​New York Attorney General Letitia James appears to have been hoisted by her own petard… Wait a minute, what’s a petard?

The phrase comes from William Shakespeare’s Hamlet. A petard was a compressed pot of gunpowder, a kind of Reformation-era grenade. In modern English, this phrase means being blown up with your own weapon.

For President Trump’s most ardent defenders, James’ predicament – being charged by the Department of Justice for bank fraud and making false statements – is more than deeply ironic. For them, it is like a fine liquor to roll across one’s tongue and savor.

Consider: James ran for her office by making an explicit promise to get Donald Trump for… something.

Once elected, she brought a civil action against then-private citizen Donald Trump and the Trump Organization for exaggerating his wealth while seeking a commercial loan. The former and future president was fined $515 million, even though his lender – a former Deutsche bank executive – testified that Trump was a model borrower. An appeals court later slashed the amount of the fine.

“Today, justice has been served,” James said in reaction to her courtroom win. “This is a tremendous victory for this state, this nation, and for everyone who believes that we must all play by the same rules – even former presidents.”

Now James is facing federal charges for making false statements regarding her renting of a second home in Virginia. If convicted, James could face a fine of up to $1 million, and a possible (though unlikely) 30 years in prison.

James’ own words are being thrown in her face – “we must all play by the same rules.”

The satisfying taste of irony may turn bitter for James’ critics. Politico reports that the indictment omitted the fact that James’ Second Home Rider explicity mentioned “short-term rentals.”

This story follows on the heels of the president’s attempted firing of Federal Reserve Board Governor Lisa Cook “for cause” – now stayed by the courts – for allegedly claiming two properties as her primary residences. If she lied, she could have obtained better mortgage terms – not a good look for someone who regulates national interest rates.

As with the James case, however, the facts are murky. It is reported that Cook characterized one property as a “vacation home” in a loan estimate.

The administration’s mortgage police at the Federal Housing Finance Agency referred another bête noire, Sen. Adam Schiff (D-CA), to the Department of Justice on a mortgage issue.

What to make of all this?

The original sin in this train of abuses was Attorney General James’ pursuit of civil charges against a former president and political enemy whom she had promised voters to ruin in court. This was compounded by Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg’s prosecution of Donald Trump for his hush-money payoff to porn star Stormy Daniels – spun by Bragg into 34 felony counts, including, somehow, violations of election law.

Now, on the theory that turnabout is fair play, the administration is targeting its former tormentors. Some of the cases – against former FBI Director James Comey and former National Security Advisor John Bolton – are complicated. For example, Comey was at best disingenuous in how he used the FBI to plant stories about Russian collusion from a source that he knew was dodgy. In both cases, however, these men have clearly been targeted out of animus. The scrupulous attention given to Bolton’s treatment of classified material, which prompted an FBI raid on his home, is clearly payback for writing a tell-all about the former advisor’s work in the first Trump White House.

Worse, the James-Cook-Schiff mortgage cases are not the result of a general crackdown. It appears that political appointees are selectively pulling mortgages of enemies for close examination.

On a human level, the instinct for payback is understandable. But if Republicans and Democrats keep targeting each other for prosecution, the U.S. political arena will come to resemble that of Moscow, where prosecutors are always ready to follow up on the promise of Stalin’s police chief, Lavrentiy Beria, who famously said: “Show me the man, and I’ll show you the crime.”

If selective prosecution is institutionalized, expect this weapon to be turned around once again against the people who now wield it.
​
Petards are being thrown, right and left. Keep it up, and everyone will be hoisted.

​Gabriel Olivier is an evangelical Christian who regularly preaches to passersby in a public park outside a public amphitheater in the city of Brandon, Mississippi. The city recognized Olivier’s right to speak, but told him he had to stay in a “protest area” far from people heading to the event center.
 
When Olivier approached pedestrians, he was confronted by police. When he explained to the local chief of police that he had a constitutional right to speak, he was arrested for his trouble and charged under a city ordinance. The U.S. Supreme Court will soon hear arguments on Olivier’s claim that the city ordinance violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
 
At its heart, this is classic forum law: Sidewalks, parks, and other public spaces have long been recognized as traditional fora for speech. But a procedural hurdle is at play as well: the question of whether Olivier should even get his day in court.
 
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff seeks restitution from state and local governments for violations of her constitutional rights, she must show that any related conviction or sentence related to that violation has been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid before suing. The Fifth Circuit held that Heck prevented Olivier from proceeding because he was convicted, pled nolo contendere, paid a fine, and chose to file a civil rights lawsuit rather than appeal his conviction.
 
Now the Supreme Court is set to determine if Olivier can bypass Heck and proceed to challenge the ordinance, or whether the procedural bar will remain, denying the merits question and leaving the city free to regulate speech.
 
If Olivier can get past this hurdle, he will have a strong case. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, has repeatedly upheld the rights of citizens to speak freely on the grounds of the U.S. Capitol, rejecting arguments that this is a “special type of enclave” immune from the guarantees of the First Amendment. Surely the prime section of a public park near an event center in Brandon, Mississippi, is subject to the same principle. Local governments often manage sidewalks, parks, plazas, and other public spaces that communities expect to remain open as fora for free speech. Consigning speakers away from intended listeners is not a reasonable restriction.
 
This case gives the High Court a chance to clarify the rules that allow citizens to challenge local restrictions on their constitutional rights. And, for a Court that has not been shy about protecting speech, it is a chance to recognize that in public parks, the roots of the First Amendment run deep.

​Last week, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a Christian-owned, women-only spa in Washington State must serve biological males if they identify as transgender. That means, dissenting judge Kenneth Lee wrote, that “under edict from the state, women – and even girls as young as 13 years old – must be nude alongside patrons with exposed male [parts] as they receive treatment.”
 
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling is as constitutionally suspect as it is nonsensical. Olympus Spa is a Korean business drawing from a centuries-old cultural heritage. Such spas “require their patrons to be fully naked, as they sit in communal saunas and undergo deep-tissue scrubbing of their entire bodies in an open area filled with other unclothed patrons.” As such, they separate patrons by sex in accordance with their religious beliefs – which merits protection under the U.S. Constitution.
 
The facts of the case are fairly straightforward. When a pre-op transgender woman was apparently denied entry into Olympus Spa, she filed a discrimination complaint with the state’s Human Rights Commission. Eventually, Olympus brought suit on First Amendment grounds, arguing that the state’s enforcement action violated its free speech, free exercise of religion, and free association rights.
 
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the case, finding that the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) “did not impermissibly burden” those rights. The court majority asserted that the law is both neutral and generally applicable, and that the burden imposed was “no greater than was essential to eliminate discriminatory conduct.” The court further found that the spa’s activities did not constitute expressive activity.
 
Judge Lee, a Korean American, took issue with the majority’s findings – and particularly with its statutory interpretation of WLAD. The plain text, as Lee points out, bars discrimination based on “sexual orientation” and not gender identity. Moreover, he writes, the majority’s broad reading of the statute has the effect of discriminating against other protected classes – in this case, a discrete racial group of practicing Christians.
 
Lee writes:
 
“The Washington Human Rights Commission threatened prosecution against a protected class – racial minority members who want to share their cultural traditions – to favor a group that is not even a protected class under the statute. To be clear, transgender persons, like all people, deserve to be treated with respect and dignity. But showing respect does not mean the government can distort the law and impose its will on the people the law was intended to protect.”
 
Legitimate questions of statutory interpretation aside, we agree with Olympus Spa that it has strong First Amendment claims in need of recognition. Businesses, like individuals, have First Amendment rights (see Masterpiece Cakeshop). If this case goes to the U.S. Supreme Court, it is likely these principles will be applied.
 
Protect The 1st will report on any further developments in this case.

​When a federal judge this week struck down President Trump’s executive order targeting the WilmerHale law firm, ruling the order unconstitutional, it was the third recent slap-down of his efforts to punish individual firms. It also brought into stark relief how rapidly this administration is moving in two radically different directions on the First Amendment.
 
On the positive side, the president issued on day one an executive order reaffirming this administration’s commitment to the First Amendment. That order fairly criticized the Biden administration for “exerting substantial coercive pressure on third parties, such as social media companies, to moderate, deplatform, or otherwise suppress speech that the Federal Government did not approve.”
 
Following up on that order, Secretary of State Marco Rubio pledged to “close the book” on “the weaponization of America’s own government to silence, censor, and suppress the free speech of ordinary Americans.” He fulfilled this promise by shuttering the agency’s Global Engagement Center, which secretly tried to kill conservative publications and served as a Trojan horse for filtering content moderation requests to social media platforms.
 
On the other hand, Trump has repeatedly used executive orders to go after past political opponents, putting law firms they had been associated with in the crosshairs for their political leanings.
 
