clarify or expand upon key First Amendment protections in an era where such rights are up against new and unprecedented challenges.
 
Among the First Amendment cases the Court declined, several stand out as especially significant in terms of the broader impact on free expression and association. If a suitable vehicle for the issues in these cases were to come up in future litigation, we highly encourage the Supreme Court to take them.
 
No on E v. Chiu - Donor Disclosure and Free Speech
 
No on E v. Chiu centered on a challenge to a San Francisco law that required groups running election-related advertisements to disclose their donors, raising significant concerns about the balance between transparency in elections and the right to anonymous political speech. The plaintiffs argued that mandatory disclosure infringes on both free speech and association rights, raising fears of retaliation or harassment for individuals supporting controversial political causes. This is especially relevant in today’s hyper-connected digital world, where donor information is easily accessible, making contributors vulnerable to backlash.
 
As seen in Americans for Prosperity v. Bonta, the Supreme Court has already recognized that revealing donors’ identities can expose them to threats and harassment, deterring political participation. While transparency is often cited as a virtue in campaign finance, the risks to individuals' safety and privacy are real and growing. In response to these threats, 20 states have passed the Personal Privacy Protection Act (PPPA) to shield donors from exposure, acknowledging that the right to support causes anonymously is vital for a healthy democracy. The Court’s refusal to hear No on E allows these concerns to persist and leaves donor privacy vulnerable in states without such protections.
 
National Press Photographers Association v. Higgins - Drones and Press Freedom
 
In National Press Photographers Association v. Higgins, the Court declined to hear a case that highlights the growing tension between new technologies and First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs challenged a Texas law that bans drone surveillance without exceptions for journalists, arguing that the law restricts their ability to gather news. Drone technology is a new frontier for free press rights, where the tools used by journalists to report on important public issues — like protests or natural disasters — are being regulated or outright banned. Drone technology is rapidly becoming essential for covering stories from angles that are otherwise inaccessible, but without clear protections for its use, journalists are left vulnerable to restrictions that limit their news gathering capabilities. As technology continues to evolve, the Court's refusal to address this issue and others like it could have serious implications for how the press operates in the digital age.
 
Hile v. Michigan - Blaine Amendments and Religious Discrimination
 
Hile v. Michigan involved a challenge to Michigan’s Blaine Amendment, which prohibits public funding from supporting religious schools. The plaintiffs argued that this restriction discriminates against religious schools and families, violating both Equal Protection and Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment. This case mirrors other recent challenges to state-level Blaine Amendments, including South Carolina’s, which prohibit the use of public funds for religious schools.
 
Blaine Amendments, like Michigan’s, have their origins in 19th-century anti-Catholic bigotry and today block families from choosing educational options that align with their values. In South Carolina, for example, the state’s Supreme Court recently struck down a school voucher program, citing its Blaine Amendment, leaving thousands of students without financial support to attend religious schools. These rulings disproportionately harm low-income families who rely on school choice programs for access to quality education. As our amicus brief in that case argued, school choice promotes First Amendment-protected religious and speech rights by allowing families to select schools that reflect their beliefs and values. By refusing to hear Hile, the Court missed an opportunity to address the discriminatory legacy of Blaine Amendments and expand educational freedom for all families.
 
Saline Parents v. Garland - Chilling Speech in School Board Protests
 
Saline Parents v. Garland raised concerns about government overreach in monitoring political speech. The case challenged Attorney General Garland’s directive to the FBI to investigate threats at school board meetings, which parents argued unfairly targeted their free speech rights. The plaintiffs contended that the policy cast them as potential threats simply for speaking out against school policies, thereby chilling their ability to participate in public debates over education.
 
Garland’s memo suggests that parental dissent might be treated as a threat. While Garland assured Congress that the DOJ’s efforts were aimed at preventing violence, the mere initiation of an FBI investigation has a chilling effect on speech. Even the process of being investigated can suppress dissent, as individuals are subjected to the anxiety of scrutiny, potential legal costs, and damage to their reputations. Though it’s unlikely that parents would be prosecuted merely for voicing objections, the threat of federal surveillance is more than enough to stifle open debate on school policies. By refusing to hear Saline Parents, the Supreme Court left this chilling dynamic unaddressed.
 
Union and Free Speech Cases
 
The Court also passed on several cases involving unions and the First Amendment, where state employees challenged mandatory union dues deductions made after they had resigned their membership. These cases often focused on limited opt-out windows and union agreements with state agencies that enforced dues collection beyond an employee’s resignation. In previous cases, we have argued that this practice violates employees' First Amendment rights by forcing them to support union activities they may disagree with. By refusing to hear these cases, the Court left in place lower court rulings that continue to allow unions to infringe on individual speech rights through these financial extractions.
 
Why These Cases Matter
 
By denying these First Amendment cases, the Supreme Court missed key opportunities to clarify the scope of free speech and association rights in the modern age. Whether it's the rise of new technologies like drones, the balance between transparency and privacy in political advocacy, the exclusion of religious schools from public programs based on antiquated laws, or government surveillance of political speech at local levels, the Court’s passivity this term leaves many critical questions unanswered. We urge the Supreme Court to consider taking up these issues if, and when, they return in future litigation.

The recent session of the U.S. Supreme Court will likely be remembered for two major rulings implicating fundamental separation of powers doctrine: Trump v. United States, establishing presumptive immunity from prosecution for official presidential acts; and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, dispensing with the long-established “Chevron Two Step” granting deference to a federal agency’s interpretation of statutes. In both instances, the Court reaffirmed our constitutional system of checks and balances, including protection against encroachment on the powers and privileges of one branch of government by another.
 
Against the backdrop of those headline-dominating developments, the Supreme Court also took on several important First Amendment cases, with results that were constitutionally sound. Below are the highlights – and summaries – of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence released in recent weeks.
 
Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine
 
In a unanimous ruling, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the Food and Drug Administration’s regulation of the abortion drug mifepristone. Little noticed by the media, the Court’s opinion also firmly nailed down the conscience right of physicians to abstain from participating in abortions and prescribing the drug.
 
Writing for the Court, Justice Kavanaugh said that the Church Amendments, which prohibit the government from imposing requirements that violate the conscience rights of physicians and institutions, “allow doctors and other healthcare personnel to ‘refuse to perform or assist’ an abortion without punishment or discrimination from their employers.”
 
From now on, any effort to restrict or violate the conscience rights of healers will go against the unanimous opinion of all nine justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.
 
Vidal v. Elster
 
The Supreme Court, in another unanimous decision, overturned a lower court ruling that found that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s denial of an application to trademark a phrase including the name “Trump” violated the filer’s First Amendment rights.
 
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas wrote that “[o]ur courts have long recognized that trademarks containing names may be restricted.” But such trademark restrictions, while “content-based” must be “viewpoint neutral.” This opinion prevents commercial considerations to scissor out pieces of the national debate. While the decision rejected a novel First Amendment claim to a speech-restricting trademark, it affirms sound First Amendment principles and protects the speech of all others who would discuss and debate the virtues and vices of prominent public figures.
 
