​Earlier we compared the First Amendment records of Sen. J.D. Vance and Gov. Tim Walz, finding the two vice presidential candidates problematic with notable bright spots.
 
So how do the two candidates at the top of the ticket compare on defending speech? Answer: Even more problematic, but also with some bright spots.
 
Vice President Kamala Harris
 
As a U.S. Senator, Harris in 2017 co-sponsored an amendment with her fellow Californian and leading Democrat, the late Sen. Dianne Feinstein, that would have required federal agencies to obtain a probable cause warrant before the FISA Court could allow the government to review the contents of Americans’ emails. Protecting Americans from warrantless surveillance of their private communications concerning personal, political, and religious lives is one of the best ways to protect speech.
 
As a senator, Harris also defended the First Amendment rights of social media platforms to moderate their content. This is not surprising given that she was from California and big tech is one of her best backers. The Washington Post reports that Karen Dunn, one of Google’s top attorneys in against the Biden administration’s antitrust case, is a top Harris advisor. This closeness suggests a danger that a Harris administration might lean heavily in support of using friendly relations with big tech as a backdoor way to censor critics and conservative speech.
 
Consider that Harris once called for the cancellation of former President Donald Trump’s then-Twitter account, saying:
 
“And the bottom line is that you can’t say that you have one rule for Facebook and you have a different rule for Twitter. The same rule has to apply, which is that there has to be a responsibility that is placed on these social media sites to understand their power … They are speaking to millions of people without any level of oversight or regulation. And that has to stop.”
 
Why does it have to stop? Americans have spoken for two centuries without any level of oversight or regulation. You might find the speech of many to be vile, unhinged, hateful, or radical. But unless it calls for violence, or is obscene, it is protected by the First Amendment. When, exactly, did liberals lose their faith in the American people and replace it with a new faith in the regulation of speech?
 
Worse, as California Attorney General, Harris got the ball rolling on trying to force nonprofits to turn over their federal IRS Form 990 Schedule B, which would have given her office the identities of donors.
 
Under Harris’s successor, this case went to the U.S. Supreme Court. Protect The 1st was proud to submit an amicus brief, joined with amici from a coalition of groups from across the ideological spectrum. We demonstrated that the likely exposure of donors’ identities would result in various forms of “cancellation,” from firings and the destruction of businesses, to actual physical threats. A Supreme Court majority agreed with us in Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta in 2021 that the same principle that defended Alabama donors to the NAACP extends to all nonprofits.
 
The Biden-Harris administration has also been mum on worldwide crackdowns on speech, from a Brazilian Supreme Court Justice’s cancellation of X, to hints from the French government that this U.S.-based platform might be the next target after the arrest of Telegram CEO Pavel Durov.
 
Former President Donald Trump
 
This is a harder one to judge. It’s long been said that Donald Trump wears better if you turn the sound off.
 
On the plus side, President Trump took a notably strong approach in supporting surveillance reform. A victim himself of illicit surveillance justified by the FBI before the FISA Court with a doctored political dossier and a forged document, President Trump was sensitive to the First Amendment implications of an overweening surveillance state. To his credit, he nixed the reauthorization of one surveillance authority – Section 215, or the so-called “business records provision.”
 
During the pandemic, Trump issued guidance in defense of religious liberty. He said: “Some governors have deemed liquor stores and abortion clinics essential but have left out churches and houses of worship. It’s not right. So I’m correcting this injustice and calling houses of worship essential.” He backed up his defense of religious liberty by appointing three Supreme Court Justices – Neil Gorsuch, Amy Coney Barrett, and Brett Kavanaugh – who have been strong defenders of religious liberty.
 
But turn the sound back on and you will hear Donald Trump call the American press “the enemy of the people.” Call the media biased, corrupt, in the bag for the Democrats, whatever you like … but “enemy of the people?” Trump’s rhetoric on the media often edges toward physical hostility. As president, he mocked a CNN reporter who was hit with a rubber bullet while covering the 2020 riots in Minneapolis. “Remember that beautiful sight?” Trump asked.
 
At a time when journalists are under threat in America and around the world, this is a decidedly un-American way to confront media bias.
 
Donald Trump has also called for a loosening of the libel laws to allow elected officials to more easily pursue claims against journalists without having to meet the Supreme Court’s “actual malice” standard. We agree that there is room for sharpening libel law in the age of social media amplification, but allowing wealthy politicians to sue news outlets out of business would be one effective way to gut the First Amendment.
 
So what should we conclude? Both Harris and Trump have mixed records. Both have taken bold stands for speech. Both have treated the opposition as so evil that they do not deserve legal protections. Both seem capable of surprising us, either by being more prone to censorship or to taking bold stands for free speech.
 
Whatever your political leanings, urge your candidate and your party to lean on the side of the First Amendment.

The recent session of the U.S. Supreme Court will likely be remembered for two major rulings implicating fundamental separation of powers doctrine: Trump v. United States, establishing presumptive immunity from prosecution for official presidential acts; and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, dispensing with the long-established “Chevron Two Step” granting deference to a federal agency’s interpretation of statutes. In both instances, the Court reaffirmed our constitutional system of checks and balances, including protection against encroachment on the powers and privileges of one branch of government by another.
 
Against the backdrop of those headline-dominating developments, the Supreme Court also took on several important First Amendment cases, with results that were constitutionally sound. Below are the highlights – and summaries – of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence released in recent weeks.
 
Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine
 
In a unanimous ruling, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the Food and Drug Administration’s regulation of the abortion drug mifepristone. Little noticed by the media, the Court’s opinion also firmly nailed down the conscience right of physicians to abstain from participating in abortions and prescribing the drug.
 
Writing for the Court, Justice Kavanaugh said that the Church Amendments, which prohibit the government from imposing requirements that violate the conscience rights of physicians and institutions, “allow doctors and other healthcare personnel to ‘refuse to perform or assist’ an abortion without punishment or discrimination from their employers.”
 
From now on, any effort to restrict or violate the conscience rights of healers will go against the unanimous opinion of all nine justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.
 
Vidal v. Elster
 
The Supreme Court, in another unanimous decision, overturned a lower court ruling that found that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s denial of an application to trademark a phrase including the name “Trump” violated the filer’s First Amendment rights.
 
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas wrote that “[o]ur courts have long recognized that trademarks containing names may be restricted.” But such trademark restrictions, while “content-based” must be “viewpoint neutral.” This opinion prevents commercial considerations to scissor out pieces of the national debate. While the decision rejected a novel First Amendment claim to a speech-restricting trademark, it affirms sound First Amendment principles and protects the speech of all others who would discuss and debate the virtues and vices of prominent public figures.
 
The Court was right to refuse the endorsement of a government-granted monopoly on a phrase about a presidential candidate.
 
NRA v. Vullo
 
NRA v. Vullo – yet another unanimous opinion – cleared the way for the National Rifle Association to pursue a First Amendment claim against a New York insurance regulator who had twisted the arms of insurance companies and banks to blacklist the group.
 
Maria Vullo, former superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services, met with Lloyd’s of London executives in 2018 to bring to their attention technical infractions that plagued the affinity insurance market in New York, unrelated to NRA business. Vullo told the executives that she would be “less interested” in pursuing these infractions “so long as Lloyd’s ceased providing insurance to gun groups.” She added that she would “focus” her enforcement actions “solely” on the syndicates with ties to the NRA, “and ignore other syndicates writing similar policies.”
 
The Court found for the NRA, writing that, “[a]s alleged, Vullo’s communications with Lloyd’s can be reasonably understood as a threat or as an inducement. Either of those can be coercive.”
 
The Supreme Court’s opinion vacates the Second Circuit’s ruling to the contrary and remands the case to allow the lawsuit to continue.
 
As the Court wrote, “the critical takeaway is that the First Amendment prohibits government officials from wielding their power selectively to punish or suppress speech, directly or (as alleged here) through private intermediaries.” And we wholeheartedly agree – censorship by proxy is still government censorship.
 
Moody v. NetChoice

In one of two cases involving the nexus of government and social media, the Court seemed to punt on making a final decision on the constitutionality of laws from Florida and Texas restricting the ability of social media companies to regulate access to, and content on, their platforms.
 