This week, Senior Judge Richard Leon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia essentially said “enough.” He granted summary judgment in favor of WilmerHale, finding the president’s order violated key First Amendment protections and constituted an improper attempt to punish WilmerHale for its legal advocacy.
 
As with other executive orders, this one had barred WilmerHale lawyers from federal buildings, ordered a review of client contracts, and suspended the firm’s security clearances. Any of these measures alone would have been enough to make it impossible for WilmerHale’s 1,100 lawyers to represent many of their clients, hobbling the careers of those lawyers and the cases of their clients.
 
Judge Leon found these measures retaliatory, noting they stemmed from the firm’s representation of clients and causes President Trump dislikes, especially WilmerHale’s long association with former special counsel Robert Mueller.
 
Judge Leon rejected the administration’s effort to defend its order piece by piece, but instead compared it to “gumbo” with the opening section condemning the firm for the hiring of Robert Mueller to justify the later “meaty ingredients – e.g., the Andouille, the okra, the tomatoes, the crab, the oysters.” But, Judge Leon wrote, it is the opening section that vents on Robert Mueller, “the roux” which “holds everything together. A gumbo is served and eaten with the ingredients together, and so too must the sections of the Order be addressed together … this gumbo gives the Court heartburn.” 
 
One doesn’t have to be a fan of the lengthy Mueller “Russian collusion” investigation to share Judge Leon’s heartburn. Leon warned that upholding the order would betray the vision of the Founders. Judge Leon’s opinion finds the executive order to be a grand tour of violated First Amendment rights – from retaliation for speech, to viewpoint discrimination, interference with petition rights, and infringement of free association. The judge wrote: “The Order shouts through a bullhorn: If you take on causes disfavored by President Trump, you will be punished!”
 
The parallels to the administration’s enjoined orders against Perkins Coie and Covington & Burling are equally clear. Judge John Bates, in blocking an action against law firm Jenner & Block, quoted the Supreme Court in a major precedent, National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo (2024), one that ought to make it clear to conservatives what it would feel like if the shoe were on the other foot. Judge Bates wrote:
 
“More subtle but perhaps more pernicious is the message the order sends to the lawyers whose unalloyed advocacy protects against governmental viewpoint becoming government-imposed orthodoxy. This order, like the others, seeks to chill legal representation the administration doesn’t like, thereby insulating the Executive Branch from the judicial check fundamental to the separation of powers. It thus violates the Constitution, and the Court will enjoin its operation in full.”
 
Especially concerning to these jurists was the orders’ use of federal contracts to coerce firms and clients. As Judge Leon wrote, that is coercion, not policy. The adversarial system depends on lawyers being free to take on controversial cases without fear of retribution. Nine firms settled to avoid similar orders. WilmerHale chose to fight – and won a sweeping ruling for the First Amendment and for the principle that legal advocacy must remain free from political interference.
 
With these precedents in place, we hope it is clear to President Trump that attacks on law firms are going to continue to hit a brick wall, one that likely extends all the way to the Supreme Court if necessary.
 
A better way forward is to drop this fruitless campaign of harassment and return to what worked so well for President Trump early on – defending the First Amendment.

​The mindfulness movement encourages people to focus on the now, to be in the moment as they work, but also as they walk, trim the shrubs, drive the kids to school, and boil the spaghetti.
 
How about mindfulness at the moment of one’s execution?
 
In Buddhism, the practice of Maranasati is to use mindful breathing to reach the deepest level of contemplation. Many Buddhists engage in meditation and other spiritual practices as they actually are dying.
 
One person who sought to do this was the recently departed Jessie Hoffman, 46, a convert to Buddhism who wished to engage in meditative breathing as he died. He was prevented from doing so, however, because of the manner of his death, which happened Tuesday night. Hoffman had been sentenced to be lawfully executed for first-degree murder and became the first person in Louisiana to have a mask strapped on his face to be asphyxiated by breathing nitrogen gas.
 
Hoffman faced the death penalty because he had, at age 18, kidnapped 28-year-old Molly Elliott, raped her, shot her in the head, and left her naked body by a river.
 
After 27 years of appeals, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a stay of Hoffman’s execution, dismissing the claim that death by nitrogen amounted to a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment.”
 
Four Supreme Court Justices, including Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson would have granted Hoffman’s application for a stay. Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote a short dissent explaining his reasoning.
 
Justice Gorsuch noted that no one “has questioned the sincerity of Mr. Hoffman’s religious beliefs.” This is relevant to the application of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which forbids the government from violating a prisoner’s sincerely held religious beliefs. Justice Gorsuch took a lower court to task for issuing its own “find[ing] about the kind of breathing that Mr. Hoffman’s faith requires.”
 
Given the failure of the lower court to fully vet Hoffman’s claim – and the “Fifth Circuit’s unexplained omission” in doing so – Justice Gorsuch announced that he would have granted the stay and vacated the judgment. He would also have remanded the case for the Fifth Circuit to address Hoffman’s RLUIPA claim.
 
This is reminiscent of another case, Ramirez v. Collier (2020), in which the Court ruled in favor of John Henry Ramirez, a man on death row in Texas who petitioned to have his minister lay a hand on him as he received a lethal injection. The Court sided with Ramirez, 8-1. The prisoner’s minister was permitted, in fact, to place his right hand on Ramirez as he died.
 
On its face, the idea of being able to engage in meditative breathing while ceasing to breathe altogether sounds a bit absurd. Prosecutors are always alert to prisoners who manufacture religious objections to extend their lives. Hoffman had requested that he be executed by firing squad, which would, to say the least, have also interfered with his meditative breathing.
 
But Justice Gorsuch reminds us that the free practice of religion, at the most solemn moment of a person’s life, should command sufficient respect to fully explore an RLUIPA claim. At the very least, Hoffman’s claim deserved more consideration, even if it was ultimately rejected.

Ramirez’s attorney, Seth Kretzer, said it best: “The First Amendment applies in the most glorified halls of power and also in the hell of the execution chamber.”

In an amicus brief to the Supreme Court on Monday night, Protect The 1st represented 66 Members of Congress that showed the U.S. Supreme Court why it should reverse a Fourth Circuit ruling in Mahmoud v. Taylor that rejected the First Amendment objections of parents whose children, some as young as three, cannot be opted out of exposure to material on moral issues controversial with many parents. In its brief, the Protect The First Foundation showed that it is unconstitutional to deny parents this choice, and that “federal law has consistently protected parental rights in the educational arena.”
 
Background
In 2022, the Montgomery County school board embraced books that promoted pronoun preferences, pride parades, and gender transitioning for young students. One book tasks three- and four-year-olds to search for images from a word list that includes “intersex flag,” “drag queen,” “underwear,” “leather,” and a celebrated activist/sex worker. 
 
When some Muslim and Christian parents sought to opt out their children from these teachings, one board member told them that claiming these books “offend your religious rights or your family values or your core beliefs is just telling your kid, ‘Here’s another reason to hate another person.’” On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that because there was no evidence of either coercion or a direct penalty on these parents’ religious faith if their children were required to participate in these one-sided portrayals of questions about morality, this case involved no burden on their First Amendment rights.
 
An Absurd Outcome
The Protect The 1st brief demonstrates that there is nothing in federal law or the Court’s precedent that remotely supports the Fourth Circuit’s decision to deny parents the choice to keep their children out of such indoctrinating instruction.

• The Board argued that Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 required it to deny notice or the right to opt out. Protect The 1st told the Supreme Court: “Yet the Board failed to quote or even cite a single provision of Title IX for its claim. Nor could it. The statute’s plain language makes clear that a school’s duty is to not itself discriminate.”

 

• The Fourth Circuit shared the Board’s view that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton controlled this expansive interpretation of Title IX. In fact, in Bostock, the majority – which ruled on whether an employer who fires someone for simply being homosexual or transgender – addressed employer discrimination, not educational policy. The majority did “not purport to address bathrooms, locker rooms, [dress codes,] or anything else of the kind.”

 

• In Bostock, the Court went out of its way to display concern that this opinion did not trample on religious liberty: “We are also deeply concerned with preserving the promise of the free exercise of religion enshrined in our Constitution; that guarantee lies at the heart of our pluralistic society.”

Neither the statute’s text nor Supreme Court precedent support the Board’s claims or the Fourth Circuit’s opinions.
​

• The current opinion stands directly opposed to carefully crafted laws passed by Congress over the past half-century to protect the religious freedom rights of parents. Courts have also regularly applied the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to protect parental rights.