The Court was right to refuse the endorsement of a government-granted monopoly on a phrase about a presidential candidate.
 
NRA v. Vullo
 
NRA v. Vullo – yet another unanimous opinion – cleared the way for the National Rifle Association to pursue a First Amendment claim against a New York insurance regulator who had twisted the arms of insurance companies and banks to blacklist the group.
 
Maria Vullo, former superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services, met with Lloyd’s of London executives in 2018 to bring to their attention technical infractions that plagued the affinity insurance market in New York, unrelated to NRA business. Vullo told the executives that she would be “less interested” in pursuing these infractions “so long as Lloyd’s ceased providing insurance to gun groups.” She added that she would “focus” her enforcement actions “solely” on the syndicates with ties to the NRA, “and ignore other syndicates writing similar policies.”
 
The Court found for the NRA, writing that, “[a]s alleged, Vullo’s communications with Lloyd’s can be reasonably understood as a threat or as an inducement. Either of those can be coercive.”
 
The Supreme Court’s opinion vacates the Second Circuit’s ruling to the contrary and remands the case to allow the lawsuit to continue.
 
As the Court wrote, “the critical takeaway is that the First Amendment prohibits government officials from wielding their power selectively to punish or suppress speech, directly or (as alleged here) through private intermediaries.” And we wholeheartedly agree – censorship by proxy is still government censorship.
 
Moody v. NetChoice

In one of two cases involving the nexus of government and social media, the Court seemed to punt on making a final decision on the constitutionality of laws from Florida and Texas restricting the ability of social media companies to regulate access to, and content on, their platforms.
 
Many commentators believed the Court would resolve a split between the Fifth Circuit (upholding a Texas law restricting various forms of content moderation and imposing other obligations on social media platforms) and the Eleventh Circuit (which upheld the injunction against a Florida law regulating content and other activities by social media platforms and by other large internet services and websites).
 
The Court’s ruling was expected to resolve the hot-button issue of whether Facebook and other major social media platforms can depost and deplatform. Instead, the Court found fault with the scope and precision of both the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuit opinions, vacating both of them and telling the lower courts to drill down on the varied details of both laws and be more precise as to the First Amendment issues posed by such different provisions. The opinion did, however, offer constructive guidance with ringing calls for stronger enforcement of First Amendment principles as they relate to the core activities of content moderation.
 
The opinion, written by Justice Elena Kagan, declared that: “On the spectrum of dangers to free expression, there are few greater than allowing the government to change the speech of private actors in order to achieve its own conception of speech nirvana.”

Murthy v. Missouri
 
In what looked to be a major case regarding the limits of government “jawboning” to get private actors to restrict speech, the Court instead decided that Missouri, Louisiana, and five individuals whose views were targeted by the government for expressing misinformation could not demonstrate a sufficient connection between the government’s action and their ultimate deplatforming by private actors.
 
Accordingly, the Court’s reasoning in this 6-3 decision is that the two states and five individuals lacked Article III standing to bring this suit. A case that could have defined the limits of government involvement in speech for the central media of our time was thus deflected on procedural grounds.
 
Justice Samuel Alito, in a fiery dissent signed by Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch, criticized the punt, calling Murthy v. Missouri “one of the most important free speech cases to reach this Court in years.” Fortunately, NRA v. Vullo, discussed above, sets a solid baseline against government efforts to pressure private actors to do the government’s dirty work in suppressing speech the government does not like. Later cases will, we hope, expand upon that base.
 
Secret communications from the government to the platforms to take down one post or another is inherently suspect under the Constitution and likely to lead us to a very un-American place. Let us hope that the Court selects a case in which it accepts the standing of the plaintiffs in order to give the government, and our society, a rule to live by.
 
Gonzalez v. Trevino
 
Protect The 1st has reported on the case of Sylvia Gonzalez, a former Castle Hills, Texas, council member who was arrested for allegedly tampering with government records back in 2019. In fact, she merely misplaced them, and was subsequently arrested, handcuffed, and detained in what was likely a retaliatory arrest for criticizing the city manager. In turn, Gonzalez brought suit.
 
Gonzalez’s complaint noted that she was the only person charged in the past 10 years under the state’s government records law for temporarily misplacing government documents. In 2019’s Nieves v. Bartlett, the Supreme Court found that a plaintiff can generally bring a federal civil rights claim alleging retaliation if they can show that police did not have probable cause. The Court also allowed suit by plaintiffs claiming retaliatory arrests if they could show that others who engaged in the same supposedly illegal conduct, but who did not engage in protected but disfavored speech, were not arrested.
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit threw out Gonzalez’s case, finding that she would have had to offer examples of those who had mishandled a government petition in the same way that she had but – unlike her – were not arrested. The Supreme Court, by contrast, found that, “[a]lthough the Nieves exception is slim, the demand for virtually identical and identifiable comparators goes too far.” The Court thus made it a bit easier for the victims of First Amendment retaliation to sue government officials who would punish people for disfavored speech.
 
The controversy will now go back to the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration.
 
***

While the Court avoided some potentially landmark decisions on procedural grounds, and offered a mixed bag of decisions concerning plaintiffs’ ability to obtain redress against potential First Amendment violations, the majority consistently showed a strong desire to protect First Amendment principles – shielding people and private organizations from government-compelled speech.

​When the U.S. Supreme Court put challenges to Florida and Texas laws regulating social media content moderation on the docket, it seemed assured that this would be one of the yeastiest cases in recent memory. The Supreme Court’s majority opinion came out Monday morning. At first glance, the yeast did not rise after all. These cases were remanded back to the appellate courts for a more thorough review.
 
But a closer look at the opinion shows the Court offering close guidance to the appellate court, with serious rebukes of the Texas law.
 
Anticipation was high for a more robust decision. The Court was to resolve a split between the Fifth Circuit, which upheld the Texas law prohibiting viewpoint discrimination by large social media platforms, while the Eleventh Circuit upheld the injunction against a Florida law regulating the deplatforming of political candidates. The Court’s ruling was expected to resolve once and for all the hot-button issue of whether Facebook and other major social media platforms can depost and deplatform.
 
Instead, the Court found fault with the scope and precision of both the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuit opinions, vacating both of them. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Elena Kagan, found that the lower courts failed to consider the extent to which their ruling would affect social media services other than Facebook’s News feed, including entirely different digital animals, such as direct messages. The Supreme Court criticized the lower courts for not asking how each permutation of social media would be impacted by the Texas and Florida laws.
 
Overall, the Supreme Court is telling the Fifth and Eleventh to drill down and spell out a more precise doctrine that will be a durable guide for First Amendment jurisprudence in social media content moderation. But today’s opinion also contained ringing calls for stronger enforcement of First Amendment principles.
 
