​States from Maine to Colorado keep defying court rulings by crafting new and disingenuous ways to exclude religious charities and schools from enjoying the same access to state benefits as secular organizations. And they keep getting slammed by the courts. And they keep asking to get slammed again.
 
To paraphrase the old John Mellencamp song – sometimes the law doesn’t feel like it should, so judges are there to “make it hurt so good.” This year’s award for top legal masochist has to go to Wisconsin Attorney General Josh Kaul.
 
Kaul had gone all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court to argue that the Catholic Charities Bureau of Wisconsin didn’t deserve a religious exemption from the state’s unemployment tax law. The reason? Because Catholic Charities serves the poor and the elderly of all faiths, without discriminating by religion or trying to proselytize its beneficiaries. Kaul thus deemed the Catholic Charities Bureau as being insufficiently religious. In June, Kaul was squashed by a 9-0 Supreme Court opinion.
 
“It is fundamental to our constitutional order that the government maintain ‘neutrality’ between religion and religion,” Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote for the Court. “There may be hard calls to make in policing that rule, but this is not one.”
 
So credit Kaul for at least forging a moment of unity between the liberals and conservatives on the Court.
 
Then Kaul came back with a new theory. He argued that these exemptions should be taken away from all religious charities. In other words, he wanted Wisconsin to go from discriminating against one religion to discriminating against all religions. Protect The 1st joined many groups in filing briefs in support of Catholic Charities.
 
On Monday, the Wisconsin Supreme Court hit Kaul with a terse order to obey the Supreme Court decision. Perhaps they had taken in the advice we gave the court in our brief, writing:
 
“By repealing a valuable statutory exemption for an entire class of religious organizations while keeping the exemptions in place for secular organizations, the State’s proffered remedy invites the Court to violate the Constitution in new ways and to flout U.S. Supreme Court precedent in this and related contexts. This Court should decline that perilous invitation.”
 
Don’t be surprised, however, if Kaul or Wisconsin legislators come back with yet another legal scheme or legislation that continues to push the campaign to punish Catholic Charities. Why these persistent efforts? We don’t pretend to know. Anti-religious bias? Because Roman Catholics hold traditional views on abortion and sexuality? Or do politicians like Kaul have such a blinkered view of the First Amendment that blatant discrimination goes unseen?
 
“It turns out that penalizing charities is not a winning legal strategy,” said Eric Rassbach, vice president and senior counsel at Becket, which represented Catholic Charities.
 
But we must admit that there is a kind of logic behind these persistent efforts by the states, whether Kaul’s or Pennsylvania’s continued bullying of the Little Sisters of the Poor. These would-be pruners of the First Amendment only need to get lucky once – to win in an appellate court, with the precedent holding after an exhausted Supreme Court finally finds no room in its docket.
 
For that reason, the defenders of freedom of belief must be just as persistent. Whether you are religious or not, when it comes to the First Amendment we must all keep the faith.

​The U.S. Supreme Court spent two hours on Monday debating whether President Trump lawfully fired Rebecca Slaughter, a Democratic member of the Federal Trade Commission. At stake is whether the FTC remains an “independent” agency or becomes fully subject to a “unitary executive.”

Given that Section 5 of the FTC Act empowers commissioners to investigate companies for “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” including commercial speech, this case holds significant but contradictory First Amendment implications. But first, some background.

Precedent Is “a Dried Husk”

Several Justices questioned a New Deal-era precedent called Humphrey’s Executor, which prevents a president from firing a commissioner except for cause.

• Chief Justice John Roberts told Slaughter’s lawyer that the precedent “is just a dried husk of whatever people used to think it was.”

 

• Justice Neil Gorsuch added it was “poorly reasoned” and asserted that there is “no such thing in our constitutional order as a fourth branch of government that’s quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative.”

Remarks like these led many court watchers to predict that Slaughter is unlikely to reclaim her seat when the Court rules next year.

Who Makes the Laws?

Justice Elena Kagan offered perhaps the most consequential line of the day. Under the unitary executive theory, she said, the president has “control over everything, including over much of the lawmaking that happens in this country.”

Lawmaking?

That candid acknowledgement spotlights the central constitutional tension in this case: the FTC engages in “lawmaking,” despite not being part of the only body charged with writing laws – Congress. This plays into Justice’s Gorsuch’s critique that FTC is a hybrid that exists outside of the Constitution’s delegation of powers. That reality may well prompt the Court’s conservative majority to overturn Humphrey’s Executor and place FTC under presidential control.

Congress designed the FTC, with its five commissioners drawn from both parties – three from the majority party – to inspire constructive debate from opposing sides. With one Republican member resigned, a Democrat not contesting his firing, and Slaughter fired, the FTC currently has only two commissioners, both Republicans. The Justices must now consider whether this original congressional bipartisan design can be wholly discarded.

The separation of powers issues created by the growth of agencies and the modern executive branch require not only holding the president accountable for executive functions, but also rolling back the excessive delegation of legislative power to the executive. A unitary executive that amasses control of both executive and legislative functions is no solution. It is a lopsided response to half the problem – leaving the system even more unbalanced.

Regulating Speech: Risks Under Both Models

But how would overruling Humphrey’s Executive affect the First Amendment? Unfortunately, the risks to free expression run in both directions.

Earlier this year, FTC Chairman Andrew Ferguson launched an investigation into social media censorship. The FTC declared that “censorship by technology platforms is not just un-American, it is illegal.” We’ve often criticized major social media platforms for censoring conservative views. But the law is clear: the First Amendment only forbids government censorship, not private content moderation. Companies can filter, curate, or label content however they want – whether that means putting funny mustaches on every image of President Trump or adding Vulcan ears on Gov. Gavin Newsom.

The FTC does have the power to crack down on fraudulent claims that magic vitamins cure cancer. But it is a profound overreach for government to police a media company simply because regulators want more liberal or conservative content.

As for “un-American,” the Federal Communications Commission – which has some merger authority over media companies – threatened ABC if it did not fire talk show host Jimmy Kimmel. “We can do this the easy way or the hard way,” FCC Chairman Brendan Carr said, prompting Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) to compare his threat to that of a Mafioso.

At least under a unitary executive, an administration can be held publicly accountable, as Sen. Cruz demonstrated. Independent agencies, by contrast, can wield vast power with no democratic check. One of the early congressional architects of the FTC promised the agency would take “business matters out of politics.” President Biden’s Chair Lina Khan rejected that view, declaring that “all decisions are political.”

In truth, the FTC’s deliberations have always been influenced by politics. But the recent heightened politicization of the FTC points to a subtler risk created when Congress delegated its lawmaking powers to an independent agency within the executive branch.

A Constitutional Contradiction with No Easy Fix

The best solution might be to scrap the entire model and rebuild it from the ground up. But no one expects the Supreme Court or the Congress to do that.
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For now, the task falls to the rest of us to call out free speech violations whether they arise from a presidentially controlled FTC or one run by independent ideologues insulated from democratic accountability.

​The late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg once said, “It is hard not to have a big year at the Supreme Court.” Is that still true? What if the Supreme Court dropped an opinion and it made no sound?
 
The High Court has repeatedly come down on the side of assuring equal treatment for religious people – from protecting the right of religious schools to participate in “universal” state scholarship programs, to the right to personal religious expression, to the right of religious charities to participate in publicly funded programs.
 
And yet many states – from Maine to Colorado – keep coming back with regulations and state rulings contrary to those of the Supreme Court. Novel legal theories are being advanced, such as the ongoing attempt by Pennsylvania to switch from discriminating against Catholic participation in a charitable exemption – a policy previously knocked down by the Supreme Court – to discriminating against all religions in favor of secular charities.
 
Maine’s attempt to use clever legal tweaks after Carson v. Makin (2024) – in which the Court held that a state antidiscrimination law meant that religious schools could not be excluded from a state tuition program for private schools – threatens to revive the nullification-style legal approach of the Confederacy.
 
What, then, is behind this determination by some states to defy the clear principles set down by the Supreme Court by continuing to try to exclude religious charities and organizations from equal participation in public programs?
 
It’s easy to just say “politics.” But to fully understand this political dynamic, we must look first at the widening gulf between voters of blue and red states on questions of belief.
 