“It seems clear to us that the excuses given by the board and the court, relying on federal law and Supreme Court precedent, border on the frivolous,” said Erik Jaffe, President of Protect The 1st. “Both Congress and the Supreme Court have routinely supported parental choice in matters involving the education of their children. And an opt-out for parents has long been recognized as a non-disruptive remedy that protects the rights of parents.

“We fully expect the Supreme Court to agree.”

The recent session of the U.S. Supreme Court will likely be remembered for two major rulings implicating fundamental separation of powers doctrine: Trump v. United States, establishing presumptive immunity from prosecution for official presidential acts; and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, dispensing with the long-established “Chevron Two Step” granting deference to a federal agency’s interpretation of statutes. In both instances, the Court reaffirmed our constitutional system of checks and balances, including protection against encroachment on the powers and privileges of one branch of government by another.
 
Against the backdrop of those headline-dominating developments, the Supreme Court also took on several important First Amendment cases, with results that were constitutionally sound. Below are the highlights – and summaries – of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence released in recent weeks.
 
Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine
 
In a unanimous ruling, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the Food and Drug Administration’s regulation of the abortion drug mifepristone. Little noticed by the media, the Court’s opinion also firmly nailed down the conscience right of physicians to abstain from participating in abortions and prescribing the drug.
 
Writing for the Court, Justice Kavanaugh said that the Church Amendments, which prohibit the government from imposing requirements that violate the conscience rights of physicians and institutions, “allow doctors and other healthcare personnel to ‘refuse to perform or assist’ an abortion without punishment or discrimination from their employers.”
 
From now on, any effort to restrict or violate the conscience rights of healers will go against the unanimous opinion of all nine justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.
 
Vidal v. Elster
 
The Supreme Court, in another unanimous decision, overturned a lower court ruling that found that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s denial of an application to trademark a phrase including the name “Trump” violated the filer’s First Amendment rights.
 
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas wrote that “[o]ur courts have long recognized that trademarks containing names may be restricted.” But such trademark restrictions, while “content-based” must be “viewpoint neutral.” This opinion prevents commercial considerations to scissor out pieces of the national debate. While the decision rejected a novel First Amendment claim to a speech-restricting trademark, it affirms sound First Amendment principles and protects the speech of all others who would discuss and debate the virtues and vices of prominent public figures.
 
The Court was right to refuse the endorsement of a government-granted monopoly on a phrase about a presidential candidate.
 
NRA v. Vullo
 
NRA v. Vullo – yet another unanimous opinion – cleared the way for the National Rifle Association to pursue a First Amendment claim against a New York insurance regulator who had twisted the arms of insurance companies and banks to blacklist the group.
 
Maria Vullo, former superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services, met with Lloyd’s of London executives in 2018 to bring to their attention technical infractions that plagued the affinity insurance market in New York, unrelated to NRA business. Vullo told the executives that she would be “less interested” in pursuing these infractions “so long as Lloyd’s ceased providing insurance to gun groups.” She added that she would “focus” her enforcement actions “solely” on the syndicates with ties to the NRA, “and ignore other syndicates writing similar policies.”
 
The Court found for the NRA, writing that, “[a]s alleged, Vullo’s communications with Lloyd’s can be reasonably understood as a threat or as an inducement. Either of those can be coercive.”
 
The Supreme Court’s opinion vacates the Second Circuit’s ruling to the contrary and remands the case to allow the lawsuit to continue.
 
As the Court wrote, “the critical takeaway is that the First Amendment prohibits government officials from wielding their power selectively to punish or suppress speech, directly or (as alleged here) through private intermediaries.” And we wholeheartedly agree – censorship by proxy is still government censorship.
 
Moody v. NetChoice

In one of two cases involving the nexus of government and social media, the Court seemed to punt on making a final decision on the constitutionality of laws from Florida and Texas restricting the ability of social media companies to regulate access to, and content on, their platforms.
 
Many commentators believed the Court would resolve a split between the Fifth Circuit (upholding a Texas law restricting various forms of content moderation and imposing other obligations on social media platforms) and the Eleventh Circuit (which upheld the injunction against a Florida law regulating content and other activities by social media platforms and by other large internet services and websites).
 
The Court’s ruling was expected to resolve the hot-button issue of whether Facebook and other major social media platforms can depost and deplatform. Instead, the Court found fault with the scope and precision of both the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuit opinions, vacating both of them and telling the lower courts to drill down on the varied details of both laws and be more precise as to the First Amendment issues posed by such different provisions. The opinion did, however, offer constructive guidance with ringing calls for stronger enforcement of First Amendment principles as they relate to the core activities of content moderation.
 
The opinion, written by Justice Elena Kagan, declared that: “On the spectrum of dangers to free expression, there are few greater than allowing the government to change the speech of private actors in order to achieve its own conception of speech nirvana.”

Murthy v. Missouri
 
In what looked to be a major case regarding the limits of government “jawboning” to get private actors to restrict speech, the Court instead decided that Missouri, Louisiana, and five individuals whose views were targeted by the government for expressing misinformation could not demonstrate a sufficient connection between the government’s action and their ultimate deplatforming by private actors.
 
Accordingly, the Court’s reasoning in this 6-3 decision is that the two states and five individuals lacked Article III standing to bring this suit. A case that could have defined the limits of government involvement in speech for the central media of our time was thus deflected on procedural grounds.
 
Justice Samuel Alito, in a fiery dissent signed by Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch, criticized the punt, calling Murthy v. Missouri “one of the most important free speech cases to reach this Court in years.” Fortunately, NRA v. Vullo, discussed above, sets a solid baseline against government efforts to pressure private actors to do the government’s dirty work in suppressing speech the government does not like. Later cases will, we hope, expand upon that base.
 
Secret communications from the government to the platforms to take down one post or another is inherently suspect under the Constitution and likely to lead us to a very un-American place. Let us hope that the Court selects a case in which it accepts the standing of the plaintiffs in order to give the government, and our society, a rule to live by.
 
Gonzalez v. Trevino
 
Protect The 1st has reported on the case of Sylvia Gonzalez, a former Castle Hills, Texas, council member who was arrested for allegedly tampering with government records back in 2019. In fact, she merely misplaced them, and was subsequently arrested, handcuffed, and detained in what was likely a retaliatory arrest for criticizing the city manager. In turn, Gonzalez brought suit.
 
Gonzalez’s complaint noted that she was the only person charged in the past 10 years under the state’s government records law for temporarily misplacing government documents. In 2019’s Nieves v. Bartlett, the Supreme Court found that a plaintiff can generally bring a federal civil rights claim alleging retaliation if they can show that police did not have probable cause. The Court also allowed suit by plaintiffs claiming retaliatory arrests if they could show that others who engaged in the same supposedly illegal conduct, but who did not engage in protected but disfavored speech, were not arrested.
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit threw out Gonzalez’s case, finding that she would have had to offer examples of those who had mishandled a government petition in the same way that she had but – unlike her – were not arrested. The Supreme Court, by contrast, found that, “[a]lthough the Nieves exception is slim, the demand for virtually identical and identifiable comparators goes too far.” The Court thus made it a bit easier for the victims of First Amendment retaliation to sue government officials who would punish people for disfavored speech.
 
The controversy will now go back to the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration.
 
***

While the Court avoided some potentially landmark decisions on procedural grounds, and offered a mixed bag of decisions concerning plaintiffs’ ability to obtain redress against potential First Amendment violations, the majority consistently showed a strong desire to protect First Amendment principles – shielding people and private organizations from government-compelled speech.

​It is a rare day that a federal court can get the First Amendment so wrong. But a panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals managed to do it.
 
In the 2021 local school board election in Bourne, Massachusetts, candidate Kari MacRae based her campaign on a promise to “fight woke values.” She posted on TikTok that “the reason why I’m taking on this responsibility is to ensure that students, at least in our town, are not being taught critical race theory.” She shared a meme that showed a man wearing a sport’s bra with the caption, “Equality doesn’t always mean equity.”
 
You might deplore or “like” MacRae’s stance. But her comments clearly fall under the category of political speech, which courts have held is the most protected form of speech, subject to strict scrutiny when challenged by government restrictions. Clearly, many residents agreed with MacRae – she won her seat on the school board. That mandate, endorsed by the voters, did not stop the school district from firing her after she was later hired as a schoolteacher and these posts came to light.
 
The First Circuit, in ruling against MacRae, cited precedent in which government employees were sanctioned for statements they made in an official capacity. Judge Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson wrote that “public employees’ First Amendment rights ‘are not absolute,’ and so public employees ‘by necessity must accept certain limitations on [their] freedom.’” The case she cited, Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) concerned statements by an employee of the Los Angeles district attorney’s office about the veracity of facts in a warrant affidavit. The Supreme Court held that the DA’s office could discipline the employee for publicly contradicting his superiors.
 