The Court explicitly rebuked the Fifth Circuit for approval of the Texas law, “whose decision rested on a serious misunderstanding of the First Amendment precedent and principle.” It pointed to a precedent, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, in which the Court held that a newspaper could not be forced to run a political candidate’s reply to critical coverage.
 
The opinion is rife with verbal minefields that will likely doom the efforts of Texas and Florida to enforce their content moderation laws. For example:
 
“But this Court has many times held, in many contexts, that it is no job for government to decide what counts as the right balance of private expression – to ‘un-bias’ what it thinks is biased, rather than to leave such judgments to speakers and their audiences.”
 
The Court delved into the reality of content moderation, noting that the “prioritization of content” selected by algorithms from among billions of posts and videos in a customized news feed necessarily involves judgment. An approach without standards would turn any social media site into a spewing firehose of disorganized mush. The Court issued a brutal account of the Texas law, which prohibits blocking posts “based on viewpoint.” The Court wrote:
 
“But if the Texas law is enforced, the platforms could not – as they in fact do now – disfavor posts because they:
 

• support Nazi ideology;
• advocate for terrorism;
• espouse racism, Islamophobia, or anti-Semitism;
• encourage teenage suicide and self-injury;
• discourage the use of vaccines;
• advertise phony treatments for disease;
• advance false claims of election fraud.”

 
So what appeared on the surface to be a punt is really the Court’s call for a more fleshed out doctrine that respects the rights of private entities to manage their content without government interference. For a remand, this opinion is surprisingly strong – and strong in protection of the First Amendment.

​Trademarks support brand integrity in the marketplace, including through certain restrictions on commercial speech. But what about the use of a living person’s name, specifically “Trump Too Small”? (If you don’t know what this means, we’ll let you Google it.) Merchant Steve Elster wanted to register that phrase as a trademark to sell T-shirts. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office denied his application. A lower court, however, held that the government violated Elster’s First Amendment rights.
 
The Supreme Court today, in a unanimous decision, overturned that ruling and held that the phrase with the former president’s name cannot be trademarked. “Our courts have long recognized that trademarks containing names may be restricted,” Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for the majority. But such trademark restrictions, while “content-based” must be “viewpoint neutral.”
 
Justice Barrett wrote that the “government can reasonably determine that, on the whole, protecting marks that include another living person’s name without consent risks undermining the goals of trademark.” This is in keeping with a 1946 trademark law that bans the registration of any trademark that uses a living person’s name without their written consent.
 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor in a concurrence wrote that First Amendment considerations should be applied. She emphasized that First Amendment constraints can be respected without undermining traditional trademark rules.
 
Both sides have a point in law and in principle. Not only did the Court protect the name of a living person, it also refused to enforce a government monopoly on a phrase about a presidential candidate. To take a more generic example, suppose someone trademarked a phrase about Trump or Biden being too old, or too extreme, or too apt to take vacations. Imagine the complexities of a marketplace with thousands of products engaging in a national discussion about presidential candidates with select phrases off limits to anyone who didn’t want to pay or seek written permission to use them.
 
The Court was right to prevent commercial considerations from scissoring out pieces of the national debate. As a result of the Court’s decision, the public remains free to debate – in print, on T-shirts, on mugs, or on TV – the Goldilocks question of whether Trump is too small, too large, or just right. Now that is free speech.  

​The media is abuzz today about the unanimous ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court that rejected a challenge to the Food and Drug Administration’s regulation for the use of the abortion drug mifepristone. What’s overlooked, however, is that the Court’s opinion, authored by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, firmly nails down the conscience right of physicians and healers to abstain from participating in abortions and prescribing mifepristone.
 
This opinion firms up national policy on conscience rights. At a time when some in the federal bureaucracy and the states seem determined to chip away at conscience rights, the Court’s opinion will act as a concrete bollard to block further efforts at encroachment.
 
Justice Kavanaugh wrote that the Church Amendments, which prohibit the government from imposing requirements that violate the conscience rights of physicians and institutions, “allow doctors and other healthcare personnel to ‘refuse to perform or assist’ an abortion without punishment or discrimination from their employers.” The Court’s opinion also repeatedly quotes the Biden Administration in affirming that “federal conscience protections encompass ‘the doctor’s beliefs rather than particular procedures’ … As the Government points out, that strong protection for conscience remains true even in a so-called healthcare desert, where other doctors are not readily available.”
 
The opinion notes as a matter of law and fact that federal conscience laws have protected pro-life doctors ever since the FDA approved mifepristone in 2000. The pro-life plaintiffs in this case argued that the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) might be interpreted to require individual emergency room doctors to participate in emergency abortions. But the administration rejected that reading of EMTALA, and the Court declared today “we agree with the Government’s view of EMTALA on that point.”
 
These declarations are not as sensational as upholding a drug that is used for the majority of pregnancy terminations. From now on, however, any effort to restrict or violate the conscience rights of healers will go against the declared intent of the Biden Administration and the unanimous opinion of all nine Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.

“At the heart of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause is the recognition that viewpoint discrimination is uniquely harmful to a free and democratic society.”
 
This declaration comes from a unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, that clears the way for the National Rifle Association to pursue a First Amendment claim against a New York insurance regulator who had twisted the arms of insurance companies and banks to blacklist the Second Amendment advocacy group. The NRA was represented by Protect The 1st Senior Legal Advisor Eugene Volokh, as well as the American Civil Liberties Union.
 
Maria T. Vullo, superintendent of New York’s Department of Financial Services, had earlier found that NRA’s affinity insurance benefits for members were constructed and sold in a way that violated New York law. Vullo then pushed beyond her regulatory purview into an attempt to punish speech.
 
Vullo met with Lloyd’s of London executives in 2018 to bring to their attention technical infractions that plagued the affinity insurance market in New York, unrelated to NRA business. Vullo told the executives that she would be “less interested” in pursuing these infractions “so long as Lloyd’s ceased providing insurance to gun groups.” She added that she would “focus” her enforcement actions “solely” on the syndicates with ties to the NRA, “and ignore other syndicates writing similar policies.” Vullo followed up with guidance letters to insurance companies and financial services firms extolling the severance of ties with the NRA as a way for companies to fulfill their “corporate social responsibility.”
 
“As alleged, Vullo’s communications with Lloyd’s can be reasonably understood as a threat or as an inducement,” the Court found. “Either of those can be coercive.” The Court quoted a Seventh Circuit opinion regarding a sheriff who interfered with a website by coercing its payment-services providers: “The analogy is to killing a person by cutting off his oxygen rather than by shooting him.”
 
The core of the Court’s opinion rested on Bantam Books v. Sullivan, which involved a Rhode Island state commission that sought to censor books by prohibiting distributors from moving targeted books to stores. Compliance was assured by police offers dispatched to the distribution companies to check their records. The Supreme Court held that the commission’s actions amounted to censorship. In this case, the Court found:
 
“Ultimately, Bantam Books stands for the principle that a government official cannot do indirectly what she is barred from doing directly: A government official cannot coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on her behalf.”
 