According to the Pew Research Religious Landscape Study, 78 percent of Americans identified as Christian in 2007, with another 5 percent adhering to Judaism, Islam, or another religion. In 2024, 62 percent of Americans identified as Christian, with a slight bump up to 7 percent for other religions.
 
The decline in Christian observance has not been geographically uniform. It is concentrating in the blue polarity of the color spectrum.
 
For example, 77 percent of adults in South Carolina and Mississippi identify as Christian. Bright red South Dakota is 79 percent Christian. But in blue Colorado, the percent of state residents identifying as Christian dropped from 67 percent in 2007 to 52 percent last year. Maine saw a precipitous drop from 72 percent to 51 percent.
 
Pennsylvania’s Christian identification fell from 82 percent to 62 percent. Similar declines can be seen in blue states, from Massachusetts and New York to California. Many of these states are close to minority status for the nation’s largest religion. Oregon is already there, only 43 percent Christian.
 
The First Amendment, of course, protects any and all religion, including conversion to other religions and to no religion at all. But this widening gap between the states is concerning because it coincides with a growing politicization of a principle that, up until now, has been considered sacred by Americans of all beliefs – the free exercise of religion (including the right not to be religious).
 
The Freedom from Religion Foundation (FFRF) poses as a neutral force to keep church and state separate. But in many domains, from charity to education, strict secularism is not neutral, as seen in Pennsylvania’s attempt to elevate secular charities over religions ones. (The mirror image of such thinking would be efforts by red state politicians who want to place explicitly religious, usually Protestant, content in public classrooms.) Cracking down on the speech of either secularism or religion violates the spirit and the letter of the First Amendment.
 
Yet, with growing non-religious populations in blue states, FFRF is having success in channeling political and legal action against the equitable treatment of religious speech and activities. We hope more lawmakers will come to see that this goes against the philosophy of the signers of the Constitution – many Protestants, two Catholics, and several deists who doubted Biblical miracles and the divinity of Jesus.
 
What the founders understood, we need to understand today: Government can – and must – respect the role of religious people and organizations without being religious itself.

​For more than a decade, the Little Sisters of the Poor – a community of Catholic nuns who devote their lives to caring for the elderly poor – have been trapped in a never-ending nightmare of litigation. Their “crime”? After Congress enacted the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Little Sisters declined to provide coverage for drugs like the week-after pill in their health plan because doing so would violate their core religious beliefs.
 
Pennsylvania Already Slapped Down by the Supreme Court

In 2017, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a new rule with a broad religious exemption to the ACA’s contraceptive mandate. The government admitted it had broken the law when it previously tried to force faith-based nonprofits into compliance. That acknowledgment should have closed the book on this case.
 
Not satisfied to leave these nuns alone, Pennsylvania immediately sued the federal government to remove the Little Sisters’ exemption. Pennsylvania asked a federal judge to force the Little Sisters to comply with a federal mandate or face tens of millions of dollars in fines.
 
In 2019, after years of litigation, the Little Sisters asked the U.S. Supreme Court to protect them. In a 7-2 decision, the Little Sisters won. Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the Court, captured the heart of the matter:
 
“For over 150 years, the Little Sisters have engaged in faithful service and sacrifice, motivated by a religious calling… But [since the enactment of the contraceptive mandate], they … have had to fight for the ability to continue in their noble work without violating their sincerely held religious beliefs.”
 
The Supreme Court upheld the federal government’s authority to issue a religious exemption to the contraceptive mandate under the text of the ACA. It has yet to clarify how the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which prohibits government from substantially burdening religious exercise, would protect religious groups like the Little Sisters.
 
Pennsylvania Refuses to Throw in the Towel

Despite the Supreme Court’s rebuke, Pennsylvania – joined by more than a dozen states – kept pushing in lower courts to undo the Little Sisters’ protections. On Aug. 13, in a ruling against a Trump-era conscience rule, a federal district court in Philadelphia once again sided with Pennsylvania.
 
The Little Sisters are now again having to appeal to the Third Circuit. A case that should have ended years ago, central to protecting the free exercise rights of all Americans, thus continues on.
 
In the hands of state regulators, a narrow exemption for nuns caring for the elderly poor is apparently worthy of a multistate lawsuit. That alone speaks volumes.
 
The Stakes for Minority Faiths

Courts have long recognized a recurring problem – when judges and regulators do not understand a particular faith, they often undervalue the importance of its practices. That risk is highest for minority religions, which often lack resources, political power, and popular support. These communities depend heavily on statutory protections like RFRA, which is designed to operate:
​

• As a shield – allowing religious believers to defend themselves in court

 

• But also as a sword – empowering the government to proactively avoid violating conscience

If agencies are forbidden from issuing exemptions, religious minorities will be forced to wait until their beliefs are already compromised before seeking relief. By then, the harm is already done.
 
That is what makes the continuing campaign against the Little Sisters so troubling. Even after a decisive 7–2 Supreme Court victory, state governments continue trying to force a group of nuns to violate their vows or face crushing fines.
 
We expect that the Little Sisters will once again prevail. But this case serves as a warning about the fragility of religious liberty in the face of persistent official hostility from many states.

What does the U.S. Supreme Court have to do to make its opinions stick?

In June, the State of Wisconsin was rebuked by a unanimous Court for expelling the local Catholic Charities Bureau from a statewide exemption available to all other religions. Now Wisconsin is trying to get around the Court’s ruling by expelling all religious charities from this program, while continuing to make it available to secular charities.

Here's the background: In June, Justices from Sonia Sotomayor to Clarence Thomas unanimously reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling that would have forced the Catholic Charities Bureau into the state unemployment system instead of being allowed, as other charities are, to pay into its own more efficient network.

Why were the Catholics singled out? The state court reasoned that because Catholic Charities serves people of all faiths and no faith, it is therefore not inherently a religious charity.
​

• At the time, PT1st noted that an expert witness, one Jesus of Galilee, said that whatever “you do for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you do for me.” Jesus did not say the needy might be outside the orbit of care, whether Samaritans or Greeks. Nor did he say that one must proselytize while providing food, clothing, or shelter.

 

• The Court found that Wisconsin’s discrimination violated Catholic Charities’ First Amendment rights. Justice Sotomayor, who wrote the Court’s unanimous opinion, called Wisconsin’s exclusion “denominational discrimination.” She wrote: “It is fundamental to our constitutional order that the government maintain ‘neutrality’ between religion and religion. There may be hard calls to make in policing that rule, but this is not one.”

Ouch.

You would think that after this humiliation, Wisconsin would get it right. But like many other states, from Maine to New York, when it comes to equitable treatment of religious organizations, Wisconsin came back with a novel way to get around the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Wisconsin’s new theory is that it should now ban all religiously based charities from accessing the exemption.

There is just one problem with the state’s workaround. It would leave the exemption in effect for secular organizations, creating fresh violations of the First Amendment. So the state has gone from denominational discrimination to discrimination against all religions.

In our brief supporting Catholic Charities’ petition before the Supreme Court, we note:

“The miserly remedy requested by the State on remand calls to mind a poem by American poet and illustrator, Shel Silverstein. It reads: ‘Now I lay me down to sleep. I pray the Lord my soul to keep. And if I die before I wake, I pray the Lord my toys to break. So none of the other kids can use ‘em … Amen.”

​There’s actually nothing to read in tea leaves except, perhaps, whether they would make a good cup of tea. The same can often be said for oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court. Time and again, justices who pepper lawyers on one side with critical questions sometimes vote in their favor.
 
Still, Damon Landor, the petitioner in Landor v. Louisiana Dept. of Corrections, who sat through the oral argument of his case, has every reason to feel despondent over the hot bench questioning of his lawyer on Monday.
 
Landor is seeking damages for violations of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which protects the religious rights of prisoners. This is important because it is a long-standing principle that where there’s a right, there must be a remedy (ubi jus ibi remedium). Many legal scholars argue that courts have a responsibility to impose remedies – in this case, personal damages for state prison guards.
 
That Landor has a sympathetic case has been recognized by all. A devout Rastafarian, Landor was in prison for a drug-related conviction. For most of his incarceration, Landor maintained long dreadlocks under the Nazarite vow, an important outward sign of his faith.
 