But MacRae did not make these statements as a teacher in a classroom. She made them as a private citizen running for office before she was even hired.
 
The Wall Street Journal points out the obvious danger of this ruling:
​
“The First Circuit’s decision delineates no statute of limitation or limiting principle to employee speech that government employers can punish. A teacher could be fired for hanging a ‘Make America Great Again’ flag at home. Political activity during college years could become grounds for dismissal.”
 
Love or hate what McRae says, comments from her political campaign should not be cause for her dismissal as a teacher. The U.S. Supreme Court might find review of this case to be too tempting to ignore.

​Protect The 1st is proud to announce our filing of an amicus brief before the U.S. Supreme Court in a pivotal case challenging a law in Michigan that restricts the religious rights of parents.
 
This legal challenge opposes what is known as a Blaine Amendment. This lawsuit is spearheaded by a group of Michigan parents confronting the amendment's prohibition on state aid to private, religiously affiliated schools. They show that it violates the Equal Protection Clause by denying families the opportunity to advocate for the freedom to choose educational options that align with their religious values.
 
The origins of Blaine Amendments are steeped in ugly history marked by discrimination and bigotry. Initially proposed as a federal law in 1875 by House Speaker James G. Blaine, these amendments seek to prevent direct government aid to religiously affiliated educational institutions. They reflect a period of intense anti-Catholic sentiment, targeting the influx of Catholic immigrants and their schools. While the federal amendment failed, many states, including Michigan, adopted similar provisions. Michigan's Blaine Amendment, like those of other states, effectively bars state support for religious schools, impacting those who seek education aligned with their religious beliefs and cultural values.
 
Protect The 1st believes that such amendments are not only a relic of a prejudiced past but continue to infringe on our First Amendment rights today. They undermine the pluralism that is vital to our nation’s educational landscape by restricting access to diverse schooling options that reflect familial and cultural values. This approach runs counter to the essence of American liberty and the pursuit of happiness, which includes the right of parents to direct their children's education.
 
Our brief celebrates the opportunity to challenge Michigan’s outdated and discriminatory Blaine Amendment. By standing with the petitioners, we aim to affirm the importance of educational choice and religious freedom, ensuring that all families have the right to educate their children in a manner consistent with their beliefs. Just five days after the petitioners filed before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court called for a response in this case, a positive sign that the Court is seriously considering granting it cert.
 
Protect The 1st looks forward to further developments in this case.

​In November, we reported on a controversy in the San Antonio suburb of Castle Hills, which epitomizes the growing trend of using the law to punish disfavored speech. The Supreme Court’s recent argument reveals several justices showing solidarity with the arrested party.
 
Here are the facts: Sylvia Gonzalez was elected to a seat on the Castle Hills city council in 2019. During her first council meeting, a resident submitted a petition to remove the city manager – a petition spearheaded by Gonzalez – and it wound up in Gonzalez’s personal binder of documents. After being asked for the petition by the mayor, Gonzalez found it among her effects and handed it over.
 
The mayor initiated an investigation into Gonzalez under a Texas statute providing that “[a] person commits an offense if he […] intentionally destroys, conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the verity, legibility, or availability of a governmental record.” A warrant was subsequently served against Gonzalez, who was taken to jail and resigned from the council in humiliation. 
 
Gonzalez claims her arrest was retaliatory – trumped-up charges based on a little enforced statute and stemming from her support for removing the city manager. At issue is a legal doctrine known as the “jaywalking exception,” which guards against law enforcement arresting people for protected speech under the guise of some other petty statutory violation.
 
In Nieves v. Bartlett, the Supreme Court held that retaliatory arrest claims may proceed where probable cause exists – as it technically did with Gonzalez – but a plaintiff is arrested in a situation where officers “typically exercise their discretion not to do so.”
 
In such circumstances, a plaintiff must present “objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.”
 
Attempting to satisfy the exception, Gonzalez presented evidence that not one of 215 grand jury felony indictments in Bexar County under a tampering statute over the preceding decade involved an allegation remotely similar to the one levied against her. The Fifth Circuit found this insufficient, holding that Nieves requires comparative evidence of individuals who engaged in the “same” criminal conduct but were not arrested. In other words, going by the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, Gonzalez would have to find specific instances of people who misplaced government documents but were not arrested. How would anyone even find such instances? The Fifth Circuit tasked her with proving a negative.
 
If the Fifth Circuit’s decision is left in place, Protect The 1st explained it would make it easier for law enforcement or other government officials to punish critics for expressing protected speech based on novel applications of relatively minor criminal laws. It also sets the evidentiary bar so high that few could ever hope to prove their case in a court of law.
 
During oral arguments, several justices seemed to agree. Justice Gorsuch, speaking about the many unenforced statutes on the books, said:
 
“You're saying they can all sit there unused, except for one person who alleges that ‘I was the only person in America who's ever been prosecuted for this because I dared express a view protected by the First Amendment,’ and that's not actionable?”
 
Justice Kagan, clearly thinking along the same lines, said the plaintiff has “solid objective evidence” that they were treated differently than similarly situated persons, noting:
 
“You should be able to say, ‘They've never charged somebody with this kind of crime before and I don't have to go find a person who has engaged in the same conduct.’”
 
Justice Jackson made similar remarks, while Chief Justice Roberts, who authored Nieves, seemed to take the other side, questioning whether expanding the evidentiary basis for refuting probable cause is consistent with the Court’s earlier ruling. It “seems to me to be inconsistent,” he said. Justice Kavanaugh likewise noted, "If you intentionally stole a government document at a government proceeding — that's not nothing.”
 
Why Gonzalez would want to hide a petition she helped organize is far from clear. Her conduct was so benign that the only inference one can reasonably draw is that she was the target of retaliation. Protect The 1st hopes the Court sides with her and makes it clear they will hold public officials accountable for weaponizing the law against those who speak their minds.

​A case from Grants Pass, Oregon, presents a compelling study and examination of the role that religious charities play in helping the helpless.
 
In 2018, a group of homeless people sued the City of Grants Pass over its municipal ordinances – and hefty fines – meant to prohibit sleeping on public land. Specifically, the group alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment, which bans “cruel and unusual punishment.” In 2023, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled for the plaintiffs using its own particularized formula that bans the prosecution of homeless people if there “is a greater number of homeless individuals … than the number of available” shelter beds. At the same time, the court relied on precedent asserting that shelters with a “mandatory religious focus” could not be included in their calculations due to possible violations of the Constitutional prohibition against the establishment of religion.
 
Whatever one thinks of the underlying issue about rights and responsibilities regarding homelessness, the Ninth Circuit’s disregard for religious charitable organizations shows a broader legal hostility towards religion itself. Worse, it discounts religious institutions’ many contributions to social welfare and safety.
 
In 1971, the Supreme Court held in Lemon v. Kurtzman that state statutes do not violate the Establishment Clause if they: 1) have a secular purpose 2) do not advance or inhibit religion, and 3) do not result in “excessive government entanglement” with religion. The test was used repeatedly as a means to disenfranchise – or entirely disregard – religious institutions that contribute to the public good. 
 
In 2022’s Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch instructed lower courts to ignore Lemon, instead directing them towards a historical analysis that takes into account what was understood as a religious “establishment” when our nation was founded.
 
Unfortunately, this guidance is largely disregarded across the United States. As the Becket Fund writes, “[f]or decades, the Lemon test had caused courts to incorrectly apply the Establishment Clause, driving religious people and religious ideas out of public life. Even though Lemon was overturned, many lower courts, including ones within the Ninth Circuit, continue to rely on it.” Becket’s amicus brief before the U.S. Supreme Court, which is set to review the case soon, urges the justices to “reiterate that courts should apply a historical test” when deciding on Establishment Clause violations.
 
Much is at stake behind this seemingly esoteric legal issue.
 
Religious institutions unquestionably have always had and continue to have a major role in providing a social safety net in the United States. Continuing to rely on the Lemon test, which categorically excludes religious organizations from public life due to their “overall religious atmosphere,” is a gross overextension and misinterpretation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. As the Becket Fund notes, it “confuses private and state action” when it comes to making distinctions about religion. Overall, this ruling is indicative of widespread local government dismissal of, or even hostility toward, the social contributions of people of faith.
 
If a theocracy is one extreme the courts wish to avoid, a secular lack of acceptance for religious pluralism is the opposite extreme. Governments should welcome religious institutions that provide social safety nets. And it starts with the rejection of a reactionary, overruled legal doctrine that discredits the civic contribution of religious charities.

​The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling against the Apache Stronghold, unless overturned, will allow the Apache’s Oak Flat religious site to be destroyed by a private mining company.
 