The Supreme Court’s opinion vacates the Second Circuit’s reversal of a lower court opinion, and remands it for adjudication under this ruling. When that case is heard again, the judges of the Second Circuit will have these words of this unanimous opinion ringing in their ears:
 
“[T]he critical takeaway is that the First Amendment prohibits government officials from wielding their power selectively to punish or suppress speech, directly or (as alleged here) through private intermediaries.”

​Can a protest organizer be held civilly liable for the unlawful actions of another at a demonstration? That’s the question at issue in McKesson v. Doe, one with significant implications for protected speech.
 
The case’s circuitous journey through the courts started in 2016, when an anonymous Louisiana law enforcement officer was struck with a “rock-like” object hurled by an unknown person at a Black Lives Matter protest. This was a despicable act of violence that was in no sense expressive speech. Those who commit such acts of violence must be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. But what is the liability of those who organize a peaceful protest that is infiltrated by the violent?
 
Plaintiff John Doe brought suit against activist DeRay McKesson, who organized the event, on the theory that McKesson’s role as the event organizer encompassed a duty to protect everyone present. In 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s decision against McKesson, which upheld a novel theory from Doe of “negligent protest.” The Court remanded the case to the Louisiana Supreme Court, instructing it to analyze whether state law actually provides for negligence liability in such situations. This decision seems to ignore precedent in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, which held that “[c]ivil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a group, some members of which committed acts of violence.”
 
The Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately reached the conclusion that state tort law does, in fact, provide Doe with a cause of action. As a result, the Fifth Circuit reinstated its ruling and the case returned again to the highest court in the land.
 
Notably, the Supreme Court ruled in the intervening years in Counterman v. Colorado that a subjective, mens rea standard (meaning specific intent, not just negligence) is required for a finding of liability in lawsuits that seek to punish speech. Justice Kagan wrote that the “First Amendment precludes punishment, whether civil or criminal, unless the speaker’s words were ‘intended’ (not just likely) to produce imminent disorder.”
 
Accordingly, in an order rejecting certiorari in the McKesson case earlier this month, Justice Sotomayor strongly implied that the Court has already settled this question of law. She wrote, “Although the Fifth Circuit did not have the benefit of this Court’s recent decision in Counterman when it issued its opinion, the lower courts now do. I expect them to give full and fair consideration to arguments regarding Counterman’s impact in any future proceedings in this case.”
 
The Supreme Court clearly wants to allow some deference to state law. However, it seems entirely reasonable to require a showing of intent in situations involving the random outbreak of violence at protests. Failure to do so could have a significant, chilling effect on political speech. If civil liability can be assigned for merely organizing an event, then we’re likely to see a lot less civil discourse in the future.
 
Journalists have similar concerns. As the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press explains, protecting against liability for the “uncoordinated,” lawless actions of others “is a critical safeguard for reporters who attend tumultuous events where violence may break out — political rallies, say, or mass demonstrations — in order to bring the public the news.” 
 
It remains possible the Fifth Circuit may reevaluate its ruing in light of Counterman, but it’s disappointing that the Supreme Court declined to weigh-in in a meaningful way. When states start imposing low liability thresholds on protestors, it jeopardizes First Amendment protections for all of us.

​The U.S. Supreme Court is set to address several critical free-speech cases this session related to speech rights in the context of social media. One of those questions was recently settled, with the Court ruling on whether an official who blocks a member of the public from their social media account is engaging in a state action or acting as a private citizen. Answer: It depends on the context.
 
Writing for a unanimous Court in the case of Lindke v. Freed, Justice Amy Coney Barrett reaffirmed that members of the public can sue a public official where their actions are “attributable to the State” (consistent with U.S.C. §1983). In order to make that determination, the Court issued a new test, holding that:
 
“A public official who prevents someone from commenting on the official’s social-media page engages in state action under §1983 only if the official both (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the State’s behalf on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when speaking in the relevant social-media posts.”
 
This is a holistic analysis, consistent with the Protect The 1st amicus brief filed in O’Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier. We argued that “no single factor is required to establish state action; rather, all relevant factors must be considered together to determine whether an account was operated under color of law.”
 
That case, along with the Court’s banner case, Lindke v. Freed, is now vacated and remanded for new proceedings consistent with the Court’s novel test. When, as the Court acknowledges, “a government official posts about job-related topics on social media, it can be difficult to tell whether the speech is official or private.” So the Court set down rules. A state actor must have the actual authority – traced back to “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” – to speak on behalf of the state. However, should an account be clearly designated as “personal,” an official “would be entitled to a heavy (though not irrebuttable) presumption that all of the posts on [their] page were personal.”
 
In Lindke v. Freed, the public official’s Facebook account was neither designated as “personal” nor “official.” Therefore, a fact-specific analysis must be undertaken “in which posts’ content and function are the most important considerations.” As the Court explains:
 
“A post that expressly invokes state authority to make an announcement not available elsewhere is official, while a post that merely repeats or shares otherwise available information is more likely personal. Lest any official lose the right to speak about public affairs in his personal capacity, the plaintiff must show that the official purports to exercise state authority in specific posts.”
 
When a public official blocks a citizen from commenting on any of his posts on a “mixed-use” social media account, he risks liability for those that are professional in nature. Justice Barrett writes that a “public official who fails to keep personal posts in a clearly designated personal account therefore exposes himself to greater potential liability.”
 
It's always been good policy to keep official and private accounts separate. The public must be able to have access to government-issued information, whether through a social media account or a public notice posted on the door of a government building. Moreover, citizens should be able to speak on issues of public concern, whether through Facebook or in a public square. Officials – presidents and former presidents included – should take note.

​In November, we reported on a controversy in the San Antonio suburb of Castle Hills, which epitomizes the growing trend of using the law to punish disfavored speech. The Supreme Court’s recent argument reveals several justices showing solidarity with the arrested party.
 
Here are the facts: Sylvia Gonzalez was elected to a seat on the Castle Hills city council in 2019. During her first council meeting, a resident submitted a petition to remove the city manager – a petition spearheaded by Gonzalez – and it wound up in Gonzalez’s personal binder of documents. After being asked for the petition by the mayor, Gonzalez found it among her effects and handed it over.
 
The mayor initiated an investigation into Gonzalez under a Texas statute providing that “[a] person commits an offense if he […] intentionally destroys, conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the verity, legibility, or availability of a governmental record.” A warrant was subsequently served against Gonzalez, who was taken to jail and resigned from the council in humiliation. 
 
Gonzalez claims her arrest was retaliatory – trumped-up charges based on a little enforced statute and stemming from her support for removing the city manager. At issue is a legal doctrine known as the “jaywalking exception,” which guards against law enforcement arresting people for protected speech under the guise of some other petty statutory violation.
 