With only three weeks left before his release, Landor was transferred to the Ramond Laborde Correctional Center in Louisiana. At intake, he explained his beliefs, presented proof of past accommodations, and handed a guard a copy of the Fifth Circuit decision protecting Rastafarian inmates.
 
The guard threw it in the trash. When Landor offered to contact his lawyer to affirm the legal principle protecting his dedication to his religion, guards forcibly handcuffed him to a chair and shaved his head.
 
Justice Amy Coney Barrett seemed to speak for everyone when she said, “the facts of this case are egregious.” She echoed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which “emphatically” condemned “the treatment Landor endured.” But, as Justice Neil Gorsuch told Landor’s attorney, the federal appeals courts “are unanimously against you and have been for many, many, many years.”
 
The many “manys” are justified. Despite the sympathy of the Fifth Circuit, Landor lost, as he had done before in lower courts. “We can’t decide a case just based on these facts,” Barrett said.
 
She joined Justice Gorsuch and Justice Brett Kavanaugh in pressing Landor’s lawyer and the Trump administration about insufficient notice to states that their employees could pay heavy fines for violating RLUIPA’s federal religious protections. Citing the string of losses by Landor and others, Justice Barrett said, “It’s hard to see how it could be clear to the states [when] all of the law went the other way.”
 
Justice Kavanaugh weighed in: “The hard part, as I see it, for your case, for me, is that you need a clear statement” to alert state employees that they are personally at risk for violations.
 
Conservative justices – including Chief Justice John Roberts – displayed skepticism that RLUIPA, an express application of Congress’s spending power, could authorize damages against individual state officers if they had not participated in contract negotiations accepting federal funds. Liberal justices – who often part ways with that conservative majority on expanding protections of religious freedom – were more sympathetic to Landor.
 
“Generally speaking, if you’re a prison official, you know you’re working in a prison and you are bound by law to pay damages if you violate the law,” said Justice Sonia Sotomayor.
 
It remains to be seen which side will prevail. But when warm weather returns to Washington, we will know if Landor’s tough day in court was an omen or not.

​Gabriel Olivier is an evangelical Christian who regularly preaches to passersby in a public park outside a public amphitheater in the city of Brandon, Mississippi. The city recognized Olivier’s right to speak, but told him he had to stay in a “protest area” far from people heading to the event center.
 
When Olivier approached pedestrians, he was confronted by police. When he explained to the local chief of police that he had a constitutional right to speak, he was arrested for his trouble and charged under a city ordinance. The U.S. Supreme Court will soon hear arguments on Olivier’s claim that the city ordinance violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
 
At its heart, this is classic forum law: Sidewalks, parks, and other public spaces have long been recognized as traditional fora for speech. But a procedural hurdle is at play as well: the question of whether Olivier should even get his day in court.
 
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff seeks restitution from state and local governments for violations of her constitutional rights, she must show that any related conviction or sentence related to that violation has been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid before suing. The Fifth Circuit held that Heck prevented Olivier from proceeding because he was convicted, pled nolo contendere, paid a fine, and chose to file a civil rights lawsuit rather than appeal his conviction.
 
Now the Supreme Court is set to determine if Olivier can bypass Heck and proceed to challenge the ordinance, or whether the procedural bar will remain, denying the merits question and leaving the city free to regulate speech.
 
If Olivier can get past this hurdle, he will have a strong case. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, has repeatedly upheld the rights of citizens to speak freely on the grounds of the U.S. Capitol, rejecting arguments that this is a “special type of enclave” immune from the guarantees of the First Amendment. Surely the prime section of a public park near an event center in Brandon, Mississippi, is subject to the same principle. Local governments often manage sidewalks, parks, plazas, and other public spaces that communities expect to remain open as fora for free speech. Consigning speakers away from intended listeners is not a reasonable restriction.
 
This case gives the High Court a chance to clarify the rules that allow citizens to challenge local restrictions on their constitutional rights. And, for a Court that has not been shy about protecting speech, it is a chance to recognize that in public parks, the roots of the First Amendment run deep.

​When the U.S. Supreme Court recently heard Chiles v. Salazar, the justices were confronted with a deceptively simple question: Can a state dictate what licensed therapists may or may not say to their adolescent clients about sexuality and gender? At stake is the speech of every professional – including therapists who affirm same-sex attraction, as well as those who are willing to question it.

Also at stake is nothing less than the First Amendment’s bedrock promise that the government cannot punish expression based on viewpoint.
​
A Law That Bans One Side of a Conversation

Colorado’s law forbids therapists from engaging in any counseling with minors that aims to “change sexual orientation or gender identity,” including talk that seeks to reduce unwanted same-sex attraction or align gender identity with biological sex. Importantly, this law applies even to purely voluntary, conversational therapy – no drugs, no “aversion” techniques, just words between a willing patient and a counselor.

For therapist Kaley Chiles, that law means she is forced to remain quiet with minors who come to her seeking help to live in accordance with their religious or personal convictions about sexuality. She argues that this is unconstitutional censorship on voluntary speech about deeply contested moral, religious, and scientific questions.

Her lawyer, James Campbell, told the justices that if Colorado’s position stands, the state could “transform counselors into mouthpieces for the government.”

Campbell invoked the Court’s 2018 decision in NIFLA v. Becerra, which struck down a California law forcing pro-life pregnancy centers to advertise abortion services. There, the Court held that professional speech still receives First Amendment protection and warned against “censoring private conversations between professionals and their clients.”

The First Amendment in the Therapy Room

The Tenth Circuit had rejected Chiles’s claim, applying the lowest standard of review – rational basis – to Colorado’s speech restriction. That ruling, Campbell told the Court, “gutted” NIFLA. Under such lenient scrutiny, a state could silence any disfavored viewpoint in a counseling session, from advice about divorce to moral discussions about abortion or family life.

Several justices appeared troubled by that possibility. Justice Elena Kagan noted that if one therapist can tell a client “I’ll help you accept that you’re gay,” while another cannot say “I’ll help you change that” – “that seems like viewpoint discrimination.”

Justice Neil Gorsuch pressed Colorado’s lawyer further. He asked that if the state can ban therapy that seeks to align a person’s identity with their biological sex, could a different state ban therapy that affirms a patient’s gay orientation – and justify it under the same rational basis standard?

Colorado’s attorney, Shannon Stevenson, said yes.

That answer underscores the double danger of viewpoint discrimination. What Colorado does today in the name of progress, another state could do tomorrow in the name of tradition.

The federal government, appearing as a friend of the Court on Chiles’s side, made that exact point. Hashim Mooppan reminded the Court that in the 1970s, “it was the standard of care that being gay was a mental illness.” Under Colorado’s theory, a state back then could have outlawed counseling that affirmed a gay identity.

That hypothetical isn’t ancient history; it’s the mirror image of the current case. What one era’s experts deem dangerous, another calls affirming. The Constitution doesn’t trust the government to referee such debates.

Professional Speech Is Still Speech

Colorado’s defense, echoed by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, was that Chiles is acting as a medical professional, not a private speaker. Justice Jackson asked why a therapist’s conversation about sexuality should be treated differently from a doctor prescribing medication. Campbell answered: “Because this involves a conversation.”

That distinction matters. The First Amendment protects the exchange of ideas, even those occurring in professional settings. In NIFLA, the Court rejected the notion of a “professional speech doctrine” that would allow the state to regulate speech more freely simply because the speaker is licensed. As Justice Thomas wrote for the majority, “The First Amendment does not permit the government to impose content-based restrictions on speech without satisfying strict scrutiny.”

If Chiles were decided otherwise, it would signal that professional speech – including a therapist’s, a professor’s, or even a lawyer’s – enjoys only conditional protection, subject to the prevailing political winds.

The Slippery Slope of State-Approved Speech

Colorado insists its law protects minors from harm but it has not cited a single study showing harm from voluntary talk therapy of the kind Chiles offers. Nor did the state explore less restrictive alternatives, such as informed-consent requirements or professional guidelines. Instead, it chose to ban speech outright – a blunt instrument aimed not at harm, but at a disfavored idea.

And that is the essence of viewpoint discrimination – when the government’s concern is not the method of communication, but the message. The genius of the First Amendment is its neutrality. It protects speech we find uncomfortable precisely because we cannot predict which ideas will one day fall out of favor.

