Fourth Circuit Rules that Knowing a Listener’s Intent Can Land You in Prison

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals this week upheld the lengthy prison sentence of a Virginia man for knowingly training a customer who intended to create a weapon to kill federal agents. (Hat tip: Eugene Volokh.)

This case reflects a twist in First Amendment law. The Supreme Court established in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) that while one cannot be prosecuted for “hate speech,” one can be prosecuted for inciting “imminent lawless action.” But what if the bad intentions are in the mind not of the speaker, but in the mind of the listener?

The defendant in this case, Christopher Arthur, provided training to “help the average person to be able to defend themselves” against “tyrannical government of our own or an invading tyrannical government.” His online manuals included such handy topics as how to create “Fatal Funnels, Wartime Tactics” and “Improvised Explosives.”

As frightening as this sounds, such speech could be lawful if the intent is to defend oneself in a Red Dawn scenario in which communists (or cartels, or aliens, or a future dictator, etc.) conquer the United States. But Arthur became a target of FBI investigation after one of his customers, Joshua Blessed, was found to have had 14 live pipe bombs in his home identical to those in Arthur’s manual. Blessed also started a shootout with law enforcement, firing at least 29 shots, which ended with him being riddled with bullets.

The FBI investigation of Arthur relied on a confidential informant, codenamed “Buckshot,” who told Arthur that he wanted to kill federal ATF agents. From this, the Fourth Circuit majority concluded that the speech was “integral to criminal conduct.” It was “tantamount to aiding and abetting a crime.”

We cannot disagree. Providing the means to create, in Arthur’s words, “a freaking death box” in which to lure and kill federal agents should not be shielded by the First Amendment.

But a dissent from Judge Roger Gregory (p. 32) reminds us that even in the most clear-cut cases, ambiguities exist that could be twisted out of recognition in future cases. Judge Gregory imagines the following scenario.

“Consider, for instance, [a] university professor … who is scheduled to give a lecture on the physics of combustion, or even simply on the topic of potential energy, which surely constitutes ‘part’ of information about explosives. If the professor had reason to believe a listener would weaponize his information – perhaps a potential attendee sent a letter outlining malicious intentions, or an audience member wore a T-shirt suggesting an affinity for violence – then the professor could conceivably be prosecuted” under a federal statute.

“The same could be said for a publisher of an instructional manual for safe use of explosives in construction and demolition. If the publisher received prior notice of a potential reader’s inclination to weaponize the manual’s information, the publisher would be at risk of prosecution … In both examples, protected and socially valuable speech is stilted because of the possibility that a rogue audience member would misuse the information provided, even if the speaker did not intend such misuse …”

This scenario doesn’t appear to apply to Arthur’s case, who received a candid idea of what his customer intended.
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But Judge Gregory raises an important point. Today’s reasonable inferences have a way of being stretched to unreasonable extremes tomorrow. Holding speakers criminally responsible for a listener’s intentions risks turning protected instruction into prosecutable speech. That’s a standard the courts – and Congress – should watch with caution.

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