In Nieves v. Bartlett, the Supreme Court held that retaliatory arrest claims may proceed where probable cause exists – as it technically did with Gonzalez – but a plaintiff is arrested in a situation where officers “typically exercise their discretion not to do so.”
 
In such circumstances, a plaintiff must present “objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.”
 
Attempting to satisfy the exception, Gonzalez presented evidence that not one of 215 grand jury felony indictments in Bexar County under a tampering statute over the preceding decade involved an allegation remotely similar to the one levied against her. The Fifth Circuit found this insufficient, holding that Nieves requires comparative evidence of individuals who engaged in the “same” criminal conduct but were not arrested. In other words, going by the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, Gonzalez would have to find specific instances of people who misplaced government documents but were not arrested. How would anyone even find such instances? The Fifth Circuit tasked her with proving a negative.
 
If the Fifth Circuit’s decision is left in place, Protect The 1st explained it would make it easier for law enforcement or other government officials to punish critics for expressing protected speech based on novel applications of relatively minor criminal laws. It also sets the evidentiary bar so high that few could ever hope to prove their case in a court of law.
 
During oral arguments, several justices seemed to agree. Justice Gorsuch, speaking about the many unenforced statutes on the books, said:
 
“You're saying they can all sit there unused, except for one person who alleges that ‘I was the only person in America who's ever been prosecuted for this because I dared express a view protected by the First Amendment,’ and that's not actionable?”
 
Justice Kagan, clearly thinking along the same lines, said the plaintiff has “solid objective evidence” that they were treated differently than similarly situated persons, noting:
 
“You should be able to say, ‘They've never charged somebody with this kind of crime before and I don't have to go find a person who has engaged in the same conduct.’”
 
Justice Jackson made similar remarks, while Chief Justice Roberts, who authored Nieves, seemed to take the other side, questioning whether expanding the evidentiary basis for refuting probable cause is consistent with the Court’s earlier ruling. It “seems to me to be inconsistent,” he said. Justice Kavanaugh likewise noted, "If you intentionally stole a government document at a government proceeding — that's not nothing.”
 
Why Gonzalez would want to hide a petition she helped organize is far from clear. Her conduct was so benign that the only inference one can reasonably draw is that she was the target of retaliation. Protect The 1st hopes the Court sides with her and makes it clear they will hold public officials accountable for weaponizing the law against those who speak their minds.

​The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling against the Apache Stronghold, unless overturned, will allow the Apache’s Oak Flat religious site to be destroyed by a private mining company.
 
These lands have long been recognized by the U.S. government as the singular, sacred site of the Apaches’ worship. Set to be transformed into a crater twice as deep as the Washington Monument, not only is Oak Flat in danger of being destroyed, but with it the religion that centers around that site.
 
The least we can say is that this one was painfully close, a 6-5 split decision. The Ninth Circuit asserted that the transfer of this land, revered as the center of the Apache religion for centuries, did not (somehow) even trigger an inquiry under, much less violate, violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. That Act requires strict scrutiny of any law that burdens religious freedom. Judge Mary H. Murguia issued a stinging rebuke of the majority in her dissent:
 
“We are asked to decide whether the utter destruction of Chí’chil Biłdagoteel, a site sacred to the Western Apaches since time immemorial, is a ‘substantial burden’ on the Apaches’ sincere religious exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4. Under any ordinary understanding of the English language, the answer must be yes.”
 
Unless the U.S. Supreme Court grants cert. and overturns the Ninth Circuit’s unduly narrow conception of what constitutes a “burden” on religion, the Oak Flat religious site will become one of the nation’s largest copper ore mines, the result of a midnight deal in Congress. This scenic place of worship will become an ugly pit.
 
What was the reasoning of the majority? This en banc decision relied on a U.S. Supreme Court case, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n (1988), which held that government disposition of property does not violate the Free Exercise Clause so long as it “compels no behavior contrary to … belief.” It is doubtful that the Ninth Circuit’s broad reading of that statement remains valid, if it ever was. If barring people from entering a place of worship under COVID restrictions raises serious free exercise problems, it is hard to see how completely destroying a religion’s essential place of worship does not at least impose a burden sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny under RFRA.
 
People of all faiths should be concerned that the circuit court took such a miserly view of the free exercise of religion. Imagine the outcry from Catholics if the government decided to turn the Basilica of the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception into dust. Or the outcry of American Jews if a midnight deal in Congress targeted the Touro Synagogue in Rhode Island – the oldest still standing in the United States, and where George Washington welcomed Jews into the heart of America – to become a seemingly bottomless pit. The notion that such acts would not even “burden” the exercise of religion goes well beyond the implausible and into the absurd.
 
We hope the Justices of the Supreme Court dwell on the words of our first President, who famously wrote to the congregants of the Touro Synagogue: “Every one shall sit in safety under his own vine and fig tree, and there shall be none to make him afraid.” Can we say that is true for everyone in our country now? To again quote the dissenting judges, “the destruction of the Apaches’ sacred site will prevent worshipers from ever again exercising their religion.”
 
Luke Goodrich, senior counsel at Becket who represented the Apache, tweeted: “We fully expect SCOTUS to take this case, confirm the plain meaning of federal law, and hold that Native Americans are entitled to the same protection of their religious freedom that every other American enjoys.” Protect The 1st is also hopeful the Court will see that the Apaches’ free exercise of religion is inextricable from the preservation of this uniquely holy place.
 
For the Supreme Court to review this case would be a prayer answered.

​In this age of “corporate social responsibility,” can a government regulator mount a pressure campaign to persuade businesses to blacklist unpopular speakers and organizations? This is the central question the U.S. Supreme Court faces in National Rifle Association v. Vullo.  
 
Here's the background on this case: Maria Vullo, then-superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services, used her regulatory clout over banks and insurance companies in New York to strongarm them into denying financial services to the National Rifle Association. This campaign was waged under an earnest-sounding directive to consider the “reputational risk” of doing business with the NRA and firearms manufacturers.
​
Vullo imposed consent orders on three insurers that they never again provide policies to the NRA. She issued guidance that encouraged financial services firms to “sever ties” with the NRA and to “continue evaluating and managing their risks, including reputational risks” that may arise from their dealings with the NRA or similar gun promotion organizations.
 
“When a regulator known to slap multi-million fines on companies issues ‘guidance,’ it is not taken as a suggestion,” observed Gene Schaerr, PT1st general counsel. “It’s sounds more like, ‘nice store you’ve got here, it’d be shame if anything happened to it.’”
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a lower court’s decision that found that Vullo used threats to force the companies she regulates to cut ties with the NRA. The Second Circuit reasoned that: “The general backlash against gun promotion groups and businesses … could (and likely does) directly affect the New York financial markets; as research shows, a business's response to social issues can directly affect its financial stability in this age of enhanced corporate social responsibility.”
​
You don’t have to be an enthusiast of the National Rifle Association to see the problems with the Second Circuit’s reasoning. Aren’t executives of New York’s financial services firms better qualified to determine what does and doesn’t “directly affect financial stability” than a regulator in Albany? How aggressive will government become in using its almost unlimited ability to buy or subpoena data of a target organization to get its way? Can government stymie the speech rights of a national advocacy organization with 5 million supporters?
 