A Warning from the Court
​
When Justice Kagan and Justice Gorsuch – often ideological opposites – both voiced concern about viewpoint discrimination, it suggests that Chiles’s case may transcend culture-war lines. The Court’s challenge is not to decide who is right about gender or sexuality, but to reaffirm that the government cannot dictate the answer.

- Samuel Johnson

​Alex Jones, founder of InfoWars, is asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review a defamation judgment ordering him to pay nearly $1.5 billion to an FBI agent and parents of children murdered in the Sandy Hook school massacre that took 26 lives.

Jones notoriously claimed the 2012 tragedy in Connecticut was a deep-state “hoax” and that the grieving parents of 20 slain children were “crisis actors” hired to promote gun control. Once on the stand, he admitted that the massacre was “100 percent” real, but now argues that his appeal should succeed on First Amendment grounds, with references to a landmark First Amendment case.

Does Jones Have a Leg to Stand On?

In New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), the Court raised the bar for public figures to win libel suits, requiring proof of “actual malice” – reckless disregard for the truth or knowingly making false statements. The decision gave critics of the powerful “breathing space” to report without undue fear of crushing lawsuits.

Jones’ lawyers invoke Sullivan, but their argument rests on the claim that a Connecticut court’s default judgment makes the precedent irrelevant. That claim is undercut by Jones’ refusal to participate in his trial, including ignoring discovery orders. Worse for Jones, the odds against him are steep. The Supreme Court hears fewer than 100 cases of 6,000 to 7,000 petitions it receives each year.

Viewed through the lens of Sullivan, Jones’ defamation was about as serious as it gets. As a result of Jones’ attacks, Sandy Hook survivors testified that they suffered from threats of death and rape, along with the added trauma of being branded impostors before an audience of millions.

How Might the Court Consider this Petition?
​
A Supreme Court clerk weighing this petition would likely check every Sullivan box:
​

• Reckless disregard for truth? Check.
• Knowingly making false statements? Check.
• The Sullivan standard for “actual malice”? Check and check.

The First Amendment, bolstered by Sullivan, likely still leaves Jones without sufficient “breathing space” to protect his outrageous claims. “Speech is free,” a plaintiff’s lawyer in the case once told a jury, “but lies you have to pay for.”

We have sometimes criticized how courts have subsequently gone beyond Sullivan to the point of making it almost impossible for public figures to win a defamation case. The Jones case, however, may mark the bottom line. His snarling visage could then become the enduring image of what “actual malice” truly means.
​
For a deeper dive on Sullivan’s history and legacy, check out this piece by Columbia’s Knight First Amendment Institute.

What does the U.S. Supreme Court have to do to make the law clear to the states?

Several states seem determined to get around the 6-3 ruling of the Court in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis. In that 2023 opinion, the Court upheld the First Amendment right of a digital designer not to be compelled to write, design, and create websites that conflicted with her religious beliefs opposing same-sex marriage.

Even if you disagree with those conservative religious beliefs, you still have a stake in the right of people not to be forced to violate their religious beliefs in businesses that rely on expressive activities.

Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote that under the logic of a Colorado state board, which pressed the case against 303 Creative, the government could be allowed “to force all manner of artists, speechwriters, and others whose services involve speech to speak what they do not believe on pain of penalty.”

He added that under the same logic, Colorado “could require an unwilling Muslim movie director to make a film with a Zionist message, or an atheist muralist to accept a commission celebrating Evangelical zeal … Equally, the government could force a male website designer married to another man to design websites for an organization that advocates against same-sex marriage.”

The Court followed the logic of its Masterpiece Cakeshop decision in 2018, which found that a baker who crafts wedding cakes with special messages was engaged in expressive activity. This made his profession one in which religious scruples must be protected by the First Amendment.

Now California is prosecuting another baker, Cathy Miller, owner of Tastries Bakery in Bakersfield for refusing to make a cake for a same-sex couple. In the Becket Fund video below, there is no doubt that Miller sees her work as artistry that supports her Christian beliefs.

Before starting a wedding cake, Miller meets with every bride and groom to get the message right. “What is the intent of the cake?” she asks. “How can I bless somebody with this?”
​
When a same-sex couple asked her to make a cake, Miller said that she “prayed for the right words” on how to communicate with the prospective customers. She told them that she is the only baker in Bakersfield with this restriction and offered a referral. Legal action by the state soon followed, along with coarse threats and vandalism from anonymous attackers.

​The Court has made it clear that the principle protecting expressive services is narrow and limited. A restaurateur or hotel owner who tried to deny service to LGBTQ customers would be hit with a civil rights violation – and rightly so.

There is, perhaps, a larger culture takeaway in this case for people on all sides of the religious and cultural divide.
​
Given that almost every baker would jump at the chance to take the order that Miller took a pass on, could we just agree to live and let live? Does everything have to be litigated to the ultimate degree? Or the next time, might two customers actually follow up on Miller’s referral to a “really good decorator” who is more than happy to make their cake?

​There is much more to Rastafari than reggae music and the ritual inhalation of ganja. This belief system is, in fact, recognized as an Abrahamic religion, with roughly one million adherents around the world, dedicated to its interpretation of the Bible and devotion to Jah, the Rasta designation for God.
 
Damon Landor, a devout Rastafarian, had grown dreadlocks over nearly two decades in devotion to his faith. Sentenced to prison for a drug-related conviction, Damon was allowed to keep his dreadlocks in keeping with court interpretations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). With only three weeks left before his release, Damon was transferred to Raymond Laborde Correctional Center in Louisiana. At intake, he explained his beliefs, presented proof of past accommodations, and handed a guard a copy of the Fifth Circuit decision protecting Rastafarian inmates.
 
The guard threw it in the trash. When Damon offered to contact his lawyer to prove his dedication to his religion, guards forcibly handcuffed him to a chair and shaved his head bald. What began as an ugly dispute is now a landmark religious-liberty case. The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to review Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections.
 
Though lower courts condemned the conduct, they denied Landor the ability to seek monetary damages under RLUIPA, finding that the statute bars such relief against individual officials.
 
In a powerful amicus brief, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty argues that allowing damages under RLUIPA is essential – not merely appropriate – for holding prison officials accountable and safeguarding religious liberties. The brief warns that without such a remedy, courts effectively bless “mootness gamesmanship” – the practice of officials evading accountability by transferring or releasing inmates before injunctive relief can take effect.
 
“Without money damages, prison officials can engage in strategic gamesmanship to moot meritorious cases,” Becket told the Court. Becket warns that RLUIPA would otherwise be a "parchment promise." The brief also highlights that fears of burdening officials are overblown. Existing safeguards, including qualified immunity, the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion and filing requirements, and screening for frivolous suits, ensure that only culpable officials face liability.
 
If the Supreme Court holds that RLUIPA doesn’t authorize damages, countless prisoners – particularly those who are transferred or released before adjudication – could never receive redress for profound religious violations. This is why dozens of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim organizations have filed amicus briefs in this case, understanding that respect for the religious rights of some involve the religious rights of all.
 
Protect The 1st will closely follow oral argument before the Court on November 10. In the meantime, keep in mind the words of the late, great Bob Marley: “You never know how strong you are until being strong is your only choice.”

​When the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case of Kari MacRae, a Massachusetts teacher fired over social media posts made before she was hired, Justice Clarence Thomas took to his pen. He issued a scorching rebuke of lower courts, particularly the First Circuit, calling them out for botching the application the First Amendment in public employee speech cases.
 
“This case is the latest in a trend of lower court decisions that have misapplied our First Amendment precedents in cases involving controversial political speech,” Thomas wrote, warning that if left unchecked, government employers will increasingly restrict “disfavored or unpopular speech in the name of preventing disruption.”
 
Thomas didn’t dissent from the Court’s decision to deny certiorari, recognizing that this case may not have been the best vehicle to revisit the legal test known as the Pickering-Garcetti framework. Under that standard, public employees have First Amendment protection when speaking as private citizens on matters of public concern, unless their speech unduly disrupts the government’s ability to function as an employer. But as Thomas emphasized, that balance cannot be twisted to give the government a free pass to punish speech it merely dislikes, especially when expressed outside the workplace and before employment even begins.
 