Many commentators believed the Court would resolve a split between the Fifth Circuit (upholding a Texas law restricting various forms of content moderation and imposing other obligations on social media platforms) and the Eleventh Circuit (which upheld the injunction against a Florida law regulating content and other activities by social media platforms and by other large internet services and websites).
 
The Court’s ruling was expected to resolve the hot-button issue of whether Facebook and other major social media platforms can depost and deplatform. Instead, the Court found fault with the scope and precision of both the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuit opinions, vacating both of them and telling the lower courts to drill down on the varied details of both laws and be more precise as to the First Amendment issues posed by such different provisions. The opinion did, however, offer constructive guidance with ringing calls for stronger enforcement of First Amendment principles as they relate to the core activities of content moderation.
 
The opinion, written by Justice Elena Kagan, declared that: “On the spectrum of dangers to free expression, there are few greater than allowing the government to change the speech of private actors in order to achieve its own conception of speech nirvana.”

Murthy v. Missouri
 
In what looked to be a major case regarding the limits of government “jawboning” to get private actors to restrict speech, the Court instead decided that Missouri, Louisiana, and five individuals whose views were targeted by the government for expressing misinformation could not demonstrate a sufficient connection between the government’s action and their ultimate deplatforming by private actors.
 
Accordingly, the Court’s reasoning in this 6-3 decision is that the two states and five individuals lacked Article III standing to bring this suit. A case that could have defined the limits of government involvement in speech for the central media of our time was thus deflected on procedural grounds.
 
Justice Samuel Alito, in a fiery dissent signed by Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch, criticized the punt, calling Murthy v. Missouri “one of the most important free speech cases to reach this Court in years.” Fortunately, NRA v. Vullo, discussed above, sets a solid baseline against government efforts to pressure private actors to do the government’s dirty work in suppressing speech the government does not like. Later cases will, we hope, expand upon that base.
 
Secret communications from the government to the platforms to take down one post or another is inherently suspect under the Constitution and likely to lead us to a very un-American place. Let us hope that the Court selects a case in which it accepts the standing of the plaintiffs in order to give the government, and our society, a rule to live by.
 
Gonzalez v. Trevino
 
Protect The 1st has reported on the case of Sylvia Gonzalez, a former Castle Hills, Texas, council member who was arrested for allegedly tampering with government records back in 2019. In fact, she merely misplaced them, and was subsequently arrested, handcuffed, and detained in what was likely a retaliatory arrest for criticizing the city manager. In turn, Gonzalez brought suit.
 
Gonzalez’s complaint noted that she was the only person charged in the past 10 years under the state’s government records law for temporarily misplacing government documents. In 2019’s Nieves v. Bartlett, the Supreme Court found that a plaintiff can generally bring a federal civil rights claim alleging retaliation if they can show that police did not have probable cause. The Court also allowed suit by plaintiffs claiming retaliatory arrests if they could show that others who engaged in the same supposedly illegal conduct, but who did not engage in protected but disfavored speech, were not arrested.
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit threw out Gonzalez’s case, finding that she would have had to offer examples of those who had mishandled a government petition in the same way that she had but – unlike her – were not arrested. The Supreme Court, by contrast, found that, “[a]lthough the Nieves exception is slim, the demand for virtually identical and identifiable comparators goes too far.” The Court thus made it a bit easier for the victims of First Amendment retaliation to sue government officials who would punish people for disfavored speech.
 
The controversy will now go back to the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration.
 
***

While the Court avoided some potentially landmark decisions on procedural grounds, and offered a mixed bag of decisions concerning plaintiffs’ ability to obtain redress against potential First Amendment violations, the majority consistently showed a strong desire to protect First Amendment principles – shielding people and private organizations from government-compelled speech.

​When the U.S. Supreme Court put challenges to Florida and Texas laws regulating social media content moderation on the docket, it seemed assured that this would be one of the yeastiest cases in recent memory. The Supreme Court’s majority opinion came out Monday morning. At first glance, the yeast did not rise after all. These cases were remanded back to the appellate courts for a more thorough review.
 
But a closer look at the opinion shows the Court offering close guidance to the appellate court, with serious rebukes of the Texas law.
 
Anticipation was high for a more robust decision. The Court was to resolve a split between the Fifth Circuit, which upheld the Texas law prohibiting viewpoint discrimination by large social media platforms, while the Eleventh Circuit upheld the injunction against a Florida law regulating the deplatforming of political candidates. The Court’s ruling was expected to resolve once and for all the hot-button issue of whether Facebook and other major social media platforms can depost and deplatform.
 
Instead, the Court found fault with the scope and precision of both the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuit opinions, vacating both of them. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Elena Kagan, found that the lower courts failed to consider the extent to which their ruling would affect social media services other than Facebook’s News feed, including entirely different digital animals, such as direct messages. The Supreme Court criticized the lower courts for not asking how each permutation of social media would be impacted by the Texas and Florida laws.
 
Overall, the Supreme Court is telling the Fifth and Eleventh to drill down and spell out a more precise doctrine that will be a durable guide for First Amendment jurisprudence in social media content moderation. But today’s opinion also contained ringing calls for stronger enforcement of First Amendment principles.
 
The Court explicitly rebuked the Fifth Circuit for approval of the Texas law, “whose decision rested on a serious misunderstanding of the First Amendment precedent and principle.” It pointed to a precedent, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, in which the Court held that a newspaper could not be forced to run a political candidate’s reply to critical coverage.
 
The opinion is rife with verbal minefields that will likely doom the efforts of Texas and Florida to enforce their content moderation laws. For example:
 
“But this Court has many times held, in many contexts, that it is no job for government to decide what counts as the right balance of private expression – to ‘un-bias’ what it thinks is biased, rather than to leave such judgments to speakers and their audiences.”
 
The Court delved into the reality of content moderation, noting that the “prioritization of content” selected by algorithms from among billions of posts and videos in a customized news feed necessarily involves judgment. An approach without standards would turn any social media site into a spewing firehose of disorganized mush. The Court issued a brutal account of the Texas law, which prohibits blocking posts “based on viewpoint.” The Court wrote:
 
“But if the Texas law is enforced, the platforms could not – as they in fact do now – disfavor posts because they:
 

• support Nazi ideology;
• advocate for terrorism;
• espouse racism, Islamophobia, or anti-Semitism;
• encourage teenage suicide and self-injury;
• discourage the use of vaccines;
• advertise phony treatments for disease;
• advance false claims of election fraud.”

 
So what appeared on the surface to be a punt is really the Court’s call for a more fleshed out doctrine that respects the rights of private entities to manage their content without government interference. For a remand, this opinion is surprisingly strong – and strong in protection of the First Amendment.

​The expected landmark, decision-of-the-century, Supreme Court opinion on government interaction with social media content moderation and possible official censorship of Americans’ speech ended today not with a bang, not even with a whimper, but with a shrug.
 
The Justices ruled 6-3 in Murthy v. Missouri to overturn a lower court’s decision that found that the federal government likely violated the First Amendment rights of Missouri, Louisiana, and five individuals whose views were targeted by the government for expressing “misinformation.”
 
The Court’s reasoning, long story short, is that the two states and five individuals lacked Article III standing to bring this suit. The court denied that the individuals could identify traceable past injuries to their speech rights. In short, a case that could have defined the limits of government involvement in speech for the central media of our time was deflected by the court largely on procedural grounds.
 
Justice Samuel Alito, writing a dissent signed by Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch, implicitly criticized this punt, calling Murthy v. Surgeon General “one of the most important free speech cases to reach this Court in years.” He compared the Court’s stance in this case to the recent National Rifle Association v. Vullo, an opinion that boldly protected private speech from government coercion.
 
The dissenters disagreed with the Court on one of the plaintiffs’ standing, finding that Jill Hines, a healthcare activist whose opinions on Covid-19 were blotted out at the request of the government, most definitely had standing to sue. Alito wrote:
 
“If a President dislikes a particular newspaper, he (fortunately) lacks the ability to put the paper out of business. But for Facebook and many other social media platforms, the situation is fundamentally different. They are critically dependent on the protections provided by §230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 … For these and other reasons, internet platforms have a powerful incentive to please important federal officials …”
 
We have long argued that when the government wants to weigh in on “misinformation” (and “disinformation” from malicious governments), it must do so publicly. Secret communications from the government to the platforms to take down one post or another is inherently offensive to the Constitution and likely to lead us to a very un-American place.
 