These lands have long been recognized by the U.S. government as the singular, sacred site of the Apaches’ worship. Set to be transformed into a crater twice as deep as the Washington Monument, not only is Oak Flat in danger of being destroyed, but with it the religion that centers around that site.
 
The least we can say is that this one was painfully close, a 6-5 split decision. The Ninth Circuit asserted that the transfer of this land, revered as the center of the Apache religion for centuries, did not (somehow) even trigger an inquiry under, much less violate, violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. That Act requires strict scrutiny of any law that burdens religious freedom. Judge Mary H. Murguia issued a stinging rebuke of the majority in her dissent:
 
“We are asked to decide whether the utter destruction of Chí’chil Biłdagoteel, a site sacred to the Western Apaches since time immemorial, is a ‘substantial burden’ on the Apaches’ sincere religious exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4. Under any ordinary understanding of the English language, the answer must be yes.”
 
Unless the U.S. Supreme Court grants cert. and overturns the Ninth Circuit’s unduly narrow conception of what constitutes a “burden” on religion, the Oak Flat religious site will become one of the nation’s largest copper ore mines, the result of a midnight deal in Congress. This scenic place of worship will become an ugly pit.
 
What was the reasoning of the majority? This en banc decision relied on a U.S. Supreme Court case, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n (1988), which held that government disposition of property does not violate the Free Exercise Clause so long as it “compels no behavior contrary to … belief.” It is doubtful that the Ninth Circuit’s broad reading of that statement remains valid, if it ever was. If barring people from entering a place of worship under COVID restrictions raises serious free exercise problems, it is hard to see how completely destroying a religion’s essential place of worship does not at least impose a burden sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny under RFRA.
 
People of all faiths should be concerned that the circuit court took such a miserly view of the free exercise of religion. Imagine the outcry from Catholics if the government decided to turn the Basilica of the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception into dust. Or the outcry of American Jews if a midnight deal in Congress targeted the Touro Synagogue in Rhode Island – the oldest still standing in the United States, and where George Washington welcomed Jews into the heart of America – to become a seemingly bottomless pit. The notion that such acts would not even “burden” the exercise of religion goes well beyond the implausible and into the absurd.
 
We hope the Justices of the Supreme Court dwell on the words of our first President, who famously wrote to the congregants of the Touro Synagogue: “Every one shall sit in safety under his own vine and fig tree, and there shall be none to make him afraid.” Can we say that is true for everyone in our country now? To again quote the dissenting judges, “the destruction of the Apaches’ sacred site will prevent worshipers from ever again exercising their religion.”
 
Luke Goodrich, senior counsel at Becket who represented the Apache, tweeted: “We fully expect SCOTUS to take this case, confirm the plain meaning of federal law, and hold that Native Americans are entitled to the same protection of their religious freedom that every other American enjoys.” Protect The 1st is also hopeful the Court will see that the Apaches’ free exercise of religion is inextricable from the preservation of this uniquely holy place.
 
For the Supreme Court to review this case would be a prayer answered.

​When does a legal reporting requirement for a social media company become a violation of the First Amendment? When it drums up public and political pressure to enforce viewpoint discrimination.
 
This is the conclusion of legal scholar Eugene Volokh and Protect The First Foundation, which filed an amicus brief late Wednesday before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals asking it to overturn a lower court ruling that upheld a California law requiring social media companies to disclose their content moderation practices. California Bill AB 587, signed into law by Gov. Gavin Newsom in 2022, compels social media companies to produce two such reports a year on their moderation practices and decisions, to be published on the website of the California Attorney General.
 
This law “violates the First Amendment’s stringent prohibition on viewpoint discrimination” by “requiring social media companies to define viewpoint-based categories of speech,” declared Volokh, Senior Legal Advisor to Protect The 1st. “The law also requires these companies to report their policies as to those viewpoints, but not other viewpoints ...”
 
This brief supports the challenge from X Corp.’s lawsuit filed in September 2023 that also asserted that AB 587 violates the First Amendment, which “unequivocally prohibits this kind of interference with a traditional publisher’s editorial judgment.”
 
Volokh and Protect The 1st cited the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case, NAACP v. Alabama (1958), in which the Court overturned an Alabama law that would have compelled disclosure of the NAACP’s membership lists. The threat behind this law, the Court noted, relied on governmental and private community pressures that would result in the harassment of individuals and discouragement of their speech.

“Generating either massive fines or public ‘pressure,’ a euphemism for public hostility, triggers the most exacting scrutiny our Constitution demands,” Volokh told the court. “California Assembly Bill 587 violates the First Amendment’s stringent prohibition on viewpoint discrimination. And AB 587 does so by leaning on social media companies to do the government’s dirty work, either through fear of fine or public pressure.”
 
The brief cites a Supreme Court opinion that states “what cannot be done directly [under the Constitution] cannot be done indirectly.” Volokh writes:
“The intent behind the law is clear from its legislative history, comments by its enforcer (Attorney General Rob Bonta), and common sense. That intent is to strongarm social media companies to restrict certain viewpoints—to combine law and public pressure to do something about how platforms treat those particular viewpoints, and not other viewpoints. That confirms that the facial viewpoint classification in the statute is indeed a viewpoint-based government action aimed at suppressing speech—and that violates the First Amendment.”
 
Protect The 1st will continue to report on X Corp.v. Bonta as an important flashpoint in the continuous struggle to keep speech free of official regulation.

​In the closing days of 2023, Elon Musk and X Corp lost the first round of their bid in a state court to overturn a California law that would require social media platforms to disclose their content moderation policies. The law in question came into effect in 2022 and was advertised as a way to tamp down on hate speech, disinformation, harassment, and extremism.
 
The suit alleged that that the law’s real purpose was to coerce social media platforms into censoring content deemed problematic by the state. While District Judge William Shubb ruled that the law does impose a substantial compliance burden, he found it does not unjustifiably infringe on First Amendment rights.
 
Protect The 1st believes X has a strong basis to appeal under settled precedent.
 
For example, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court found that states can require an advertiser to disclose information without violating the advertiser's First Amendment free speech protections. But the disclosure requirements must be reasonably related to the state’s interest in preventing deception of consumers. This is not a case of selling gummies and advertising them as cures for cancer.
 
It is reasonable to assert that some social media companies might do themselves a favor by releasing simple, clear content moderation policies to the public. But we should never forget that these policies are confidential, proprietary information. Requiring their forced disclosure could tip the scales in favor of state-enforced censorship of social media, which at least one federal judge believes is already occurring on a mass scale. Worse, the California law violates the First Amendment by compelling speech on the part of the companies themselves.
 
Protect The 1st expects X to appeal with good prospects to overturn this ruling.

​Protect The 1st has long followed a First Amendment legal struggle between the Orthodox synagogue Young Israel of Tampa and the Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority (HART). That public authority had rejected Young Israel’s efforts to place advertisements for its “Chanukah on Ice” event on HART vehicles and bus shelters. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has now weighed in, permanently enjoining HART’s policy prohibiting ads that “promote a religious faith or religious organization.”
 
This case is important on multiple fronts. First, HART’s policy represents unconstitutional – and unreasonable – viewpoint discrimination because it bans religious speech on the sole basis of its religious character. It presents the troubling implication that if we can ban religious advertisements in public transit areas solely because they are religious, what’s to stop local governments from banning religious speech in public parks or other long-observed public venues of free speech?

Further, the case represents a milestone in First Amendment jurisprudence because it has resulted in a permanent injunction on continued implementation of the policy as written. As we wrote in our amicus brief:
 
“First Amendment rights are fundamental rights essential to every other form of freedom. As a result, First Amendment rights warrant special protection. Because courts cannot enjoin conduct and do not ‘strike down’ unconstitutional laws, a court cannot adequately protect First Amendment interests without including prohibitions against future illegal conduct in its injunction.
 
“Without such preventative relief, governments would be free to repeat the same constitutional violation in the future. Any resolution of this case that fails to prevent future harm does not adequately vindicate the First Amendment.”
 
Earlier, a district court had come down on the side of Young Israel, issuing a permanent injunction forbidding HART from “rejecting any advertisement on the ground that the advertisement primarily promotes a religious faith or religious organization.” On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit likewise upheld that permanent injunction, though on slightly different grounds, reasoning that “….HART’s policy, even if viewpoint neutral, is unreasonable due to a lack of objective and workable standards.”
 
Indeed, the court found that HART has “no specific training or written guidance to interpret its . . . policy.” Internal review of religious advertisements is subject to the whims of the reviewers, and HART makes no attempt to inform its employees of any “workable norms” that might help them make an objective determination of the policy’s application. The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling thus “‘means that there is no circumstance in which this particular ban on [religious] advertising could ever be lawful.’”
 