Even if you take Vullo’s justifications at face value, the government cannot override the Bill of Rights to slightly reduce the rate of corporate bankruptcies. The dangers of a nebulous, government-imposed “corporate social responsibility standard” is a grave threat to all constitutionally protected individual rights.
 
Protect The 1st is far from alone in this view. The ACLU, which also filed a brief in favor of the NRA, writes: “This is a critically important First Amendment fight: if government officials can pressure the businesses they regulate to blacklist the NRA in New York, then officials in other states can punish other advocacy organizations in the same way – including the ACLU itself.” Other not aligned with the NRA are alarmed as well. James P. Corcoran, former New York Superintendent of Insurance, in his amicus brief writes that while he does not support the National Rifle Association, he believes “that the threat to free speech at issue here could equally harm groups aligned with his own political views if left unchecked."
 
For all these reasons, we urge the Supreme Court in this case to put the First Amendment first.

​They say, “misery acquaints a man with strange bedfellows,” and to most followers of the national discourse, no pair of institutions could make for an odder couple than the National Rifle Association and the American Civil Liberties Union. Yet in keeping with its principles, the ACLU has decided to represent the NRA before the Supreme Court, and it’s causing some consternation within the group.
 
The ACLU of Texas announced on December 15 that it would not join with its national organization in siding with the NRA’s suit against New York’s Department of Financial Services. They join the New York Civil Liberties Union, who said in a statement: "The NRA is among the most powerful advocacy organizations in the country, with resources to secure the nation’s finest lawyers. It does not need the ACLU to volunteer for that job."
 
The case, National Rifle Association v. Vullo, asks whether former New York State Department of Financial Services Superintendent Maria Vullo violated the First Amendment by encouraging banks and insurance companies to stop doing business with the NRA following the 2018 Parkland, Florida high school shooting. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled against the NRA, arguing that “government officials have a right — indeed, a duty — to address issues of public concern.”
 
The NRA, which is also represented by Brewer Attorneys and Counselors as well as constitutional scholar and Protect the First Senior Advisor Eugene Volokh, believes the case was erroneously decided. In their certiorari petition, they write:
 
“The Second Circuit’s opinion below gives state officials free rein to financially blacklist their political opponents – from gun-rights groups to abortion-rights groups, to environmentalist groups, and beyond. It lets state officials ‘threaten[] regulated institutions with costly investigations, increased regulatory scrutiny and penalties should they fail to discontinue their arrangements with’ a controversial speaker, on the ground that disfavored political speech poses a regulable ‘reputational risk.’ … It also permits selective investigations and penalties targeting business arrangements with disfavored speakers, even where the regulator premises its hostility explicitly on an entity’s political speech and treats leniently, or exempts, identical transactions with customers who lack controversial views.”
 
For their part, the ACLU has made clear that they disagree with the NRA’s overarching policy goals. In a statement, they said: “The ACLU does not support the NRA or its mission. We signed on as co-counsel because public officials shouldn’t be allowed to abuse the powers of the office to blacklist an organization just because they oppose an organization’s political views.”
 
We could not agree more, and the NRA makes a compelling argument that Vullo overstepped her bounds. In fact, the Supreme Court has already ruled in Bantam Books v. Sullivan from 1963 that the government violates fundamental First Amendment rights when it targets an organization through “informal sanctions,” including “coercion, persuasion and intimidation.”
 
We applaud the ACLU for standing up for what’s right, even – and especially – when it’s hard to do so. We look forward to further developments in this case.

If you follow this blog you are probably concerned about growing ignorance of, or contempt for, the First Amendment, as well as an increasing appetite for weaponizing the law to punish disfavored speech. A case out of Castle Hills, Texas, is illustrative of this weaponization.
 
While some underlying motives are in dispute, the facts – per the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals – are stark. Sylvia Gonzalez was elected to a seat on the Castle Hills city council in 2019. After learning that many of her constituents were unhappy with the performance of the city manager, Gonzalez helped organize a petition for that official’s removal. During her first city council meeting, a resident of Castle Hills submitted the petition, which somehow wound up in Gonzalez’s personal binder of documents. After being asked for it by the mayor, Gonzalez found the petition among her effects and handed it over during that same meeting.
 
The mayor initiated an investigation of Gonzalez under a Texas Penal Code statute that provides that “[a] person commits an offense if he […] intentionally destroys, conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the verity, legibility, or availability of a governmental record.” A warrant was subsequently served against Gonzalez, who was taken to jail and later resigned from her post.
 
Why Gonzalez would want to hide a petition she helped organize is far from clear. Gonzalez argues it was an honest mistake. The warrant affidavit speculates that Gonzalez hid it because a resident claimed she convinced them to sign it under false pretenses.
 
What is not disputable is that Gonzalez was arrested, handcuffed, and detained for the purported crime of placing a document in her folder during a meeting. The 72-year-old Gonzalez claims her arrest was retaliatory, stemming from her support for removing the city manager.
 
Sylvia Gonzalez brought suit in U.S. district court, alleging two counts of retaliation. The city respondents, in turn, filed a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, a legal doctrine that generally protects government officials from lawsuits unless it can be shown they violated a “clearly established” statutory or constitutional right. The city officials argued that the existence of probable cause rendered Gonzalez’s claims moot.
 
The district court, for its part, denied the government’s motion to dismiss based on a 2019 Supreme Court opinion in Nieves v. Bartlett. The court held that retaliatory arrest claims may proceed where probable cause exists (as it technically did with Gonzalez), but in cases in which officers “typically exercise their discretion not to do so.”
 
This is what is more commonly known as the “jaywalking exception,” and it guards against law enforcement arresting people for petty crimes for less than noble purposes. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor admitted in her memoir, “I jaywalk with the best of them.” Everyone jaywalks, but very few are actually arrested for it. It is an infraction, however, that could be used as pretext to arrest someone.
 
In such circumstances, the U.S. Supreme Court held, a plaintiff must present “objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.”
 
Gonzalez, attempting to satisfy the Nieves exception, presented evidence that not one of 215 grand jury felony indictments in Bexar County under a tampering statute over the preceding decade involved an allegation remotely similar to the one levied against her. The district court found this “objective evidence” sufficient.
 
In the appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that Nieves requires comparative evidence of individuals who engaged in the “same” criminal conduct but were not arrested. In other words, going by the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, Gonzalez would have to find specific instances of people who misplaced government documents but were not arrested.
 