Let us hope that the Court selects a case in which it accepts the standing of the plaintiffs in order to give the government, and our society, a rule to live by.

​Trademarks support brand integrity in the marketplace, including through certain restrictions on commercial speech. But what about the use of a living person’s name, specifically “Trump Too Small”? (If you don’t know what this means, we’ll let you Google it.) Merchant Steve Elster wanted to register that phrase as a trademark to sell T-shirts. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office denied his application. A lower court, however, held that the government violated Elster’s First Amendment rights.
 
The Supreme Court today, in a unanimous decision, overturned that ruling and held that the phrase with the former president’s name cannot be trademarked. “Our courts have long recognized that trademarks containing names may be restricted,” Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for the majority. But such trademark restrictions, while “content-based” must be “viewpoint neutral.”
 
Justice Barrett wrote that the “government can reasonably determine that, on the whole, protecting marks that include another living person’s name without consent risks undermining the goals of trademark.” This is in keeping with a 1946 trademark law that bans the registration of any trademark that uses a living person’s name without their written consent.
 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor in a concurrence wrote that First Amendment considerations should be applied. She emphasized that First Amendment constraints can be respected without undermining traditional trademark rules.
 
Both sides have a point in law and in principle. Not only did the Court protect the name of a living person, it also refused to enforce a government monopoly on a phrase about a presidential candidate. To take a more generic example, suppose someone trademarked a phrase about Trump or Biden being too old, or too extreme, or too apt to take vacations. Imagine the complexities of a marketplace with thousands of products engaging in a national discussion about presidential candidates with select phrases off limits to anyone who didn’t want to pay or seek written permission to use them.
 
The Court was right to prevent commercial considerations from scissoring out pieces of the national debate. As a result of the Court’s decision, the public remains free to debate – in print, on T-shirts, on mugs, or on TV – the Goldilocks question of whether Trump is too small, too large, or just right. Now that is free speech.  

​The media is abuzz today about the unanimous ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court that rejected a challenge to the Food and Drug Administration’s regulation for the use of the abortion drug mifepristone. What’s overlooked, however, is that the Court’s opinion, authored by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, firmly nails down the conscience right of physicians and healers to abstain from participating in abortions and prescribing mifepristone.
 
This opinion firms up national policy on conscience rights. At a time when some in the federal bureaucracy and the states seem determined to chip away at conscience rights, the Court’s opinion will act as a concrete bollard to block further efforts at encroachment.
 
Justice Kavanaugh wrote that the Church Amendments, which prohibit the government from imposing requirements that violate the conscience rights of physicians and institutions, “allow doctors and other healthcare personnel to ‘refuse to perform or assist’ an abortion without punishment or discrimination from their employers.” The Court’s opinion also repeatedly quotes the Biden Administration in affirming that “federal conscience protections encompass ‘the doctor’s beliefs rather than particular procedures’ … As the Government points out, that strong protection for conscience remains true even in a so-called healthcare desert, where other doctors are not readily available.”
 
The opinion notes as a matter of law and fact that federal conscience laws have protected pro-life doctors ever since the FDA approved mifepristone in 2000. The pro-life plaintiffs in this case argued that the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) might be interpreted to require individual emergency room doctors to participate in emergency abortions. But the administration rejected that reading of EMTALA, and the Court declared today “we agree with the Government’s view of EMTALA on that point.”
 
These declarations are not as sensational as upholding a drug that is used for the majority of pregnancy terminations. From now on, however, any effort to restrict or violate the conscience rights of healers will go against the declared intent of the Biden Administration and the unanimous opinion of all nine Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.

“At the heart of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause is the recognition that viewpoint discrimination is uniquely harmful to a free and democratic society.”
 
This declaration comes from a unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, that clears the way for the National Rifle Association to pursue a First Amendment claim against a New York insurance regulator who had twisted the arms of insurance companies and banks to blacklist the Second Amendment advocacy group. The NRA was represented by Protect The 1st Senior Legal Advisor Eugene Volokh, as well as the American Civil Liberties Union.
 
Maria T. Vullo, superintendent of New York’s Department of Financial Services, had earlier found that NRA’s affinity insurance benefits for members were constructed and sold in a way that violated New York law. Vullo then pushed beyond her regulatory purview into an attempt to punish speech.
 
Vullo met with Lloyd’s of London executives in 2018 to bring to their attention technical infractions that plagued the affinity insurance market in New York, unrelated to NRA business. Vullo told the executives that she would be “less interested” in pursuing these infractions “so long as Lloyd’s ceased providing insurance to gun groups.” She added that she would “focus” her enforcement actions “solely” on the syndicates with ties to the NRA, “and ignore other syndicates writing similar policies.” Vullo followed up with guidance letters to insurance companies and financial services firms extolling the severance of ties with the NRA as a way for companies to fulfill their “corporate social responsibility.”
 
“As alleged, Vullo’s communications with Lloyd’s can be reasonably understood as a threat or as an inducement,” the Court found. “Either of those can be coercive.” The Court quoted a Seventh Circuit opinion regarding a sheriff who interfered with a website by coercing its payment-services providers: “The analogy is to killing a person by cutting off his oxygen rather than by shooting him.”
 
The core of the Court’s opinion rested on Bantam Books v. Sullivan, which involved a Rhode Island state commission that sought to censor books by prohibiting distributors from moving targeted books to stores. Compliance was assured by police offers dispatched to the distribution companies to check their records. The Supreme Court held that the commission’s actions amounted to censorship. In this case, the Court found:
 
“Ultimately, Bantam Books stands for the principle that a government official cannot do indirectly what she is barred from doing directly: A government official cannot coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on her behalf.”
 
The Supreme Court’s opinion vacates the Second Circuit’s reversal of a lower court opinion, and remands it for adjudication under this ruling. When that case is heard again, the judges of the Second Circuit will have these words of this unanimous opinion ringing in their ears:
 
“[T]he critical takeaway is that the First Amendment prohibits government officials from wielding their power selectively to punish or suppress speech, directly or (as alleged here) through private intermediaries.”

​Can a protest organizer be held civilly liable for the unlawful actions of another at a demonstration? That’s the question at issue in McKesson v. Doe, one with significant implications for protected speech.
 
The case’s circuitous journey through the courts started in 2016, when an anonymous Louisiana law enforcement officer was struck with a “rock-like” object hurled by an unknown person at a Black Lives Matter protest. This was a despicable act of violence that was in no sense expressive speech. Those who commit such acts of violence must be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. But what is the liability of those who organize a peaceful protest that is infiltrated by the violent?
 
Plaintiff John Doe brought suit against activist DeRay McKesson, who organized the event, on the theory that McKesson’s role as the event organizer encompassed a duty to protect everyone present. In 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s decision against McKesson, which upheld a novel theory from Doe of “negligent protest.” The Court remanded the case to the Louisiana Supreme Court, instructing it to analyze whether state law actually provides for negligence liability in such situations. This decision seems to ignore precedent in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, which held that “[c]ivil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a group, some members of which committed acts of violence.”
 
The Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately reached the conclusion that state tort law does, in fact, provide Doe with a cause of action. As a result, the Fifth Circuit reinstated its ruling and the case returned again to the highest court in the land.
 
Notably, the Supreme Court ruled in the intervening years in Counterman v. Colorado that a subjective, mens rea standard (meaning specific intent, not just negligence) is required for a finding of liability in lawsuits that seek to punish speech. Justice Kagan wrote that the “First Amendment precludes punishment, whether civil or criminal, unless the speaker’s words were ‘intended’ (not just likely) to produce imminent disorder.”
 
Accordingly, in an order rejecting certiorari in the McKesson case earlier this month, Justice Sotomayor strongly implied that the Court has already settled this question of law. She wrote, “Although the Fifth Circuit did not have the benefit of this Court’s recent decision in Counterman when it issued its opinion, the lower courts now do. I expect them to give full and fair consideration to arguments regarding Counterman’s impact in any future proceedings in this case.”
 