Presumably, HART could attempt to come up with a narrowed policy in the future. For now, we are pleased with and applaud the appellate ruling, which permanently protects Young Israel’s First Amendment rights vis à vis this policy – now and into the future.

​“The First Amendment guarantees the public a qualified right of access to judicial proceedings and documents that is rooted in the understanding that public oversight of the judicial system is essential to the proper functioning of that system and, more generally, to our democratic system of self-governance.”

A hearing last week before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals includes this quote from an amici brief by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 38 other media organizations including the Associated Press, Atlantic Monthly Group, Axios, McClatchy, the National Press Club, the New York Times and The Washington Post. At issue is Virginia’s Officer of the Court Remote Access (with the charming acronym of OCRA) system, which allows attorneys and certain government agencies online access to non-confidential civil court records from participating circuit courts in the state (105 courts out of 120 in the Commonwealth).

Those not allowed online access to court records through OCRA include, well, everyone else – but most notably members of the press, who are forced to travel to each circuit court individually, in person, during weekday business hours in order to obtain documents and properly report on proceedings of public concern.

Virginia’s practice stands in contrast with the policies of at least 38 other states that allow unfettered online access to court records for all members of the public.

Accordingly, one media outlet, Courthouse News Service, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against a Virginia court clerk and the administrator of OCRA, alleging that the “Non-Attorney Access Restriction” constitutes an unconstitutional speaker-based restriction on speech.

Although the district court initially rejected the defendants’ motion to dismiss, it ultimately granted summary judgment, finding that the attorneys-only rule was a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction and thus did not require a strict scrutiny analysis. Courthouse News subsequently appealed to the Fourth Circuit.

The defendants argue that limiting online access to lawyers and certain government agencies allows the courts to better prevent against fraud and misuse of “private, sensitive information let out into the world and limiting the potential for widespread data harvesting which is often done by bots.”

On its surface, this seems a noble argument, but it fails to consider that: 1) the information online is already non-confidential in nature, with any sensitive information required to be redacted by filers of the documents; 2) any member of the public can already access these documents in person; and 3) openness has worked well for the 38 other states that have functional, non-compromised online systems in place that allow widespread public access.

Protect The 1st is particularly sensitive to the protection of online data – but, as the amici point out, Virginia’s argument is speculative at best, showing no evidence of data harvesting by bots or anyone else. Restricting access to OCRA based on assumptions about how certain non-favored speakers may use that information is plainly not content-neutral. Instead, as amici contend, it “amounts to unconstitutional speaker-based discrimination that demands strict scrutiny.”

Further, as other courts show, less restrictive means of protecting information in court documents obviously exist – certainly less restrictive than denying access to public documents.
Most importantly, fundamental press freedoms are at stake here. “…[I]n denying the press and the greater public access to OCRA,” amici write, “the Non-Attorney Access Restriction infringes the public’s presumptive constitutional right of contemporaneous access to civil court records.”

Journalists depend on remote, online access to report on cases of public concern in a timely manner. “If not reversed,” the brief declares, “the District Court’s order will hamper the ability of the news media to report on court proceedings of public interest in Virginia and around the country.”
​
Courthouse News Service, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and their fellow amici are right in urging the Fourth Circuit to overturn the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in this case. We’ll be following future developments closely.

On either side of the abortion issue, advocates and legislators have become so entrenched that they often lose sight of the constitutional forest for the trees. Consider two cases out of Colorado and New York that illustrate the lengths to which some will go to restrict speech about any choice they don’t like.
 
In April, we wrote about a Colorado law restricting the ability of physicians to discuss a treatment for women who are having second thoughts about a chemically induced abortion. That law limits prescribing progesterone, a popular method of reversing a chemical abortion. It forbids physicians from even informing pregnant women that such a treatment exists.
 
It’s essentially the inverse of legislative proposals in red states that would permit civil actions against anyone informing women about abortion options in other states. At Protect The 1st, we oppose any effort to gag physicians and other health care providers from informing patients about treatment options – particularly when it conflicts with closely held religious beliefs.
 
Such was the case with Bella Health, a Catholic healthcare clinic in Colorado that offers life-affirming care to pregnant women (among others). That includes offering progesterone.
 
With help from the Becket Fund, Bella Health sued the State of Colorado in federal court. Bella Health has now been granted a preliminary injunction barring implementation of the law and allowing the clinic to continue its work. U.S. District Court Judge Daniel D. Domenico wrote:
 
“There is no question whether [the law] burdens Bella Health’s free exercise of religion. It does. Bella Health considers it a religious obligation to provide treatment for pregnant mothers and to protect unborn life if the mother seeks to stop or reverse an abortion.”
 
Domenico further criticized the state for failing to even attempt to make the case for a compelling government interest, which is necessary for overcoming a strict scrutiny review. The fact is, which Domenico seemingly recognized, the law was a nakedly partisan response to recent developments on the national stage – an effort to punish those on the other side of this contentious issue by trampling over their First Amendment rights.  
 
In a similar case out of New York, the state passed a law in 2022 authorizing the New York State Department of Health to conduct a study on “limited service pregnancy centers on the ability of women to obtain accurate, non-coercive health care information and timely access to a comprehensive range of reproductive and sexual health care services.”  (“Limited service pregnancy” centers is how the state describes clinics that do not offer abortion services.)
 
The statute further permitted the state to demand “data and information” from any center that does not offer abortion services or referrals. That included Sisters of Life, a Catholic community of nuns who offer holistic care for women in crisis, often providing housing, maternity clothes, baby formula, and other necessities. Sisters of Life sued to overturn and enjoin enforcement of the law, rightfully concerned about the vast amount of sensitive personal data that would have be turned over – including, according to the complaint, “organizational funding; membership in umbrella organizations; services provided and most frequently sought; the number of women who access services, the geographic regions in which each woman resides, and ‘basic demographic information about each woman, including race, age, and marital status.’”
 
In more good news for the First Amendment, the Sisters dropped their lawsuit after reaching an agreement with the state stipulating that the state will not “take any enforcement action of any kind against Plaintiff based on Plaintiff’s nonresponse to or noncompliance with any survey, document request, or information request of any kind authorized by or issued by Defendant.” It’s a total surrender on the part of New York, which seems largely embarrassed by the whole ordeal.
 
State attorneys should be embarrassed. Regardless of your views on abortion, passing coercive laws to shut down speech and punish religious organizations makes a farce of the First Amendment. And while we should celebrate these victories, we must also remember that such threats to our foundational rights remain ever present – coming from the right as well as the left.

Last year, the Protect The First Foundation filed an amicus brief urging the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to hear the plight of the Yakima Nation and the Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde. These two Native American groups sued when the federal government widened U.S. Highway 26 in Eastern Oregon, demolishing an ancient stone altar and grove of trees sacred to the religion of these Americans.
 
The U.S. District Court in Oregon had first found that the U.S. Federal Highway Administration had not violated the religious rights of the tribes under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). A Ninth Circuit Court panel further did not see that it had the authority, or a need, to attempt remediation. Compounding injury with insult, the Ninth Circuit ruled the government was not responsible for the destruction of the sacred site and dismissed the case as moot. Accordingly, Protect The 1st, along with the Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty, the Sikh Coalition, and the American Islamic Congress, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider the matter.
 
Perhaps not wanting to face a High Court notably protective of the First Amendment and religious expression, the federal government quickly agreed to a settlement. The government will replant the grove of native trees, pay for the reconstruction of the sacred stone altar, and recognize the historic use of the site by Native Americans. The restoration of the sacred site is set to be completed by spring 2024. The good news comes from the Becket Foundation, which helped the tribes file their petition.
 
“Our nation has a long, dark history of needlessly destroying Native American sacred sites without consequence,” said Luke Goodrich, Vice President and Senior Counsel at Becket. In a thread on X (Twitter), Goodrich said, “The government can never fully undo the damage it caused in this case. But this agreement is one step in a better direction--allowing these tribal members to resume religious practices that the government had taken away.”
 
The stunning about-face comes despite the government’s consecutive wins in lower and appellate courts. Perhaps the government took note that Justice Neil Gorsuch has ruled in favor of Native American tribes in nearly a dozen cases, often casting his vote to give the Court’s liberal wing a rare majority.
 
The settlement comes as other cases involving Native American land are still pending. The Ninth Circuit is still considering Apache Stronghold v. United States. In that case, the federal government is seeking to give away another Native sacred site to a multinational mining giant which plans to turn the site into a copper mine. 
 
Protect The 1st congratulates the Yakima Nation and the Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde as well as the Becket Foundation for their victory. The religious liberty protections of the First Amendment apply to all Americans, but most especially to religious minorities more vulnerable than faiths with many adherents.
 