“It undermines core First Amendment values to allow a government employer to adopt an institutional viewpoint on the issues of the day and then, when faced with a dissenting employee, portray this disagreement as evidence of disruption,” Thomas wrote. He found the First Circuit’s reasoning “deeply flawed” for dismissing MacRae’s speech because of its supposedly “mocking, derogatory, and disparaging manner.”
 
Quoting Snyder v. Phelps, Thomas reminded his colleagues that “speech on matters of public concern is at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.” If the Supreme Court could protect vile funeral protests by the Westboro Baptist Church, “I do not see how the First Circuit could discount the First Amendment value of MacRae’s comparatively mild posts.”
 
MacRae’s memes, which included critiques of gender ideology and calls for colorblind policies, may have been controversial to some. They also reflected positions shared by a substantial portion of the public. For the First Circuit to reduce the weight of her First Amendment interest based on tone, or to treat pre-employment political speech as grounds for termination, sets a dangerous precedent.
 
The Court may have passed on this case, but Thomas’s warning is clear: Without a course correction, the First Amendment rights of millions of government employees and future applicants will hang by a thread.

​They knew it when they saw it. In a 6-3 opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton that a Texas “age-gate” law restricting porn sites to adults is constitutional. Civil libertarians are sure to hotly debate whether there are principles here that will be applicable to any other First Amendment cases outside of the regulation of pornography.
 
The Court held that the Texas law, which requires adults to upload documentary proof of their age online before visiting a porn site, has only an “incidental effect on protected speech.” The Court found:
 
“The First Amendment leaves undisturbed States’ traditional power to prevent minors from accessing speech that is obscene from their perspective. That power includes the power to require proof of age before an individual can access such speech. It follows that no person – adult or child – has a First Amendment right to access such speech without first submitting proof of age.”
 
Justice Elena Kagan, dissenting, wrote:
 
“Speech that is obscene for minors is often not so for adults. For them, the category of obscene – and therefore unprotected speech – is narrower … So adults have a constitutional right to view the very same speech that a State may prohibit for children. And it is a fact of life – and also of law – that adults and children do not live in hermetically sealed boxes. In preventing children from gaining access to ‘obscene for children’ speech, States sometimes take measures impeding adults from viewing it too – even though, for adults, it is constitutionally protected expression.”
 
State legislators in future debates are sure to analyze and discuss the Court’s decision. Many will see a precedent that could require similar ID checks to visit websites that are not pornographic, but also inappropriate for children – such as downloading Lady Chatterley’s Lover. Are such adults-only age-gates truly “incidental,” or are they so cumbersome as to amount to a serious restriction on speech?
 
Others will say that Court’s ruling is actually a modest recognition of the right of the states to reasonably protect children from the internet’s torrent of full-motion, high resolution pornography.
 
Sex. Porn. Age. Free Speech. This one has all the vibrant and racy elements for a debate that itself promises to exercise the First Amendment to the fullest.

​The U.S. Supreme Court has once again stepped in to remind the State of New York – and any state tempted to do likewise – that religious liberty is not a favor dispensed by bureaucrats but a constitutional guarantee. On June 17, the Court ordered New York courts to take another look at Diocese of Albany v. Harris, a case in which religious organizations are challenging a state mandate requiring employers to provide abortion coverage in their health insurance plans.
 
The plaintiffs include Catholic dioceses, Anglican and Baptist ministries, and faith-based social service providers like the Carmelite Sisters, who run nursing homes, and the Sisterhood of St. Mary, a contemplative Anglican order. Their objection is simple: They believe life begins at conception, and they refuse to be complicit in taking it. New York has bizarrely decided that this belief – shared by millions – is not worthy of respect if such a religious group is also willing to serve the public without religious discrimination.
 
When New York first proposed the abortion coverage rule, it included a broad exemption for religious objectors. But under pressure from abortion-rights activists, the exemption was narrowed to cover only those that teach religion and serve only those who share their faith. This would leave out virtually every real-world religious charitable ministry. As Lori Windham, vice president and senior counsel at Becket, noted, not even Jesus or Mother Teresa would qualify under New York's miserly exception for religious freedom.
 
The case is part of a broader legal conflict that traces back to the contraceptive mandate imposed under the Affordable Care Act. Religious groups like the Little Sisters of the Poor, who serve the elderly poor, spent a decade in court fighting the federal government over being forced to cover contraceptives and abortifacients. The Supreme Court repeatedly sided with them. But New York has pushed even further, mandating coverage for surgical abortions and setting up a restrictive exception for religious associations, denying the religious legitimacy of ministries that serve people of other faiths.
 
The Supreme Court already told New York to reconsider this case once – instructing state courts to account for its ruling in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, which held that governments cannot condition public benefits on abandoning religious beliefs. But the New York Court of Appeals upheld the mandate again this May. That refusal led to another trip to the Supreme Court and another remand back down to try again.
 
A new pivot point is the Court’s unanimous June 5 decision in Catholic Charities Bureau v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission. In that case, Wisconsin denied Catholic Charities a religious exemption from unemployment insurance rules, arguing that serving the poor wasn't inherently religious. The Court rejected this reasoning emphatically. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that such theological judgment by the government is “a textbook violation” of both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
 
With that decision in hand, the Supreme Court sent the Diocese of Albany case back to New York, making clear that religious groups don’t need to prove that their service is “religious enough” to be protected. If a ministry’s charitable work is rooted in its religious beliefs, it cannot be penalized for refusing to uncharitably limit its charity to its co-religionists. New York, for its part, has already conceded that its abortion coverage scheme cannot stand under the new precedent.
 
This is a victory not just for the nuns and ministries involved, but for anyone who believes that religious liberty does not vanish when faith communities choose to serve the public. The First Amendment does not allow states to punish religious conviction by substituting their own standards for religiosity or demand a cramped notion of religious charity.
 
Meanwhile, another case on the Supreme Court’s docket – Mahmoud v. Taylor – could further define the constitutional boundaries of religious liberty in public education. A decision is expected as early as this Thursday.
 
All eyes on Mahmoud.

Jesus told his followers that whatever “you do for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you do for me.” He didn’t specify anyone who might be outside of the orbit of care, be they Samaritans or Greeks. Nor did he say that one must proselytize while providing food, clothing, or shelter to the needy.

It is on that basis that the Catholic Charities Bureau, the social ministry of the Catholic Diocese in Wisconsin, provides services for the disabled, the elderly, and the impoverished regardless of their faith. This generous, ecumenical care may square with Jesus, but it fell short of the high standards of Wisconsin regulators and the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The state court ruled that because the charity’s care was given to people of all faiths, it is not inherently religious. For that reason, the charity was forced into the state unemployment compensation system instead of being allowed, as other religions are, to pay into its own more efficient network.

The Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court – from one end of the ideological spectrum to the other – did not hold back in forcefully overturning this Wisconsin ruling on Thursday. “It is fundamental to our constitutional order that the government maintain ‘neutrality’ between religion and religion,” Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote for the Court. “There may be hard calls to make in policing that rule, but this is not one.”

Justice Sotomayor found that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had engaged in “denominational discrimination” for holding that Catholic Charities was not religious in character because it serves people of all faiths. The state, she wrote, had wrongly imposed “a denominational preference by differentiating between religions based on theological choices.”

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion criticizing the state court for ruling that the Catholic charity is a “distinct organization” from the Diocese.

“Both the basic principles of church autonomy and the history of religious corporations establish that religious institutions are more than the corporate entities that they form,” Justice Thomas wrote. “It follows that the government may not use such entities as a means of regulating the internal governance of religious institutions.” He added: “The First Amendment’s guarantee of church autonomy gives religious institutions the right to define their internal governance structures without state interference.”

Justice Sotomayor made a key distinction sure to resonate:
​
“When the government distinguishes among religions based on theological differences in their provision of services, it imposes a denominational preference that must satisfy the highest level of judicial scrutiny. Because Wisconsin has transgressed that principle without the tailoring necessary to survive such scrutiny, the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is reversed.”

Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Apache Stronghold v. United States, about which we’ve written at length. But the Court also denied review in another important First Amendment case on the same day: L.M. v. Town of Middleborough, which concerns the limits of student self-expression in schools.
 