The Supreme Court clearly wants to allow some deference to state law. However, it seems entirely reasonable to require a showing of intent in situations involving the random outbreak of violence at protests. Failure to do so could have a significant, chilling effect on political speech. If civil liability can be assigned for merely organizing an event, then we’re likely to see a lot less civil discourse in the future.
 
Journalists have similar concerns. As the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press explains, protecting against liability for the “uncoordinated,” lawless actions of others “is a critical safeguard for reporters who attend tumultuous events where violence may break out — political rallies, say, or mass demonstrations — in order to bring the public the news.” 
 
It remains possible the Fifth Circuit may reevaluate its ruing in light of Counterman, but it’s disappointing that the Supreme Court declined to weigh-in in a meaningful way. When states start imposing low liability thresholds on protestors, it jeopardizes First Amendment protections for all of us.

​The U.S. Supreme Court is set to address several critical free-speech cases this session related to speech rights in the context of social media. One of those questions was recently settled, with the Court ruling on whether an official who blocks a member of the public from their social media account is engaging in a state action or acting as a private citizen. Answer: It depends on the context.
 
Writing for a unanimous Court in the case of Lindke v. Freed, Justice Amy Coney Barrett reaffirmed that members of the public can sue a public official where their actions are “attributable to the State” (consistent with U.S.C. §1983). In order to make that determination, the Court issued a new test, holding that:
 
“A public official who prevents someone from commenting on the official’s social-media page engages in state action under §1983 only if the official both (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the State’s behalf on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when speaking in the relevant social-media posts.”
 
This is a holistic analysis, consistent with the Protect The 1st amicus brief filed in O’Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier. We argued that “no single factor is required to establish state action; rather, all relevant factors must be considered together to determine whether an account was operated under color of law.”
 
That case, along with the Court’s banner case, Lindke v. Freed, is now vacated and remanded for new proceedings consistent with the Court’s novel test. When, as the Court acknowledges, “a government official posts about job-related topics on social media, it can be difficult to tell whether the speech is official or private.” So the Court set down rules. A state actor must have the actual authority – traced back to “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” – to speak on behalf of the state. However, should an account be clearly designated as “personal,” an official “would be entitled to a heavy (though not irrebuttable) presumption that all of the posts on [their] page were personal.”
 
In Lindke v. Freed, the public official’s Facebook account was neither designated as “personal” nor “official.” Therefore, a fact-specific analysis must be undertaken “in which posts’ content and function are the most important considerations.” As the Court explains:
 
“A post that expressly invokes state authority to make an announcement not available elsewhere is official, while a post that merely repeats or shares otherwise available information is more likely personal. Lest any official lose the right to speak about public affairs in his personal capacity, the plaintiff must show that the official purports to exercise state authority in specific posts.”
 
When a public official blocks a citizen from commenting on any of his posts on a “mixed-use” social media account, he risks liability for those that are professional in nature. Justice Barrett writes that a “public official who fails to keep personal posts in a clearly designated personal account therefore exposes himself to greater potential liability.”
 
It's always been good policy to keep official and private accounts separate. The public must be able to have access to government-issued information, whether through a social media account or a public notice posted on the door of a government building. Moreover, citizens should be able to speak on issues of public concern, whether through Facebook or in a public square. Officials – presidents and former presidents included – should take note.

​In November, we reported on a controversy in the San Antonio suburb of Castle Hills, which epitomizes the growing trend of using the law to punish disfavored speech. The Supreme Court’s recent argument reveals several justices showing solidarity with the arrested party.
 
Here are the facts: Sylvia Gonzalez was elected to a seat on the Castle Hills city council in 2019. During her first council meeting, a resident submitted a petition to remove the city manager – a petition spearheaded by Gonzalez – and it wound up in Gonzalez’s personal binder of documents. After being asked for the petition by the mayor, Gonzalez found it among her effects and handed it over.
 
The mayor initiated an investigation into Gonzalez under a Texas statute providing that “[a] person commits an offense if he […] intentionally destroys, conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the verity, legibility, or availability of a governmental record.” A warrant was subsequently served against Gonzalez, who was taken to jail and resigned from the council in humiliation. 
 
Gonzalez claims her arrest was retaliatory – trumped-up charges based on a little enforced statute and stemming from her support for removing the city manager. At issue is a legal doctrine known as the “jaywalking exception,” which guards against law enforcement arresting people for protected speech under the guise of some other petty statutory violation.
 
In Nieves v. Bartlett, the Supreme Court held that retaliatory arrest claims may proceed where probable cause exists – as it technically did with Gonzalez – but a plaintiff is arrested in a situation where officers “typically exercise their discretion not to do so.”
 
In such circumstances, a plaintiff must present “objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.”
 
Attempting to satisfy the exception, Gonzalez presented evidence that not one of 215 grand jury felony indictments in Bexar County under a tampering statute over the preceding decade involved an allegation remotely similar to the one levied against her. The Fifth Circuit found this insufficient, holding that Nieves requires comparative evidence of individuals who engaged in the “same” criminal conduct but were not arrested. In other words, going by the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, Gonzalez would have to find specific instances of people who misplaced government documents but were not arrested. How would anyone even find such instances? The Fifth Circuit tasked her with proving a negative.
 
If the Fifth Circuit’s decision is left in place, Protect The 1st explained it would make it easier for law enforcement or other government officials to punish critics for expressing protected speech based on novel applications of relatively minor criminal laws. It also sets the evidentiary bar so high that few could ever hope to prove their case in a court of law.
 
During oral arguments, several justices seemed to agree. Justice Gorsuch, speaking about the many unenforced statutes on the books, said:
 
“You're saying they can all sit there unused, except for one person who alleges that ‘I was the only person in America who's ever been prosecuted for this because I dared express a view protected by the First Amendment,’ and that's not actionable?”
 
Justice Kagan, clearly thinking along the same lines, said the plaintiff has “solid objective evidence” that they were treated differently than similarly situated persons, noting:
 
“You should be able to say, ‘They've never charged somebody with this kind of crime before and I don't have to go find a person who has engaged in the same conduct.’”
 
Justice Jackson made similar remarks, while Chief Justice Roberts, who authored Nieves, seemed to take the other side, questioning whether expanding the evidentiary basis for refuting probable cause is consistent with the Court’s earlier ruling. It “seems to me to be inconsistent,” he said. Justice Kavanaugh likewise noted, "If you intentionally stole a government document at a government proceeding — that's not nothing.”
 
Why Gonzalez would want to hide a petition she helped organize is far from clear. Her conduct was so benign that the only inference one can reasonably draw is that she was the target of retaliation. Protect The 1st hopes the Court sides with her and makes it clear they will hold public officials accountable for weaponizing the law against those who speak their minds.

​The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling against the Apache Stronghold, unless overturned, will allow the Apache’s Oak Flat religious site to be destroyed by a private mining company.
 
These lands have long been recognized by the U.S. government as the singular, sacred site of the Apaches’ worship. Set to be transformed into a crater twice as deep as the Washington Monument, not only is Oak Flat in danger of being destroyed, but with it the religion that centers around that site.
 
The least we can say is that this one was painfully close, a 6-5 split decision. The Ninth Circuit asserted that the transfer of this land, revered as the center of the Apache religion for centuries, did not (somehow) even trigger an inquiry under, much less violate, violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. That Act requires strict scrutiny of any law that burdens religious freedom. Judge Mary H. Murguia issued a stinging rebuke of the majority in her dissent:
 
“We are asked to decide whether the utter destruction of Chí’chil Biłdagoteel, a site sacred to the Western Apaches since time immemorial, is a ‘substantial burden’ on the Apaches’ sincere religious exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4. Under any ordinary understanding of the English language, the answer must be yes.”
 
Unless the U.S. Supreme Court grants cert. and overturns the Ninth Circuit’s unduly narrow conception of what constitutes a “burden” on religion, the Oak Flat religious site will become one of the nation’s largest copper ore mines, the result of a midnight deal in Congress. This scenic place of worship will become an ugly pit.
 