If the Fifth Circuit’s decision is left in place, it would make it easier for law enforcement or other government officials to punish critics for expressing protected speech based on novel applications of relatively minor criminal laws. It also sets the evidentiary bar so high that few could ever hope to prove their case in a court of law.
 
Gonzalez’s conduct was so benign that the only inference one can reasonably draw is that she was indeed the target of retaliation. That reasonable inference standard is what is required to overcome a qualified immunity defense. But varying interpretations of Nieves stand in Sylvia Gonzalez’s way.
 
A brief supporting cert from the Cato Institute, American Civil Liberties Union, and the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression seems to have enticed the U.S. Supreme Court to hear this case. The Court has a historic opportunity to bring clarity to qualified immunity and resolve a circuit split. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have interpreted Nieves to allow more flexibility in the type of evidence plaintiffs must show in making a retaliation claim. The Fifth Circuit, unfortunately, has not.
 
The Fifth Circuit’s standard would all but enfranchise the most egregious abuses. At a time when liberals and conservatives worry about the weaponization of the law, a reasonable standard to hold officials to account for abuses is needed now more than ever.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in March issued a controversial opinion in Twitter v. Garland that the Electronic Frontier Foundation calls “a new low in judicial deference to classification and national security, even against the nearly inviolable First Amendment right to be free of prior restraints against speech.”
 
X (née Twitter) is appealing this opinion before the U.S. Supreme Court. Whatever you think of X or Elon Musk, this case is an important inflection point for free speech and government surveillance accountability.
 
Among many under-acknowledged aspects of our national security apparatus is the regularity with which the government – through FBI national security letters and secretive FISA orders – demands customer information from online platforms like Facebook and X. In 2014, Twitter sought to publish a report documenting the number of surveillance requests it received from the government the prior year. It was a commendable effort from a private actor to provide a limited measure of transparency in government monitoring of its customers, offering some much-needed public oversight in the process. The FBI and DOJ, of course, denied Twitter’s efforts, and over the past ten years the company has kept up the fight, continuing under its new ownership.
 
At issue is X’s desire to publish the total number of surveillance requests it receives, omitting any identifying details about the targets of those requests. This purpose is noble. It would provide users an important metric in surveillance trends not found in the annual Statistical Transparency Report of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Nevertheless, in April 2020, a federal district court ruled against the company’s efforts at transparency. In March 2023, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s ruling, sweeping away a substantial body of prior restraint precedent in the process.
 
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit carved out a novel exemption to long established prior restraint limitations: “government restrictions on the disclosure of information transmitted confidentially as part of a legitimate government process.”
 
The implications of this new category of censorable speech are incalculable. To quote the EFF amicus brief:
 
“The consequences of the lower court’s decision are severe and far-reaching. It carves out, for the first time, a whole category of prior restraints that receive no more scrutiny than subsequent punishments for speech—expanding officials’ power to gag virtually anyone who interacts with a government agency and wishes to speak publicly about that interaction.”
 
This is an existential speech issue, far beyond concerns of party or politics. If the ruling is allowed to stand, it sets up a convenient standard for the government to significantly expand its censorship of speech – whether of the left, right or center. Again, quoting EFF, “[i]ndividuals who had interactions with law enforcement or border officials—such as someone being interviewed as a witness to a crime or someone subjected to police misconduct—could be barred from telling their family or going to the press.”
 
Moreover, the ruling is totally incongruous with a body of law that goes back a century. Prior restraints on speech are the most disfavored of speech restrictions because they freeze speech in its entirety (rather than subsequently punishing it). As such, prior restraint is typically subject to the most exacting level of judicial scrutiny. Yet the Ninth Circuit applied a lower level of strict scrutiny, while entirely ignoring the procedural protections typically afforded to plaintiffs in prior restraint cases. As such, the “decision enables the government to unilaterally impose prior restraints on speech about matters of public concern, while restricting recipients’ ability to meaningfully test these gag orders in court.”
 
We stand with X and EFF in urging the Supreme Court to promptly address this alarming development.

In April, Protect The 1st reported on two pending cases before the Supreme Court, O’Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier and Lindke v. Freed, addressing the question of what constitutes a public forum on Facebook. In both lawsuits, public officials blocked criticism from constituents on their social media sites; in both instances, the constituents sued.
 
Now, the U.S. Supreme Court is set to deliberate the urgent question: When does a personal account become public? This is the first time the Court will address the difference between public and private fora against the backdrop of the digital age. In our Protect The First Foundation amicus brief in O’Connor-Ratcliff, we write:
 
“The state action question in this case implicates two vital First Amendment rights: that of citizens to access government fora, and that of public officials to control with whom and how they communicate when they speak in their private capacities. As this case demonstrates, those rights are in tension when it is not immediately apparent whether a government representative is operating a social media account in her public or private capacity.”
 
The petitioners argue that they should be able to block constituents from their social media profiles, on which they discussed government business, as long as their actions aren’t affirmatively required as one of their government duties and they don’t explicitly invoke state authority.
 
In short, they wish to summon their own First Amendment rights to silence their critics in a public forum.
 
For many years now, Members of Congress have segregated their personal and public accounts. They are correct in doing so, and this situation shows why. The legal issue is at what point does a public official’s actions constitute “state action.” And here, the officials’ social media pages are draped in their status as public servants – even though they began as personal campaign pages. With great regularity, they post about official government business and use their accounts to facilitate their government duties. As such, they cannot then claim that when they operate those accounts they are private actors.
 
Government officials, like everyone else, have First Amendment rights. But they cannot have their cake and eat it too by speaking with the authority of government while erasing the access of their critics to that speech.
 
The fact is that we must – now – delineate the limits and boundaries of social media’s power in the context of public service. If you are a public official, you cannot – must not – be able to silence your critics in a public forum under the auspices of your own First Amendment rights.
 
Sorry. Sometimes you just have to take the heat.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled 6-3 in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis to uphold the First Amendment right of a digital designer not to be compelled to write, design, and create websites that violate her beliefs.
 
Protect The 1st applauds the Court’s decision and the reasoning behind it. Despite the religious roots of the appellant’s beliefs, this is fundamentally a case about the free exercise of speech. The Court correctly decided that web design is an expressive industry, and that no writer should be compelled to write something to which they object.
 
Lorie Smith owns 303 Creative LLC, a web design company she wanted to expand into the wedding industry. But 303 Creative’s expansion ran headlong into the State of Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), which would have required her to design websites for same-sex weddings in violation of her religious beliefs. Smith and 303 Creative lost before a U.S. District Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals before being heard in oral arguments before the Supreme Court last year.
 
In a ringing defense of speech, Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote in the majority opinion of the inviolability of free speech under the Constitution. The majority opinion states:
 
“A hundred years ago, Ms. Smith might have furnished her services using pen and paper. Those services are no less protected speech today because they are conveyed with a ‘voice’ that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.”
 