The case involves a student at Nichols Middle School in Middleborough, Massachusetts, who was prevented by faculty from attending class when he wore a T-shirt that read, “There Are Only Two Genders.” According to the facts of the case, Nichols Middle School actively encouraged student expression when it came to endorsing the view that there are many genders, but would not tolerate the opposing view. 
 
The student, known as L.M., brought suit, alleging First Amendment violations based in part on viewpoint discrimination. The critical precedent for student expression in schools is Tinker v. Des Moines, a Vietnam-era case that firmly established the principle that neither students nor teachers “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”
 
Tinker involved students wearing black armbands as a form of silent protest against the Vietnam war. Whatever your beliefs about the gender identity debate, it is similarly an issue of intense discussion throughout the media and larger public. As such, similar legal reasoning – that prohibited student expression must “materially and substantially interfere” with the functioning of the school to warrant censorship – should apply.
 
Using the Tinker test, however, both the federal district court and the First Circuit Court of Appeals denied relief. The lower courts followed the judgment of school administrators that this passive speech could trigger and cause harm to other, vulnerable students, demonstrating the inherent subjectivity of this area of law. Justice Samuel Alito called this standard “vague” and sure to be “permissive” of censorship.
 
Indeed, in an impassioned dissent from the Supreme Court’s certiorari denial, Justice Alito (joined by Justice Clarence Thomas) took heated issue with the lower courts’ findings, particularly as they relate to the First Circuit’s dismissal of LM’s viewpoint discrimination claims. He wrote:
 
“The court below erred, and badly so: the rule that viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are almost never allowed is not a new principle ... To the contrary, viewpoint neutrality has long been seen as going to ‘the very heart of the First Amendment.’ The First Circuit was wrong to expel this bedrock constitutional safeguard from our schools.
 
“The First Circuit also watered down the test adopted in Tinker for determining whether a school’s restriction of student speech is allowed. Because free speech is the default and censorship the exception, Tinker set forth a ‘demanding standard.’ We held that a school can restrict speech when it has ‘evidence’ that such restrictions are ‘necessary’ to ‘avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline.’ Thus, absent a ‘specific showing’ of such a disruption – like ‘threats or acts of violence on school premises’ – this justification for suppressing student speech does not apply. Under this standard, NMS (Nichols Middle School) had no right to censor L.M.” [Citations omitted.]
 
We agree with Justice Alito that the Court should have granted review in this case – if for no other reason than to clarify the Tinker ruling, which has been subject to wildly divergent interpretations over the years.
 
The First Circuit’s rewriting of the Tinker test leaves a lot up to speculative faculty opinions. As Justice Alito writes, it “demands that a federal court abdicate its responsibility to safeguard students’ First Amendment rights and instead defer to school officials’ assessment of the meaning and effect of speech.”
 
In an increasingly censorious world, that seems an insufficient safeguard.

​When a federal judge this week struck down President Trump’s executive order targeting the WilmerHale law firm, ruling the order unconstitutional, it was the third recent slap-down of his efforts to punish individual firms. It also brought into stark relief how rapidly this administration is moving in two radically different directions on the First Amendment.
 
On the positive side, the president issued on day one an executive order reaffirming this administration’s commitment to the First Amendment. That order fairly criticized the Biden administration for “exerting substantial coercive pressure on third parties, such as social media companies, to moderate, deplatform, or otherwise suppress speech that the Federal Government did not approve.”
 
Following up on that order, Secretary of State Marco Rubio pledged to “close the book” on “the weaponization of America’s own government to silence, censor, and suppress the free speech of ordinary Americans.” He fulfilled this promise by shuttering the agency’s Global Engagement Center, which secretly tried to kill conservative publications and served as a Trojan horse for filtering content moderation requests to social media platforms.
 
On the other hand, Trump has repeatedly used executive orders to go after past political opponents, putting law firms they had been associated with in the crosshairs for their political leanings.
 
This week, Senior Judge Richard Leon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia essentially said “enough.” He granted summary judgment in favor of WilmerHale, finding the president’s order violated key First Amendment protections and constituted an improper attempt to punish WilmerHale for its legal advocacy.
 
As with other executive orders, this one had barred WilmerHale lawyers from federal buildings, ordered a review of client contracts, and suspended the firm’s security clearances. Any of these measures alone would have been enough to make it impossible for WilmerHale’s 1,100 lawyers to represent many of their clients, hobbling the careers of those lawyers and the cases of their clients.
 
Judge Leon found these measures retaliatory, noting they stemmed from the firm’s representation of clients and causes President Trump dislikes, especially WilmerHale’s long association with former special counsel Robert Mueller.
 
Judge Leon rejected the administration’s effort to defend its order piece by piece, but instead compared it to “gumbo” with the opening section condemning the firm for the hiring of Robert Mueller to justify the later “meaty ingredients – e.g., the Andouille, the okra, the tomatoes, the crab, the oysters.” But, Judge Leon wrote, it is the opening section that vents on Robert Mueller, “the roux” which “holds everything together. A gumbo is served and eaten with the ingredients together, and so too must the sections of the Order be addressed together … this gumbo gives the Court heartburn.” 
 
One doesn’t have to be a fan of the lengthy Mueller “Russian collusion” investigation to share Judge Leon’s heartburn. Leon warned that upholding the order would betray the vision of the Founders. Judge Leon’s opinion finds the executive order to be a grand tour of violated First Amendment rights – from retaliation for speech, to viewpoint discrimination, interference with petition rights, and infringement of free association. The judge wrote: “The Order shouts through a bullhorn: If you take on causes disfavored by President Trump, you will be punished!”
 
The parallels to the administration’s enjoined orders against Perkins Coie and Covington & Burling are equally clear. Judge John Bates, in blocking an action against law firm Jenner & Block, quoted the Supreme Court in a major precedent, National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo (2024), one that ought to make it clear to conservatives what it would feel like if the shoe were on the other foot. Judge Bates wrote:
 
“More subtle but perhaps more pernicious is the message the order sends to the lawyers whose unalloyed advocacy protects against governmental viewpoint becoming government-imposed orthodoxy. This order, like the others, seeks to chill legal representation the administration doesn’t like, thereby insulating the Executive Branch from the judicial check fundamental to the separation of powers. It thus violates the Constitution, and the Court will enjoin its operation in full.”
 
Especially concerning to these jurists was the orders’ use of federal contracts to coerce firms and clients. As Judge Leon wrote, that is coercion, not policy. The adversarial system depends on lawyers being free to take on controversial cases without fear of retribution. Nine firms settled to avoid similar orders. WilmerHale chose to fight – and won a sweeping ruling for the First Amendment and for the principle that legal advocacy must remain free from political interference.
 
With these precedents in place, we hope it is clear to President Trump that attacks on law firms are going to continue to hit a brick wall, one that likely extends all the way to the Supreme Court if necessary.
 
A better way forward is to drop this fruitless campaign of harassment and return to what worked so well for President Trump early on – defending the First Amendment.

​The U.S. Supreme Court today denied the Western Apache’s last appeal to protect their sacred lands from being transformed into a copper mine. The way is now clear to transfer this parcel of the Tonto National Forest, Oak Flat, from the federal government to a multinational mining company, Resolution Copper.

Justice Neil Gorsuch was joined in an impassioned dissent by Justice Clarence Thomas. It is masterfully reasoned, leaving one to wonder not just about the blatant injustice of this land deal for the Apache, but the implications for the religious freedom of other Americans in the future.

The Background

Gorsuch goes into great detail explaining the history of the Apaches’ connection to Oak Flat and its central place in their religion. He quotes the cert petition explaining the importance of Oak Flat:

“Western Apaches believe that the site is the dwelling place of the Ga’an – ‘saints’ or ‘holy spirits’ that lie at ‘the very foundation of [their] religion … ‘They come from the ground,’ and they serve as ‘messengers between Usen, the Creator, and [Apaches] in the physical world.’

“Faithful to these beliefs, tribal members have worshipped at Oak Flat for centuries, conducting there a number of religious ceremonies that cannot take place anywhere else.”

Justice Gorsuch goes into detail about Apache ceremonies, including three-day coming-of-age-rituals for Apache girls, in which they gather plants while covered in white clay. This mirrors the Apache creation story in which a white-painted woman came out of the earth. Gorsuch quotes the plaintiff, the Apache Stronghold, which wrote that the white clay is meant to “imprint” the spirit of Oak Flat in the young women.