What was the reasoning of the majority? This en banc decision relied on a U.S. Supreme Court case, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n (1988), which held that government disposition of property does not violate the Free Exercise Clause so long as it “compels no behavior contrary to … belief.” It is doubtful that the Ninth Circuit’s broad reading of that statement remains valid, if it ever was. If barring people from entering a place of worship under COVID restrictions raises serious free exercise problems, it is hard to see how completely destroying a religion’s essential place of worship does not at least impose a burden sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny under RFRA.
 
People of all faiths should be concerned that the circuit court took such a miserly view of the free exercise of religion. Imagine the outcry from Catholics if the government decided to turn the Basilica of the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception into dust. Or the outcry of American Jews if a midnight deal in Congress targeted the Touro Synagogue in Rhode Island – the oldest still standing in the United States, and where George Washington welcomed Jews into the heart of America – to become a seemingly bottomless pit. The notion that such acts would not even “burden” the exercise of religion goes well beyond the implausible and into the absurd.
 
We hope the Justices of the Supreme Court dwell on the words of our first President, who famously wrote to the congregants of the Touro Synagogue: “Every one shall sit in safety under his own vine and fig tree, and there shall be none to make him afraid.” Can we say that is true for everyone in our country now? To again quote the dissenting judges, “the destruction of the Apaches’ sacred site will prevent worshipers from ever again exercising their religion.”
 
Luke Goodrich, senior counsel at Becket who represented the Apache, tweeted: “We fully expect SCOTUS to take this case, confirm the plain meaning of federal law, and hold that Native Americans are entitled to the same protection of their religious freedom that every other American enjoys.” Protect The 1st is also hopeful the Court will see that the Apaches’ free exercise of religion is inextricable from the preservation of this uniquely holy place.
 
For the Supreme Court to review this case would be a prayer answered.

​In this age of “corporate social responsibility,” can a government regulator mount a pressure campaign to persuade businesses to blacklist unpopular speakers and organizations? This is the central question the U.S. Supreme Court faces in National Rifle Association v. Vullo.  
 
Here's the background on this case: Maria Vullo, then-superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services, used her regulatory clout over banks and insurance companies in New York to strongarm them into denying financial services to the National Rifle Association. This campaign was waged under an earnest-sounding directive to consider the “reputational risk” of doing business with the NRA and firearms manufacturers.
​
Vullo imposed consent orders on three insurers that they never again provide policies to the NRA. She issued guidance that encouraged financial services firms to “sever ties” with the NRA and to “continue evaluating and managing their risks, including reputational risks” that may arise from their dealings with the NRA or similar gun promotion organizations.
 
“When a regulator known to slap multi-million fines on companies issues ‘guidance,’ it is not taken as a suggestion,” observed Gene Schaerr, PT1st general counsel. “It’s sounds more like, ‘nice store you’ve got here, it’d be shame if anything happened to it.’”
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a lower court’s decision that found that Vullo used threats to force the companies she regulates to cut ties with the NRA. The Second Circuit reasoned that: “The general backlash against gun promotion groups and businesses … could (and likely does) directly affect the New York financial markets; as research shows, a business's response to social issues can directly affect its financial stability in this age of enhanced corporate social responsibility.”
​
You don’t have to be an enthusiast of the National Rifle Association to see the problems with the Second Circuit’s reasoning. Aren’t executives of New York’s financial services firms better qualified to determine what does and doesn’t “directly affect financial stability” than a regulator in Albany? How aggressive will government become in using its almost unlimited ability to buy or subpoena data of a target organization to get its way? Can government stymie the speech rights of a national advocacy organization with 5 million supporters?
 
Even if you take Vullo’s justifications at face value, the government cannot override the Bill of Rights to slightly reduce the rate of corporate bankruptcies. The dangers of a nebulous, government-imposed “corporate social responsibility standard” is a grave threat to all constitutionally protected individual rights.
 
Protect The 1st is far from alone in this view. The ACLU, which also filed a brief in favor of the NRA, writes: “This is a critically important First Amendment fight: if government officials can pressure the businesses they regulate to blacklist the NRA in New York, then officials in other states can punish other advocacy organizations in the same way – including the ACLU itself.” Other not aligned with the NRA are alarmed as well. James P. Corcoran, former New York Superintendent of Insurance, in his amicus brief writes that while he does not support the National Rifle Association, he believes “that the threat to free speech at issue here could equally harm groups aligned with his own political views if left unchecked."
 
For all these reasons, we urge the Supreme Court in this case to put the First Amendment first.

If you follow this blog you are probably concerned about growing ignorance of, or contempt for, the First Amendment, as well as an increasing appetite for weaponizing the law to punish disfavored speech. A case out of Castle Hills, Texas, is illustrative of this weaponization.
 
While some underlying motives are in dispute, the facts – per the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals – are stark. Sylvia Gonzalez was elected to a seat on the Castle Hills city council in 2019. After learning that many of her constituents were unhappy with the performance of the city manager, Gonzalez helped organize a petition for that official’s removal. During her first city council meeting, a resident of Castle Hills submitted the petition, which somehow wound up in Gonzalez’s personal binder of documents. After being asked for it by the mayor, Gonzalez found the petition among her effects and handed it over during that same meeting.
 
The mayor initiated an investigation of Gonzalez under a Texas Penal Code statute that provides that “[a] person commits an offense if he […] intentionally destroys, conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the verity, legibility, or availability of a governmental record.” A warrant was subsequently served against Gonzalez, who was taken to jail and later resigned from her post.
 
Why Gonzalez would want to hide a petition she helped organize is far from clear. Gonzalez argues it was an honest mistake. The warrant affidavit speculates that Gonzalez hid it because a resident claimed she convinced them to sign it under false pretenses.
 
What is not disputable is that Gonzalez was arrested, handcuffed, and detained for the purported crime of placing a document in her folder during a meeting. The 72-year-old Gonzalez claims her arrest was retaliatory, stemming from her support for removing the city manager.
 
Sylvia Gonzalez brought suit in U.S. district court, alleging two counts of retaliation. The city respondents, in turn, filed a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, a legal doctrine that generally protects government officials from lawsuits unless it can be shown they violated a “clearly established” statutory or constitutional right. The city officials argued that the existence of probable cause rendered Gonzalez’s claims moot.
 
The district court, for its part, denied the government’s motion to dismiss based on a 2019 Supreme Court opinion in Nieves v. Bartlett. The court held that retaliatory arrest claims may proceed where probable cause exists (as it technically did with Gonzalez), but in cases in which officers “typically exercise their discretion not to do so.”
 
This is what is more commonly known as the “jaywalking exception,” and it guards against law enforcement arresting people for petty crimes for less than noble purposes. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor admitted in her memoir, “I jaywalk with the best of them.” Everyone jaywalks, but very few are actually arrested for it. It is an infraction, however, that could be used as pretext to arrest someone.
 
In such circumstances, the U.S. Supreme Court held, a plaintiff must present “objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.”
 
Gonzalez, attempting to satisfy the Nieves exception, presented evidence that not one of 215 grand jury felony indictments in Bexar County under a tampering statute over the preceding decade involved an allegation remotely similar to the one levied against her. The district court found this “objective evidence” sufficient.
 
In the appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that Nieves requires comparative evidence of individuals who engaged in the “same” criminal conduct but were not arrested. In other words, going by the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, Gonzalez would have to find specific instances of people who misplaced government documents but were not arrested.
 
If the Fifth Circuit’s decision is left in place, it would make it easier for law enforcement or other government officials to punish critics for expressing protected speech based on novel applications of relatively minor criminal laws. It also sets the evidentiary bar so high that few could ever hope to prove their case in a court of law.
 
Gonzalez’s conduct was so benign that the only inference one can reasonably draw is that she was indeed the target of retaliation. That reasonable inference standard is what is required to overcome a qualified immunity defense. But varying interpretations of Nieves stand in Sylvia Gonzalez’s way.
 
A brief supporting cert from the Cato Institute, American Civil Liberties Union, and the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression seems to have enticed the U.S. Supreme Court to hear this case. The Court has a historic opportunity to bring clarity to qualified immunity and resolve a circuit split. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have interpreted Nieves to allow more flexibility in the type of evidence plaintiffs must show in making a retaliation claim. The Fifth Circuit, unfortunately, has not.
 