We hope this settlement will send a message to careless government bureaucrats to be more respectful of Native American religious sites. We especially hope this same change of heart will also come for the Apache and their case now before the Ninth Circuit.

​In October, famed legal scholar and law professor Eugene Volokh demonstrated to an en banc hearing of the highest court in the District of Columbia that a Washington, D.C., anti-stalking statute that outlaws communications that inflict “significant mental suffering or distress” is overbroad, and thus violates the First Amendment.
 
Today, the D.C. Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Mashaud v. Boone in agreement with Volokh, who represented Protect The 1st as an amicus in this case. The court also agreed with Volokh’s contention that the court should narrow the law to speech that fits within First Amendment exceptions long recognized by courts – threats, obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct.
 
The law in this case, D.C.’s anti-stalking statute, “prohibits any speech that one should know would cause another to feel ‘seriously alarmed, disturbed, or frightened” or suffer “emotional distress.” The court vacated a lower court ruling that held an aggrieved husband liable for emails and social media posts that embarrassed a man who had conducted an extramarital affair with his wife.
 
The court based its reasoning in part on demonstrations by Volokh, Protect The 1st, and other amici who “argue the statute is constitutionally overbroad and would need to be struck down if it is not susceptible to a narrowing construction.” The court found that emotionally distressing speech as a category could subsume much speech that is necessary:
 
“Doctors deliver life-shattering prognoses that surely send reasonable people to suffer emotional tailspins of distress. Spouses knowingly inflict emotional distress by revealing longstanding paramours and demanding divorce. Police officers deliver news of loved ones having been killed. Judges pronounce death sentences. Employers tell staff that they are fired. They all know, or should know, the extraordinary distress their messages bring, and so fall within the statute’s prohibitions. Distressing speech is an important and often valuable part of life.”
 
The court turned to political communication at the highest rung of First Amendment-protected speech. Activists, from advocates of animal rights to the pro-life position on abortion, often hurl insulting words or graphic images. “Both speak on issues of public concern and are therefore entitled to the strongest First Amendment protections” despite the emotional distress such statements and images may inflict. Thus, the court reasoned, “a statute that prohibits speech indiscriminately based solely on its propensity for causing such distress is a constitutional nonstarter.”
 
Perhaps the court’s take on speech can be reduced to a quote from a 1973 U.S. Supreme Court decision, “the First Amendment needs breathing space.”
 
As Volokh has pointed out, the court did not strike down the D.C. law, but narrowed it to those discrete categories of speech that fall outside the scope of the First Amendment’s protection.
 
“We are overjoyed at this opinion from the Court of Appeals,” said Gene Schaerr, general counsel of PT1st. “We are proud to have been ably represented by Eugene Volokh and to have help vindicate the First Amendment’s protection against any laws that encroach on the freedom of speech.”

​Protect The 1st on Monday filed a comment with HHS detailing many of the ways in which the proposed recension of a 2019 rule to protect the religious conscience rights of physicians, nurses, and other health-care providers will hurt access to care among low-income and underserved Americans.
 
In 2019, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reported that a poll showed that more than 80 percent of healthcare providers who are religious would likely limit their scope of practice if they were required to participate in practices and procedures – such as abortion or sex reassignment surgery – to which they have a moral, ethical, or religious objection.
 
“If the existing rule is rescinded, many of these physicians will be forced to choose between obeying their conscience or violating their most cherished beliefs,” said Gene Schaerr, general counsel of Protect The 1st. “There is no lack of health-care providers who are willing to provide these procedures. Trying to force the minority of doctors and other providers to violate their conscience is a pointless exercise in religious discrimination and enforced ideological conformity.”
 
Protect The 1st asks HHS:
 
Please explain why, in the Department’s view, religious freedoms do not warrant protective regulatory provisions similar to those protecting other civil rights.
 
Please estimate how many doctors will likely leave the medical profession if they are required to perform medical procedures to which they are religiously opposed.
 
Please estimate the effect on underserved communities if religious hospitals and other entities choose to shut down rather than perform procedures to which they are religiously opposed.
 
Please estimate the rate at which patients will be unable to obtain what the Department considers healthcare if the 2019 final rule is largely rescinded.
 
The Protect The 1st comment also noted that the HHS proposal to move from reviews of systemic offenders to a “case-by-case” basis will shift the burden of litigation to injured parties. The department’s removal of all compliance requirements will almost certainly encourage the recent rash of local laws that discriminate on the basis of religion.
 
The Protect The 1st filing also said that the “proposed new rule is so deficient as to appear half-hearted in its attempt to protect religious freedoms.” In seeking to purportedly protect religious liberty and expand healthcare, the department’s new rule “cuts its own feet out from under it.”
 
Protect The 1st will work to communicate the dire nature of this rule change – and its impact on those who can least afford a restriction of access to health care – to the Biden Administration and to Congress.

​Former U.S. Senator Rick Santorum today joined with Protect The 1st to urge the U.S. Supreme Court to reject the petitioners’ argument in Gonzalez v. Google that the algorithmic recommendations of internet-based platforms should make them liable for users’ acts.
 
Santorum and Protect The 1st told the Court that curtailing Section 230 “would cripple the free speech and association that the internet currently fosters.” As a senator, Santorum had cast a vote for Section 230 to send the bill to President Bill Clinton’s desk for signature in 1996.
 
The Protect The 1st amicus brief informed the Court:

• Section 230 enables focused discussions: Section 230 is a law that “has created a thriving online marketplace of ideas in which diverse individuals can have their voices amplified and can freely associate with friends, journalists, thought leaders, and government officials.”
  
  
• Without Section 230 immunity, the internet would devolve into word soup: The benefits of Section 230 would be eroded if the Court adopted the petitioners’ argument. Without immunity, internet platforms could not organize content in a way that would be relevant and interesting to users.
  
  
• Section 230 explicitly allows some editorial functions: “Section 230 not only bars claims that treat platforms that host third-party content provided by others as ‘publishers’ of that content, but also identifies as protected services those that ‘filter,’ ‘choose’ and ‘organize’ content. Organization of content is an inherent aspect of any effort to effectively present vast quantities of information to the public, and it falls squarely within Section 230’s bounds.”
  
  
• Constitutional protection: Moreover, the brief states, “sorting, grouping, and placing content is also an editorial decision presumptively protected by the First Amendment.”

The brief described for the Court the harm to society that would occur if the Court were to disregard Section 230’s inclusion of First Amendment-protected editorial judgments. The brief tells the Court:

• Provocative, counterintuitive content would be blocked: “If platforms faced liability for merely organizing and displaying user content in a user-friendly manner, they would likely remove or block controversial—but First Amendment protected—speech from their algorithmic recommendations …”
  ​
• But filters could not stop bigots and pornographers: Imposing liability on platforms for their organization of content “would also make it virtually impossible for platforms to use algorithms that allow users to find content from like-minded sources and, equally important, to avoid content, like pornography and bigoted speech, that they find objectionable.”

 
And there is no need for the Supreme Court to rewrite Section 230: As amici explained, Congress can choose to amend Section 230 if new challenges necessitate a change in policy. For example, Congress recently eliminated Section 230 immunity when it conflicts with sex trafficking laws, and Congress is currently debating a variety of bills that would address specific concerns about algorithm-based recommendations.
 
The Protect The 1st’s brief states: “The judiciary is never authorized to interpret statutes more narrowly than Congress wrote them, but it is especially inappropriate to do so when Congress is already considering whether and how to amend its own law.”
 
Background:

This Protect The 1st amicus brief answers the question before the U.S. Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Google: “Does Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act immunize interactive computer services when they make targeted recommendations of information provided by another information content provider?”
 
Th case pending before the Court centers around the murder of Nohemi Gonzalez, a 23-year-old American who was killed in a terrorist attack in Paris in 2015. A day after this atrocity, the ISIS foreign terrorist organization claimed responsibility by issuing a written statement and releasing a YouTube video that attempted to glorify its actions. Gonzalez’s father sued Google, Twitter, and Facebook, claiming that social media algorithms that suggest content to users based on their viewing history makes these companies complicit in aiding and abetting international terrorism.
 
No evidence has been presented that these services played an active role in the attack in which Ms. Gonzalez lost her life. A district court granted Google’s motion to dismiss the claim based on Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, a measure that immunizes social media companies from content posted by users. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling.
 
The Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments Feb. 21.

CLICK HERE FOR THE AMICUS BRIEF 

​The Protect the First Foundation joined the Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty in an amicus brief filed today in the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to prevent the destruction of the sacred land of the Apache Stronghold of Arizona, “because the religious liberties of all rise and fall together.”
 