Now, Justice Gorsuch writes, tribal members believe the destruction of Oak Flat “will close off the portal to the Creator forever and will completely devastate the Western Apaches’ spiritual lifeblood.”

The Law

Gorsuch details obligations in an 1852 treaty between the Apaches and the government to recognize the sacred status of Oak Flat. Those obligations were overturned when legislators attached an 11th hour rider to the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, hiding it in a bill that was 698 pages long.

Justice Gorsuch proceeds to dissect and expose the illogical Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that will now allow the multinational mining company to destroy Oak Flat. Today’s motion puts at risk the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which was passed by Congress in 1993 to protect the free exercise of religion from “substantial burdens” by the federal government.

The Ninth Circuit got around RFRA by turning to a precedent, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. (1988) that involved a First Amendment challenge to a plan to construct a road on federal land near sacred tribal sites. Gorsuch writes:

“On the Ninth Circuit’s telling, Lyng set forth a special test for analyzing whether the government’s ‘disposition’ of its real property runs afoul of the Free Exercise Clause … That test, the Ninth Circuit said, permits the government to do as it pleases with its property as long as it has no ‘tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs’ and does not ‘discriminate against or among religious adherents.’”

The Result

Justice Gorsuch notes that courts have had no qualms upholding other laws restricting the government’s power to dispose of its real property. The Endangered Species Act, for example, required the halting of a federal dam to protect the “snail darter.” But no such protections can be afforded to the religion of the Apaches.

The way is now clear for Resolution Copper to blast tunnels that will result in a crater 1,000 feet deep and nearly two miles wide. While courts have acknowledged that this will permanently destroy the Apaches’ historical place of worship, preventing them from ever worshipping there, it does not – according the Ninth Circuit opinion now upheld –amount to a “substantial burden” of the First Amendment religious freedom rights of the Apache. Justice Gorsuch writes:

“Just imagine if the government sought to demolish a historic cathedral on so questionable a claim of legal reasoning. I have no doubt we would find the case worth our time. Faced with the government’s plan to destroy an ancient site of tribal worship, we owe the Apaches no less. They may live far from Washington, D.C., and their history and religious practices may be unfamiliar to many. But that should make no difference.”

He ended his dissent with a quote from the Court’s 2018 opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop:

“Popular religious views are easy enough to defend. It is in protecting unpopular religious beliefs that we prove this country’s commitment to … religious freedom.”

In his conclusion, Justice Gorsuch writes:
​
“While this Court enjoys the power to choose which cases it will hear, its decision to shuffle this case off our docket without a full airing is a grievous mistake – one with consequences that threaten to reverberate for generations."

​Protect The 1st is disappointed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 4-4 deadlock that blocks public funding of a religious charter school in Oklahoma.
 
The ruling, composed of only two sentences, leaves in place an Oklahoma Supreme Court decision to deny St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School its prospective status as the nation’s first publicly funded religious charter school.
 
This dispute started in 2023, when Oklahoma’s charter school board okayed an application by the archdiocese of Oklahoma City and the diocese of Tulsa to create St. Isidore. The school’s plan centered around online learning to address the demand for quality instruction across the Sooner State’s charter school network.
 
Soon after, Oklahoma attorney general Gentner Drummond went to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, asking it to invalidate the charter board’s contract with the school. In a 7-1 opinion, the court ruled against allowing public charter funds to support St. Isidore, holding the funding of online religious schools by the state to be unconstitutional.

In her lone dissent, Justice Dana Kuehn made the compelling point that taking the state’s money would make St. Isidore a publicly funded school, but not a “public school.” Judge Kuehn wrote:
 
“St. Isidore would not become a ‘state actor’ merely by contracting with the State to provide a choice in educational opportunities. By allowing St. Isidore to operate a virtual charter school, the State would not be establishing, aiding, or favoring any particular religious organization. To the contrary: Excluding private entities from contracting for functions, based solely on religious affiliation, would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
 
Indeed, as long as a religious school meets the state’s teaching requirements for math, science, English and other core subjects, it should be eligible for any public benefits made available to any other private school. Oklahoma’s rejection of this common sense, guiding principle is based on the antiquated Blaine Amendments – anti-Catholic laws passed largely in the 19th century to prevent Catholic schools from receiving public funding. These laws, which exist in 37 states, remain in force as living relics of anti-Catholic bigotry from a bygone era.
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has effectively ruled in three recent cases that “a State violates the Free Exercise Clause when it excludes religious observers from otherwise available public benefits.”
 
In Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, the Court ruled that a Missouri policy denying religious organizations access to playground resurfacing grants violated the Free Exercise Clause. In Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, the Court held that a Montana state constitutional provision barring aid to any school “controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination” was similarly unconstitutional. And in Carson v. Makin, the Court found that Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments also failed to pass constitutional muster.
 
Attorney General Drummond, the de facto victor in this case, seems to believe that contracting with the state makes a charter school a public school, a position with far-reaching implications for future state contractors of any religious affiliation. We heartily agree with Justice Kuehn – and so apparently does at least half of the Supreme Court (Justice Amy Coney Barrett recused herself due to a likely conflict emanating from her former position at Notre Dame).
 
As the Alliance Defending Freedom – representing the Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board – said in its certiorari petition:
 
“The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s conclusion that Trinity Lutheran, Espinoza, and Carson ‘do not apply to the governmental action in this case’ fails along with the state-action premise on which it rests … St. Isidore is not a state actor, so the lower court’s talismanic invocation of the phrase ‘governmental action’ does not distinguish this Court’s cases.”
 
But there is good news amid the bad news – the recusal of Justice Amy Coney Barrett almost certainly tilted the balance against St. Isidore. This augurs well for future cases on the equal treatment of religious based schools, as the Court has already done in Carson v. Makin.
 
States should take this opportunity to repeal prejudiced Blaine Amendments, and maybe find another, future opportunity for action that doesn’t trigger a recusal. 

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), passed in 1993 with overwhelming bipartisan support, was crafted to provide a strong shield for religious liberty. It requires that any government action that substantially burdens religious exercise must be the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling government interest. This principle was not meant to expire or be casually overridden.
 
In a recent Supreme Court filing, the Biden Administration asserted that RFRA can be silently displaced by later statutes, even if Congress says nothing about overriding religious liberty. In a brief footnote, the government argued that if a later statute mandates action – even if it burdens religious exercise – it must override RFRA by default.
 
Perhaps that was to be expected from the Biden Administration, which did not make the freedom of religious exercise a priority. More troubling is that the current administration’s Solicitor General, Dean John Sauer, echoed this view in a letter to the Supreme Court in Apache Stronghold v. United States. Sauer reaffirmed the notion that the land-exchange statute at the heart of the case supersedes RFRA, simply because it came later and is “more specific.”
 
This theory invites the piecemeal erosion of civil liberties. If accepted, it would allow Congress – or perhaps even regulatory agencies – to nullify fundamental rights like religious freedom without ever saying so explicitly. All it takes is a newer law or rule that conflicts with RFRA, and the protections vanish.
 
That logic assumes Congress fully weighs the consequences for religious liberty every time it enacts a new law. It presumes that federal agencies act with constitutional clarity. In truth, lawmakers are not always so meticulous, and regulators have been known to ride roughshod over constitutional protections.
 
This framework has already emboldened efforts to undercut conscience protections in healthcare. Under this view, statutes that promote access to abortion or gender-transition procedures can override RFRA by mere implication – forcing doctors and hospitals to act against their beliefs, without any serious effort to reconcile those conflicts.
 
It is disappointing, to say the least, that a Trump Administration lawyer would continue this Biden-era legacy. Conservatives, especially those with commitments to religious liberty, should reject any legal doctrine that grants Congress or regulators an easy path to nullify core civil rights.
 
RFRA was designed to stand as a bulwark, not a speed bump. Allowing it to be bypassed by silence or implication is not just bad legal reasoning – it undermines a law that reinforces the First Amendment’s guarantee of the free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court declared in 2020 that “RFRA operates as a kind of super-statute, displacing the normal operations of other federal laws.”
 
The Supreme Court should now again affirm that RFRA remains fully in force.