The Fifth Circuit’s standard would all but enfranchise the most egregious abuses. At a time when liberals and conservatives worry about the weaponization of the law, a reasonable standard to hold officials to account for abuses is needed now more than ever.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in March issued a controversial opinion in Twitter v. Garland that the Electronic Frontier Foundation calls “a new low in judicial deference to classification and national security, even against the nearly inviolable First Amendment right to be free of prior restraints against speech.”
 
X (née Twitter) is appealing this opinion before the U.S. Supreme Court. Whatever you think of X or Elon Musk, this case is an important inflection point for free speech and government surveillance accountability.
 
Among many under-acknowledged aspects of our national security apparatus is the regularity with which the government – through FBI national security letters and secretive FISA orders – demands customer information from online platforms like Facebook and X. In 2014, Twitter sought to publish a report documenting the number of surveillance requests it received from the government the prior year. It was a commendable effort from a private actor to provide a limited measure of transparency in government monitoring of its customers, offering some much-needed public oversight in the process. The FBI and DOJ, of course, denied Twitter’s efforts, and over the past ten years the company has kept up the fight, continuing under its new ownership.
 
At issue is X’s desire to publish the total number of surveillance requests it receives, omitting any identifying details about the targets of those requests. This purpose is noble. It would provide users an important metric in surveillance trends not found in the annual Statistical Transparency Report of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Nevertheless, in April 2020, a federal district court ruled against the company’s efforts at transparency. In March 2023, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s ruling, sweeping away a substantial body of prior restraint precedent in the process.
 
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit carved out a novel exemption to long established prior restraint limitations: “government restrictions on the disclosure of information transmitted confidentially as part of a legitimate government process.”
 
The implications of this new category of censorable speech are incalculable. To quote the EFF amicus brief:
 
“The consequences of the lower court’s decision are severe and far-reaching. It carves out, for the first time, a whole category of prior restraints that receive no more scrutiny than subsequent punishments for speech—expanding officials’ power to gag virtually anyone who interacts with a government agency and wishes to speak publicly about that interaction.”
 
This is an existential speech issue, far beyond concerns of party or politics. If the ruling is allowed to stand, it sets up a convenient standard for the government to significantly expand its censorship of speech – whether of the left, right or center. Again, quoting EFF, “[i]ndividuals who had interactions with law enforcement or border officials—such as someone being interviewed as a witness to a crime or someone subjected to police misconduct—could be barred from telling their family or going to the press.”
 
Moreover, the ruling is totally incongruous with a body of law that goes back a century. Prior restraints on speech are the most disfavored of speech restrictions because they freeze speech in its entirety (rather than subsequently punishing it). As such, prior restraint is typically subject to the most exacting level of judicial scrutiny. Yet the Ninth Circuit applied a lower level of strict scrutiny, while entirely ignoring the procedural protections typically afforded to plaintiffs in prior restraint cases. As such, the “decision enables the government to unilaterally impose prior restraints on speech about matters of public concern, while restricting recipients’ ability to meaningfully test these gag orders in court.”
 
We stand with X and EFF in urging the Supreme Court to promptly address this alarming development.

​In July we analyzed an order issued by Judge Terry A. Doughty of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana that enjoined the Biden Administration and a wide range of federal agencies from “urging, encouraging, pressuring, or inducing in any manner the removal, deletion, suppression, or reduction of content containing protected free speech posted on social-media platforms.” 
 
Last month, PT1st covered a subsequent ruling from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which significantly narrowed the scope of the district court’s injunction, reducing the district court’s ten prohibitions on government communications with social media platforms to one, and greatly limiting the agencies subject to the injunction to the White House, the FBI, the surgeon general’s office and the CDC. Now, acting on a request for review by the government, the U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear the case, staying the lower courts’ injunction in the meantime.
 
At least until the High Court rules on the case, Biden Administration officials are not barred from interacting with social media platforms to combat what they view as misinformation. Justice Alito, joined by Justices Gorsuch and Thomas, dissented from granting the stay, writing: “At this time in the history of our country, what the court has done, I fear, will be seen by some as giving the government a green light to use heavy-handed tactics to skew the presentation of views on the medium that increasingly dominates the dissemination of news. That is most unfortunate.”
 
Protect The 1st is not so sure. Given that the Court is now set to hear this case, executive branch officials will have good reason to be especially circumspect in the interim.
 
Whatever happens, this case will be of great importance for the First Amendment’s application to online speech and permissible levels of government involvement in urging platforms to moderate content.
 
And it is only one of several big cases set for consideration before our highest court in the coming months. The Supreme Court also recently agreed to hear a dispute stemming from Florida’s and Texas’ efforts to prohibit social media companies from engaging in some forms of content moderation, which the platforms have always viewed as protected by the First Amendment. In another case set in a hearing later this month, the Court will tackle the question of whether public officials can block their critics on social media.
 
Regarding the present controversy, the Fifth Circuit ruled in September that the White House, the Surgeon General’s office, the FBI, and the CDC either coerced or significantly encouraged social media platforms to moderate protected speech primarily regarding election misinformation and misinformation about the pandemic.
 
In the stay application, Solicitor General Elizabeth B. Prelogar argued that the platforms are private entities that made independent content moderation decisions. The government’s interactions with them, in turn, constituted routine advice consistent with its duties to protect public health and safety.
 
“A central dimension of presidential power,” wrote Prelogar, “is the use of the office’s bully pulpit to seek to persuade Americans – and American companies – to act in ways that the president believes would advance the public interest.”
 
The attorneys general of Missouri and Louisiana, both plaintiffs in the case, responded that the bully pulpit “is not a pulpit to bully,” arguing that the administration went too far in its communications by engaging in threatening and coercive behavior. As such, they assert, the decisions to remove or downgrade certain posts and accounts constituted government action.
 
“The government’s incessant demands to platforms,” they wrote, “were conducted against the backdrop of a steady drumbeat of threats of adverse legal consequences from the White House, senior federal officials, members of Congress and key congressional staffers — made over a period of at least five years.”
 
If, in the end, the Supreme Court determines that the government is threatening social media platforms, that will be a consequential finding. As the dissenting Justices write, “Government censorship of private speech is antithetical to our democratic form of government ...”
 
At the same time, the government must be able to speak to private actors, including social media platforms, on issues of public concern.
 
Ultimately, we need a roadmap for distinguishing between legitimate government action and coercion. A robust discussion at the national level is best suited to parse the nuances at play when it comes to social media and free speech. Congress should hold bipartisan hearings to determine the circumstances where government advice may be helpful to platforms’ content moderation decisions versus the circumstances where such advice may be coercive.
 
We’ll be watching this case closely as it progresses.

​Earlier this summer, we wrote about an opinion and order issued by Judge Terry Doughty of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana in the case of Missouri v. Biden. The controversy stemmed from accusations of government censorship and viewpoint discrimination against speech – under both the Biden and the Trump administrations – most notably social media posts related to COVID-19.

The plaintiffs argued that the government pressured social media platforms to such a degree that it interfered with the First Amendment right of the platforms to make their own content moderation decisions. Judge Doughty agreed.

The district judge’s controversial order enjoined the White House and a broad range of government agencies from engaging in a wide array of communications with social media platforms, with 10 separate provisions laying out the parameters. The administration appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which stayed the injunction.

Now, a three-judge panel from the Fifth Circuit has weighed in. Broadly, they side with Judge Doughty’s finding that the White House, the Surgeon General’s office, the FBI, and the CDC either coerced or significantly encouraged social media platforms to moderate protected speech.

At the same time, the court significantly reduced the scope of the injunction order, striking nine out of the 10 prohibitions for vagueness, overbreadth, or redundancy. Further, the court found that a range of enjoined parties – including former NIH Infectious Disease Director Anthony Fauci and the State Department – did not engage in impermissible conduct.

What we are now left with is a much narrower new injunction with a single prohibition reading as follows:

“Defendants, and their employees and agents, shall take no actions, formal or informal, directly, or indirectly, to coerce or significantly encourage social-media companies to remove, delete, suppress, or reduce, including through altering their algorithms, posted social-media content containing protected free speech. That includes, but is not limited to, compelling the platforms to act, such as by intimating that some form of punishment will follow a failure to comply with any request, or supervising, directing, or otherwise meaningfully controlling the social-media companies’ decision-making processes.” 