The Court noted that the Tenth Circuit, which ruled against Smith, had reasoned that Smith’s speech was involved in this case, but that “Colorado could compel speech from Ms. Smith consistent with the Constitution.” The majority concludes that First Amendment precedents “teach otherwise.”

For those who are inclined to see this ruling as the beginning of a discriminatory approach to services, Justice Gorsuch fleshed out the consequences if the Court were to uphold the lower court’s logic.
 
“Under Colorado’s logic, the government may compel anyone who speaks for pay on a given topic to accept all commissions on that same topic—no matter the underlying message—if the topic somehow implicates a customer’s statutorily protected trait … Taken seriously, that principle would allow the government to force all manner of artists, speechwriters, and others whose services involve speech to speak what they do not believe on pain of penalty.”
 
Justice Gorsuch then painted a convincingly realistic dystopian outcome for people on all sides, quoting a dissenting judge on the Tenth Circuit.
 
“The government could require ‘an unwilling Muslim movie director to make a film with a Zionist message,’ or ‘an atheist muralist to accept a commission celebrating Evangelical zeal,’ so long as they would make films or murals for other members of the public with different messages. Equally, the government could force a male website designer married to another man to design websites for an organization that advocates against same-sex marriage.”
 
Justice Gorsuch made it clear that there are sharp limits for this ruling, one that pertains to speech and expressive industries.
 
“[W]e do not question the vital role public accommodation laws play in realizing the civil rights of all Americans …”
 
Quoting a prior ruling that public accommodation laws “vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments,” Justice Gorsuch noted that Smith’s “voice is unique; so is everyone’s. But that hardly means a State may coopt an individual’s voice for its own purposes.”
​
Protect The 1st agrees with the Court’s reasoning and urges people on all sides to take the same cool look at the consequences that would have flowed from an alternate ruling.
 
One doesn’t have to agree with a particular belief to agree with the principle that speech should never be coerced. The Court’s opinion provides a narrow exception, one to be kept within the boundaries of the exercise of speech.

Erik Jaffe, PT1's Policy Director and PRI adjunct fellow in legal studies and one of America’s top constitutional lawyers, joins us for his annual preview of the hot Supreme Court cases that will be handed down before the end of the term.  They discuss cases involving private property rights, tech, college admissions policies, legislative gerrymandering, and more.  They also explore the controversy over Supreme Court ethics and the mystery of why we still haven’t found the Supreme Court “leaker.”

​In an amicus brief before the U.S. Supreme Court earlier this year, Protect The 1st told the Court that curtailing Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 “would cripple the free speech and association that the internet currently fosters.” Consistent with that recommendation, the Court today declined various invitations to curtail that law’s important protections for free speech.  
 
Joining with former Sen. Rick Santorum, we demonstrated in our amicus brief that Section 230 – which offers liability protection to computer-services providers that host third-party speech – is essential to enabling focused discussions and keeping the internet from devolving into a meaningless word soup.
 
“If platforms faced liability for merely organizing and displaying user content in a user-friendly manner, they would likely remove or block controversial – but First Amendment protected – speech from their algorithmic recommendations,” PT1st declared.
 
We stated that a vibrant, open discussion must include a degree of protection for sponsors of internet conversations. With Congress always able to amend Section 230 if new challenges necessitate a change in policy, there is no need for the Supreme Court to rewrite that law.
 
The Supreme Court had shown recent interest in reexamining Section 230. That could still happen, but the two cases that were before the Court turned out to be weak vessels for that review. On Thursday, the Court declined to consider reinterpreting this law in Gonzalez v. Google and Twitter v. Taamneh, finding that the underlying complaints were weak. The Court neither expressly affirmed nor rejected our approach, leaving these issues open for another day and another case. 
 
Protect The 1st will remain vigilant against future challenges to Section 230 that could undermine the freedom of speech online.

​Protect The 1st on Wednesday filed a reply brief answering claims from the University of Alabama against our petition for the U.S. Supreme Court to hear Keister v. Bell.
 
We told the court that this case is an “excellent vehicle” to resolve a split in appellate courts on the proper analysis of what constitutes a public forum. The case revolves around the right of evangelist Rodney Keister to stand on city-owned sidewalks on a public street in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, near the University of Alabama. The UA campus police enforced an agreement with the city to clamp down on expressive activity at that portion of the sidewalk, warning Keister not to preach on this portion of a public sidewalk.
 
At stake is the right of Americans to use public spaces to engage in speech – a practice that was embedded in American life long before colonials handed out Thomas Paine’s Common Sense pamphlets. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, recognizes that “traditional public fora are open for expressive activity regardless of the government intent.” On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit ruled against Keister with a multifactor balancing test and allowed the University to forbid expressive activity on the sidewalk.
 
Protect The 1st wrote: “Even assuming the propriety of a balancing test, the Eleventh Circuit’s circular reliance on the University’s intent to suppress speech was an improper fulcrum for converting the most quintessential of traditional public fora into a limited forum allowing suppression.”
 
Protect The 1st is hopeful the Court will take this chance to resolve a split in the courts and uphold the traditional right of Americans to use public property for expression and speech.

​Observers of the U.S. Supreme Court have long wondered if Justice Clarence Thomas would lead his colleagues to hold internet companies that post users’ content to the same liability standard as a publisher.
 
In a concurrence last year, Justice Thomas questioned Section 230 – a statute that provides immunity for internet companies that post user content. Justice Thomas noted that the “right to cut off speech lies most powerfully in the hands of private digital platforms. The extent to which that power matters for purposes of the First Amendment and the extent to which that power could lawfully be modified raise interesting and important questions.”
 
In the case heard today, Gonzalez v. Google, the family of a woman murdered by terrorists in Paris is suing Google not for a direct post, but for a YouTube algorithm that temporarily “recommended” ISIS material after the crime. In oral argument, Justice Thomas posed a more skeptical note.
 
“If you call information and ask for al-Baghdadi’s number and they give it to you, I don’t see how that’s aiding and abetting,” he said. Justices returned to precedents about lending libraries and bookstores not being held accountable for the content in their books. 
 
Protect The 1st joined with former Sen. Rick Santorum in an amici brief before the Court arguing that Section 230 protections are absolutely needed to sustain a thriving online marketplace of ideas. Social media companies make a good faith effort to screen out dangerous content, but with billions of messages, perfection is impossible.
 
Google attorney Lisa Blatt brought this point home in a colorful way, noting that a negative ruling would “either force sites to take down any content that was remotely problematic or to allow all content no matter how vile. You’d have ‘The Truman Show’ versus a horror show.”


The tone and direction of today’s oral argument suggests that the Justices appreciate the potential for an opinion that could have negative unforeseen consequences for free speech. Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh added that the court should not “crash the digital economy.”
 
Protect The 1st looks forward to reading the Court’s opinion and seeing its reasoning.