The U.S. Supreme Court heard two hours of oral argument Wednesday in a case that laid bare ideological fault lines in the Court concerning the tension between the First Amendment’s two clauses on religion, one guaranteeing its free exercise, the other forbidding any establishment of religion. While the Court has recently leaned in the direction of religious freedom, the recusal of Justice Amy Coney Barrett added a note of drama, raising the real possibility of a 4-4 split that would leave intact the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision blocking the school.

The case began when the Archdiocese of Oklahoma City and the Diocese of Tulsa created St. Isidore of Seville, a virtual Catholic school intended to serve all families, including those in rural and underserved areas. The Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board approved St. Isidore’s application. But state Attorney General Gentner Drummond took the board to court, claiming it had violated both state and federal law by approving a religious school as part of the charter system. The Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed with the attorney general, ruling that charter schools are public entities and thus must be secular.

We’ve made the case that this ruling is “eminently overturnable,” resting on a legal framework polluted by Blaine Amendments – a relic of 19th-century anti-Catholic bigotry. As we explained when the Court first agreed to hear this case, the Oklahoma law’s exclusion of religious institutions from an otherwise open charter school system violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh seemed to see it the same way.
 
“Those are some of the most important cases we've had,” he said, referencing two precedents, Espinoza and Carson, “saying you can't treat religious people and religious institutions and religious speech as second class in the United States.” He called Oklahoma’s policy “rank discrimination against religion,” noting that religious schools were not asking for special treatment, just the right to compete on equal footing.

Justice Samuel Alito took that concern a step further. He accused the Oklahoma attorney general’s argument of reflecting “hostility toward particular religions,” particularly Islam. Referring to Drummond’s statements warning that approval of St. Isidore would compel approval of schools run by “reprehensible” sects, Alito said those arguments “reek of hostility” and reflect an “unsavory discriminatory history” in the state’s constitutional framework.

One question that continued to arise in the oral argument centered on whether St. Isidore, as a charter school, is a state actor. If so, then its religious character would trigger establishment clause concerns. But if St. Isidore is a private actor merely contracting with the state, then exclusion based on religion becomes unconstitutional discrimination. “Casting the cloak of state action too broadly risks intruding on individual liberty,” Michael McGinley, attorney for St. Isidore, told the Court.
 
Justice Neil Gorsuch seemed to agree, warning that a ruling against the school could incentivize states to exert more control over charter schools, curbing the innovation those schools were meant to foster. Gorsuch also asked a series of questions to probe whether an educational institution such as St. Isidore could be considered a private organization for the purposes of federal law, but a public institution for the purposes of state law. This probing gives a sense of how Justice Gorsuch, and perhaps the Court, might parse the principles of this case.

The more liberal justices pushed back forcefully. Justice Elena Kagan warned of a “floodgate” effect that could compel states to fund every kind of religious school, including those with doctrines “super different” from mainstream religious or secular values. Justice Sonia Sotomayor bluntly declared: “What you’re saying is the Free Exercise Clause trumps the Establishment Clause.” Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson argued that St. Isidore was asking for a benefit not granted to anyone else – the right to operate a religious public school – although Oklahoma had every right to set up a secular charter system.
 
Chief Justice John Roberts’ few comments suggested that he is weighing the issue with caution. He noted that unlike Trinity Lutheran, Espinoza, or Carson, this case involves “much more comprehensive involvement” by the state in the charter school program. Chief Justice Robert’s terse demeanor may be a clear signal he will be the deciding vote.

Meanwhile, Gregory Garre, representing the state, warned of “uncertainty, confusion, and disruption” if the Court rules in favor of St. Isidore, arguing it would upend the laws of 47 states and the federal charter school program, all of which bar religious charter schools. But that argument overlooks what the First Amendment demands – neutrality, not hostility, toward religion.

General Drummond’s likening of the inclusion of a Catholic school in the state’s charter program to a private takeover of the operations of the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, to create a Catholic Highway Patrol, is as unserious as it is inapt. No student would be forced to attend St. Isidore. Families would choose the school, and the state’s funds would follow the child. That’s no different in substance than school voucher programs the Court has repeatedly upheld. The state didn’t design St. Isidore, doesn’t run it, and shouldn’t be allowed to exclude it for being religious.

Protect The 1st hopes the Court recognizes that this case is not about religious favoritism. It is about ending religious exclusion. Once Oklahoma opens the door to private educational providers, it cannot slam that door shut on faith-based institutions. St. Isidore deserves the same opportunity to serve Oklahoma families as any other charter school.

​It was reading time at the U.S. Supreme Court today, though the oral argument in Mahmoud v. Taylor did not end with milk, cookies, and a nap. It did indicate, however, a likely victory for the plaintiffs.

Much of today’s oral argument centered around the storybooks included in the pre-K to 6th grade curriculum in Montgomery County schools. One such storybook, Prince & Knight, factored into the discussion.

Here’s a summary of that book written for children ages 4 to 8: Once upon a time, there was a prince who was urged by his royal parents to visit neighboring kingdoms to find a suitable bride. But the prince did not find the woman he loved. While on his journey, the prince was informed that a dragon was attacking his kingdom. He joined forces with a dashing knight, who used his shield to blind the monster. This allowed the prince to successfully ensnare the dragon. When the prince tripped, the knight came to his rescue and caught him in his arms. That’s when the prince realized that he was, in fact, in love. And soon prince and knight were warmly received into the kingdom, which joyfully celebrated their royal wedding.

Another such book, Love Violet, tells the story of a girl who harbors a secret crush for another girl in her class.

In the eyes of many, Prince & Knight and Love Violet spin tales that help children to grow up with respect and acceptance. In the eyes of families that are adherents of great world religions – from Roman Catholicism to Christian evangelicalism, to Islam and Orthodox Judaism – these stories indoctrinate children into celebrating relationships that their religions reject as sinful. Forcing this instruction, therefore, is a violation of the First Amendment rights of the parents’ free exercise of religion.

No one in this case is seeking suppression of these books and teachings. Religious parents of Montgomery County school children are merely seeking the right to opt out their children from the books and its related curriculum. The Montgomery County school board at first allowed such opt-outs, then denied them, claiming that allowing them would be impractical to manage. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the school board’s decision, finding that “simply hearing about other views does not necessarily exert pressure to believe or act differently than one’s religious faith requires.”

In today’s oral argument, Justice Samuel Alito pushed back on that notion. Given that these books are read to children as young as age four, he said many will lack the faculties to dispute or disagree with what they are being told.

“I don’t think anybody can read that and say, ‘Well, this is just telling children that there are occasions when men marry other men,” said Justice Alito. “It has a clear moral message, and it may be a good message. It’s just a message that a lot of religious people disagree with.”

Justice Elena Kagan acknowledged that what some Montgomery County principals had flagged – regardless of gender, the storybooks’ focus on romantic relationships was a questionable choice for children as young as four. “I too, was struck by these young kids picture books and, on matters concerning sexuality, I suspect there are a lot of non-religious parents who weren’t all that thrilled about this.”

But Justice Kagan stuck to the notion that if opt-outs are allowed in this instance, they will have to be allowed for a host of other objections, perhaps even to the teaching of evolution in biology class. Justice Kagan said: “Once we articulate a rule like that, it would be like opt-outs for everyone.”

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s questions centered around the point that an opt-out rule would “constitutionalize” local decisions on curricula best left to the communities. “Maybe in one community, one set of values, these books are fine, but in another community with a different set of values, they’re not,” she said.

Justice Alito returned to the point that the plaintiffs were not asking that the books be removed. “What’s the big deal about allowing them to opt out?” he asked. “I am not understanding why it’s not feasible,” said Justice Brett Kavanaugh.

Overall, the tone and tenor of today’s oral argument indicates a solid majority will come down on the side of observing the right of religious parents to opt-out their children.

Two minutes into this two-and-a-half hour-long hearing, Eric Baxter of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, which represents the parents, drew on Protect The 1st’s own amicus brief for his presentation. In that brief, Protect The 1st declared: “Properly understood, the First Amendment forbids the government from imposing such coercive choices on parents as a precondition to participating in a public benefit, including public education.”
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Though we rarely make predictions about how the Court will decide, we believe that will be the likely stance the Court majority will take.