Unsurprisingly, the Biden administration is appealing the ruling – this time to the highest court in the land. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the administration’s request for an administrative stay of the Fifth Circuit injunction as the administration prepares to file a petition for certiorari by Oct. 13 (which would allow the Supreme Court to hear the controversy this term).

While it is at least reasonably likely that the Court will agree to hear this case, we stand by our prior position on the issue – that questions surrounding the limits of government interaction with social media companies merit a vigorous, informed public debate. We again urge Congress to hold bipartisan hearings to examine among other questions whether social media platforms find the communications with government to be unwelcome pressure or whether they find the information provided to be helpful.

In order to combat a tide of Covid misinformation, in 2021 the White House began closely monitoring social media companies’ health related postings.

The sense of urgency felt by federal officials was soon reflected in sometimes hyperbolic communications to the public that reflected the deep concern with a flood of harmful misinformation that they believed was getting in the way of the provision of accurate Covid related information to the public. In July 2021, at a White House presser, the Surgeon General accused social media companies of “enabl[ing] misinformation to poison” the public. Soon after, President Biden responded with his own comment about social media “killing people” and the White House publicly discussed legal options. Social media companies apparently understood the message, changing internal policies and making new efforts to deplatform users like the “disinfo dozen,” a list of influencers deemed problematic by the White House. Still, the administration continued its public messaging, with the White House Press Secretary at one point expressing explicit support for Section 230 reforms so the companies can be held accountable for “the harms they cause.”

Of course, the government must be able to communicate freely to the public and with private companies, especially on matters of public health and safety. The parties released from the District Court’s injunction likely exercised that right appropriately. There is danger, however, when the government works with social media silently to remove content, with no public transparency, especially if there is a hint (or more than a hint) of coercion.

What is that danger, exactly? Reasonable people agree there are public health messages that are irresponsible and harmful. But secret censorship, no matter the justification, is the royal road to a censored society.
​
Protect The 1st hopes that congressional hearings and a high Court review will bring clarity on the question of government communications with social media, now America’s main public square.

​In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hill v. Colorado found that restrictions on speech-related conduct outside abortion clinics was content-neutral and thus subject only to intermediate scrutiny, a lesser degree of protection. Since that time, lower courts have upheld similar state and local restrictions on speech based on this binding precedent – and despite a raft of subsequent cases that call Hill’s reasoning into question.
 
The recent case of Vitagliano v. County of Westchester is a perfect exemple of these ongoing challenges. It is now up for potential review before the Court. It offers a good opportunity to overturn Hill and the unconstitutional legal trend it originated.  
 
Here are the facts of the case: Debra Vitagliano is a devout Catholic whose mission is to offer compassionate counsel to women seeking abortions at the last minute, when such counsel might be most effective. Westchester County, like many jurisdictions before it, passed a law establishing a 100-foot buffer zone around reproductive health care facilities (encompassing public sidewalks), prohibiting anyone looking to offer such assistance from getting within eight feet of another person unless they receive explicit consent.
 
Critics of the Hill decision, including 14 states that recently filed an amicus brief, argue that Hill misapplied the legal test for determining whether a speech restriction is content-based. Specifically, they argue that the Court erroneously relied on Colorado’s references to “access” and “privacy” as justification for the statute’s purported neutrality. Since 2000, the Supreme Court has conspicuously refrained from drawing on Hill’s reasoning, and in Dobbs v. Jackson went so far as to call it a distortion of First Amendment doctrines.
 
Whenever the government passes a speech restriction that is obviously content-based (as it is here) it must be looked at through the lens of strict scrutiny. It must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. This means a government cannot simply abridge its citizens’ First Amendment rights because of some particular policy preference – for example, in another context, the idea that protest should not be allowed outside military recruitment facilities because it discourages young people from enlisting.
 
It’s clear that Hill was a policy decision, and while one may agree with its intent, it also opened the door to overstepping when it comes to restricting speech in public places.
 
The sidewalk has long been held to be a public forum. In fact, it’s arguably the place where speech about contentious political issues most belongs. As the Supreme Court wrote in McCullen v. Coakley, sidewalk speech reflects the First Amendment’s goal to “preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.” Criminalizing certain speech on public sidewalks endangers that goal. And preventing Debra Vitagliano from engaging in peaceable, non-violent conversation amounts to the kind of overbreadth that seals the deal when it comes to a law’s unconstitutionality, particularly when laws already exist prohibiting assault, trespass, and blocking clinical access.
 
Whatever your views on abortion, Hill was a bad decision that should be overturned. To quote First Amendment scholar and Harvard professor Lawrence Tribe, the case was “slam-dunk simple.” Its ruling: “slam-dunk wrong.”

In April, Protect The 1st reported on two pending cases before the Supreme Court, O’Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier and Lindke v. Freed, addressing the question of what constitutes a public forum on Facebook. In both lawsuits, public officials blocked criticism from constituents on their social media sites; in both instances, the constituents sued.
 
Now, the U.S. Supreme Court is set to deliberate the urgent question: When does a personal account become public? This is the first time the Court will address the difference between public and private fora against the backdrop of the digital age. In our Protect The First Foundation amicus brief in O’Connor-Ratcliff, we write:
 
“The state action question in this case implicates two vital First Amendment rights: that of citizens to access government fora, and that of public officials to control with whom and how they communicate when they speak in their private capacities. As this case demonstrates, those rights are in tension when it is not immediately apparent whether a government representative is operating a social media account in her public or private capacity.”
 
The petitioners argue that they should be able to block constituents from their social media profiles, on which they discussed government business, as long as their actions aren’t affirmatively required as one of their government duties and they don’t explicitly invoke state authority.
 
In short, they wish to summon their own First Amendment rights to silence their critics in a public forum.
 
For many years now, Members of Congress have segregated their personal and public accounts. They are correct in doing so, and this situation shows why. The legal issue is at what point does a public official’s actions constitute “state action.” And here, the officials’ social media pages are draped in their status as public servants – even though they began as personal campaign pages. With great regularity, they post about official government business and use their accounts to facilitate their government duties. As such, they cannot then claim that when they operate those accounts they are private actors.
 
Government officials, like everyone else, have First Amendment rights. But they cannot have their cake and eat it too by speaking with the authority of government while erasing the access of their critics to that speech.
 
The fact is that we must – now – delineate the limits and boundaries of social media’s power in the context of public service. If you are a public official, you cannot – must not – be able to silence your critics in a public forum under the auspices of your own First Amendment rights.
 
Sorry. Sometimes you just have to take the heat.

​The Supreme Court made the right call on Tuesday when it reversed (7-2) the conviction of a man convicted in Colorado under that state’s anti-stalking laws, establishing in the process a new standard for the criminal prosecution of “true threats.”

While the First Amendment broadly protects speech – including and especially controversial speech – exceptions exist for obscenity, incitement to violence, and other discrete categories. “True threats” constitutes one of those categories. 

Yet until Tuesday, some judicial disagreement persisted on the question of how to properly evaluate a purported “true threat” – particularly in the online arena. To quote Justice Kagan, “Courts are divided about (1) whether the First Amendment requires proof of a defendant’s subjective mindset in true-threats cases, and (2) if so, what mens rea standard is sufficient.” 

In this case, petitioner Billy Counterman was convicted of stalking by a Colorado court after he sent repeated online messages to a female musician that caused her to fear for her safety. The court convicted Counterman using an objective test employing a “reasonable person” standard. In other words, the court asked whether a “reasonable person” would interpret Counterman’s messages as threatening. The Colorado court found that they would.

On appeal, attorneys for Counterman argued that any determination of whether speech constitutes a “true threat” should take into account the defendant’s intent – i.e. his state of mind (mens rea). The Supreme Court agreed.

In a majority opinion authored by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court found that “the State must prove in true-threats cases that the defendant had some subjective understanding of his statements’ threatening nature.” However, according to the Court, the government need not show that the defendant’s purpose was to threaten; instead, they must merely prove that “the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his communications would be viewed as threatening violence.”

This “recklessness” standard, Kagan writes, “offers ‘enough ‘breathing space’ for protected speech,’ without sacrificing too many of the benefits of enforcing laws against true threats.” And it’s a true compromise, too – one where both sides walk away a little unhappy. “The rule we adopt today is neither the most speech-protective nor the most sensitive to the dangers of true threats,” Kagan writes. “But in declining one of those two alternative paths, something more important is gained….”