“This is a critical case for all people and communities of faith because it raises a fundamental question of what constitutes a ‘substantial burden’ on the ‘exercise of religion’ under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)” the brief states.
 
A district court had previously found that, to the Western Apache, Oak Flat is “a ‘direct corridor’ to the Creator’s Spirit.” The Oak Flat parcel of the Tonto National Forest has for centuries been such a sacred place to the Apache. If a government-approved transaction is allowed, Oak Flat will be turned over to a foreign mining consortium, Resolution Copper, to be transformed into a crater as long as the Washington Mall and as deep as two Washington Monuments.
 
A 2-1 split on a three-judge panel on the Ninth Circuit had ruled in June against the Apache, finding that the destruction of Oak Flat would not amount to a “substantial burden” on the practice of religion under RFRA. In September, however, the court made the rare move to rehear the case before an en banc hearing – meaning that it will be before 11 randomly selected Ninth Circuit judges. This happens in fewer than 0.5 percent of cases.
 
“[T]he panel erroneously concluded that the Apache will not be ‘substantially burdened’ as defined by RFRA,” Protect the First Foundation’s brief states. “Since RFRA does not define ‘substantial burden,’ this Court should follow the Supreme Court’s guidance and apply the ordinary or natural meaning of that term.” The brief also quotes Justice Neil Gorsuch from his days as a judge on the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals that whenever the government “prevents the plaintiff from participating in [a religious] activity,” and gives the plaintiff no “degree of choice in the matter,” that action “easily” imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise.
 
The brief demonstrates that the prior ruling erred in narrowly applying a previous Ninth Circuit case, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, despite it having more expansive permissible readings. “But, if true that Navajo Nation required the result reached here, then this Court should overturn it because it would mean Navajo Nation has adopted an erroneous and unduly narrow understanding of what a substantial burden is – an understanding that cannot be squared with the text or purpose of RFRA or Supreme Court precedent.”
 
The appellants also noted that the panel defended its conclusion on the grounds that the Supreme Court in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery (1988) found no valid free exercise claim. But that case preceded the passage of RFRA and its protections by decades. Moreover, in Lyng, the Court allowed the development of government land around religious sites. It did not propose to destroy them.
 
“It follows that a destroyed Oak Flat would devastate the Western Apache much like an obliterated Vatican for Catholics, a demolished Kaaba (in Mecca) for Muslims, or a dismantled temple for members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,” the brief declares. “But the burden imposed on the Western Apache would be worse still than even the destruction of religious buildings, because their religion is rooted in the land itself, not just buildings that have been built there.”
 
The brief quoted a district court: “Resolution Copper’s planned mining activity on the land will close off a portal to the Creator forever and will completely devastate the Western Apache’s spiritual lifeblood.”
 
PT1st will continue to monitor this case as it is decided by the Ninth Circuit.

​Protect The 1st filed a brief on Friday in favor of a Supreme Court petition from 21 current and former lifeguards who are being forced to remain for years against their will as dues-paying members of a public employee union.
 
In September 2019, these California Department of Parks and Recreation lifeguards signed forms that authorized a public union, the California State Law Enforcement Agency, to enroll them as members and deduct union dues from their wages.
 
On the form was a vaguely worded statement that there were limitations to withdrawal from the union. This may have seemed like boilerplate since a Supreme Court opinion in June 2018, Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, held that public-sector unions cannot require non-member employees to pay agency fees covering the costs of even non-political union activities.
 
The form did not explain that if members wished to resign their union membership, they could only do so during a single thirty-day period every four years. This means the lifeguards who signed the form will be forced to remain union members until July 2023. Over this time, any political stance or activity taken by the union will be done in the name, and with the money, of these unwilling members.
 
The lifeguards sued to protect their First Amendment rights. In April, the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against them.
 
In our brief before the Supreme Court, Protect The 1st informs the Court:
​
“The front page of the California State Law Enforcement Agency (‘CSLEA’) website currently sports a banner reading ‘My Union, My Choice!’ But when Petitioners asserted their choice to leave that union, the union and the state of California sang a different tune. California has a ‘maintenance of membership’ agreement with CSLEA, which forces employees to remain union members and pay full union dues for four years, all the while subsidizing union speech they no longer wish to support.
 
“Compelled speech and association—especially of a political nature—is not permissible under the First Amendment. And it is particularly shocking in this case, where the State seizes money from Petitioners’ paychecks and gives it to the union, which in turn supports political candidates and legislation through multiple election cycles.”
 
Our brief demonstrates three reasons why the Court should take up this case.
 
The “Member Maintenance” Agreement Compels Political Speech
California is forcing these government employees to support union speech, including political speech and candidates supported by the union, for up to four years. The repeated injuries to First Amendment rights over such a long period of time are especially egregious.

Even De Minimis Violations of the First Amendment Are Illegal
Compelling speech from American citizens for four years is unconscionable, but any compelled speech or association that violates the First Amendment, even if that compulsion includes only a few words or lasts for a few moments, is objectionable. As the Supreme Court held in 1976, “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”
 
The Lower Courts Are Eviscerating Janus’s Protections
Before the Ninth Circuit’s ruling against the lifeguards in April, the Third and Seventh Circuits had also imposed improper limits on the Supreme Court’s Janus decision. The Court had made it clear that “compelled subsidization of private speech seriously impinges on First Amendment rights.” Yet lower courts continue to allow such violations.
 
“This petition gives the high Court the means by which to reinforce the plain meaning of its ruling in Janus to the lower courts,” said Gene Schaerr, general counsel of Protect The 1st. “It upholds the obvious principle that the erosion of our First Amendment rights for even a minute is unacceptable – and the maintenance of that violation for years is obscene.”

​Protect The 1st today joined the Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty, the Sikh Coalition, and the American Islamic Congress in petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court to review the harms inflicted on religious liberty by a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision.
 
This petition concerns a case that began in 2008 when the U.S. Highway Administration, ignoring the objections of members of the Yakima Nation and Grande Ronde tribes, bulldozed Native ancestral burial grounds and dismantled a stone altar. The site was razed to widen U.S. Highway 26 in Oregon, while a tattoo parlor on the other side of the highway was left untouched.
 
After this desecration of their sacred lands, tribal members sought relief for this infringement in federal court. On Nov. 24, 2021, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the government would not be held responsible for destruction of the sacred site and dismissed the case as moot.
 
On Nov. 4, 2022, a coalition of Jews, Muslims, Sikhs, and Protect The 1st petitioned the Supreme Court to consider the threat to religious liberty, especially non-Western and Indigenous religious groups lacking political clout, by this cavalier treatment of a faith by the federal government.
 
The coalition’s petition demonstrates three errors driving the Ninth’s egregiously wrong decision, which threatens to gut the protections of the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).
 
First, The Ninth Circuit took a ‘our hands-are-tied approach.’ The court ignored that under RFRA, the government must rule out any possibility of remedying a religious freedom violation—including remedies that might partially satisfy the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. The court uncritically accepted the government’s position that any relief would, somehow, involve “safety” regarding the highway easement.
 
For example, the Ninth Circuit refused to consider actions that could be taken without impairing highway safety, such as planting trees or medicinal herbs in the surrounding areas, or whether any part of the sacred site could be rebuilt outside of the narrow strip of land covered by the easement.
 
The coalition’s petition informs the High Court that the failure of the Ninth Circuit to consider the possibility of some measure of relief “is especially troubling here, where the Ninth Circuit was deciding the rights of minority religious adherents. Especially in such cases, courts must thoroughly evaluate what sorts of accommodations believers of minority faiths might find acceptable …” 
 
Second, the Ninth Circuit’s decision ignores RFRA’s broad grant of authority to the judiciary to redress government interference with religious practice. The coalition brief explains that the Ninth Circuit decision here “flouts RFRA’s text” and Supreme Court precedent. “In holding that courts are powerless to redress statutory and constitutional violations because some remedies might (in the government’s view) implicate a state agency’s right-of-way, the Ninth Circuit got things exactly backwards.”
 
Instead, when federal courts confront federal actions that infringe on religious rights, the authority of courts to act in defense of those rights is strong.
 
Third, the Ninth Circuit took at face value the government’s claims that no remedy was feasible, instead of analyzing that claim under RFRA and RLUIPA. The coalition concludes: “If left standing, the Ninth Circuit’s decision would gut RFRA, permitting government actors to simply claim ‘infeasibility’ whenever they find accommodating religious practice inconvenient.”
 
“This case is a matter of heartbreak for American citizens of Native faiths,” said Gene Schaerr, general counsel of Protect The 1st. “It should also be a matter of deep concern for Sikhs, Jews and Muslims who wish to wear outward manifestations of their faith, as well as Christians and people of all faiths who want to preserve the protections of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.”