While the majority recognized that some prosecutors may face a higher burden of proof in future true-threats cases, they correctly weighed that burden against the potentially chilling effects of a purely objective test. Kagan writes: “The speaker’s fear of mistaking whether a statement is a threat; his fear of the legal system getting that judgment wrong; his fear, in any event, of incurring legal costs – all those may lead him to swallow words that are in fact not true threats.”

Legally, incorporation of the “mens rea” element in true-threats cases has been a long time coming. The Court has gradually built that element over the years in cases like Virginia v. Black and Elonis v. United States. In other words, it’s legally consistent with prior opinions – but it’s also good policy.

The American Civil Liberties Union, long an ardent defender of even the most offensive free speech, notes: “[O]ne person’s opprobrium may be another’s threat. A statute that proscribes speech even where the speaker does not intend to threaten, as does the Colorado statute at issue here, runs the risk of punishing protected First Amendment expression simply because it is crudely or zealously expressed.”

This is especially true in the context of online speech, which is “often abbreviated, idiosyncratic, decontextualized, and ambiguous.” Statements made on social media platforms can be accessible to impossibly large, diverse, and unpredictable audiences; how they may interpret such speech is anyone’s guess. Thus, the objective test becomes something like a negligence standard – it criminalizes mistakes. Writes the ACLU: “If First Amendment protections are to enjoy enduring relevance in the twenty-first century, they must apply with full force to speech conducted online.”

An amicus brief co-authored by the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Student Press Law Center builds on this point, suggesting that the objective standard could “incorrectly capture a staggering amount of humor, hyperbole, sarcasm, art, and even malicious speech that was never supposed to reach a particular person, and/or never intended to be read as threatening.”

​Counterman may well be convicted on remand based on the new, subjective standard for true threats. As for the rest of us, we now have a lot more certainty on the extent to which the First Amendment protects even our coarsest civil discourse – particularly in the online arena.

We applaud the Supreme Court’s ruling, one that protects all manner of speech that may be critical or harsh or hyperbolic – but non-threatening all the same.   

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled 6-3 in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis to uphold the First Amendment right of a digital designer not to be compelled to write, design, and create websites that violate her beliefs.
 
Protect The 1st applauds the Court’s decision and the reasoning behind it. Despite the religious roots of the appellant’s beliefs, this is fundamentally a case about the free exercise of speech. The Court correctly decided that web design is an expressive industry, and that no writer should be compelled to write something to which they object.
 
Lorie Smith owns 303 Creative LLC, a web design company she wanted to expand into the wedding industry. But 303 Creative’s expansion ran headlong into the State of Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), which would have required her to design websites for same-sex weddings in violation of her religious beliefs. Smith and 303 Creative lost before a U.S. District Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals before being heard in oral arguments before the Supreme Court last year.
 
In a ringing defense of speech, Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote in the majority opinion of the inviolability of free speech under the Constitution. The majority opinion states:
 
“A hundred years ago, Ms. Smith might have furnished her services using pen and paper. Those services are no less protected speech today because they are conveyed with a ‘voice’ that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.”
 
The Court noted that the Tenth Circuit, which ruled against Smith, had reasoned that Smith’s speech was involved in this case, but that “Colorado could compel speech from Ms. Smith consistent with the Constitution.” The majority concludes that First Amendment precedents “teach otherwise.”

For those who are inclined to see this ruling as the beginning of a discriminatory approach to services, Justice Gorsuch fleshed out the consequences if the Court were to uphold the lower court’s logic.
 
“Under Colorado’s logic, the government may compel anyone who speaks for pay on a given topic to accept all commissions on that same topic—no matter the underlying message—if the topic somehow implicates a customer’s statutorily protected trait … Taken seriously, that principle would allow the government to force all manner of artists, speechwriters, and others whose services involve speech to speak what they do not believe on pain of penalty.”
 
Justice Gorsuch then painted a convincingly realistic dystopian outcome for people on all sides, quoting a dissenting judge on the Tenth Circuit.
 
“The government could require ‘an unwilling Muslim movie director to make a film with a Zionist message,’ or ‘an atheist muralist to accept a commission celebrating Evangelical zeal,’ so long as they would make films or murals for other members of the public with different messages. Equally, the government could force a male website designer married to another man to design websites for an organization that advocates against same-sex marriage.”
 
Justice Gorsuch made it clear that there are sharp limits for this ruling, one that pertains to speech and expressive industries.
 
“[W]e do not question the vital role public accommodation laws play in realizing the civil rights of all Americans …”
 
Quoting a prior ruling that public accommodation laws “vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments,” Justice Gorsuch noted that Smith’s “voice is unique; so is everyone’s. But that hardly means a State may coopt an individual’s voice for its own purposes.”
​
Protect The 1st agrees with the Court’s reasoning and urges people on all sides to take the same cool look at the consequences that would have flowed from an alternate ruling.
 
One doesn’t have to agree with a particular belief to agree with the principle that speech should never be coerced. The Court’s opinion provides a narrow exception, one to be kept within the boundaries of the exercise of speech.

The U.S. Supreme Court today unanimously revived the case of a former postal employee, Gerald Groff, an evangelical Christian who claims his rights under Title VII of the civil rights law were violated when the Postal Service denied his request to refrain from working on Sunday.
 
In oral argument in April, the Justices had focused on how much disruption and hardship an employer would have to suffer in order to justify denying an employee a religious accommodation. In today’s ruling, the Court threw out the prevailing standard that businesses shouldn’t be required to suffer more than “de minimus” harm from a religious accommodation. Instead, the Court held that a business or other employer must accommodate a religious practice unless the accommodation would create a “hardship” that is “substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business.”   
 
Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Alito also made clear that the range of cognizable hardships is narrow: “An employer who fails to provide an accommodation has a defense only if the hardship is ‘undue,’” he wrote, “and a hardship that is attributable to employee animosity to a particular religion, to religion in general, or the very notion of accommodating religious practice cannot be considered ‘undue.’”
 
Justice Alito also wrote that it is not enough for an employer to conclude that forcing other employees to work overtime would constitute an undue hardship. “Consideration of other options, such as voluntary shift swapping, would also be necessary.”
 
“In throwing out the lower court ruling, the Supreme Court today took a major step toward widening respect for religious liberty,” said Gene Schaerr, general counsel of Protect The 1st. “In this unanimous ruling, the Justices made clear that, absent serious harm to the actual practice of a business, Title VII – which reflects in the private sphere the First Amendment’s protection for free exercise of religion in the public sphere – requires employers to respect an employee’s religious needs.”

Erik Jaffe, PT1's Policy Director and PRI adjunct fellow in legal studies and one of America’s top constitutional lawyers, joins us for his annual preview of the hot Supreme Court cases that will be handed down before the end of the term.  They discuss cases involving private property rights, tech, college admissions policies, legislative gerrymandering, and more.  They also explore the controversy over Supreme Court ethics and the mystery of why we still haven’t found the Supreme Court “leaker.”

​Protect The 1st on Wednesday filed a reply brief answering claims from the University of Alabama against our petition for the U.S. Supreme Court to hear Keister v. Bell.
 
We told the court that this case is an “excellent vehicle” to resolve a split in appellate courts on the proper analysis of what constitutes a public forum. The case revolves around the right of evangelist Rodney Keister to stand on city-owned sidewalks on a public street in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, near the University of Alabama. The UA campus police enforced an agreement with the city to clamp down on expressive activity at that portion of the sidewalk, warning Keister not to preach on this portion of a public sidewalk.
 
At stake is the right of Americans to use public spaces to engage in speech – a practice that was embedded in American life long before colonials handed out Thomas Paine’s Common Sense pamphlets. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, recognizes that “traditional public fora are open for expressive activity regardless of the government intent.” On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit ruled against Keister with a multifactor balancing test and allowed the University to forbid expressive activity on the sidewalk.
 
Protect The 1st wrote: “Even assuming the propriety of a balancing test, the Eleventh Circuit’s circular reliance on the University’s intent to suppress speech was an improper fulcrum for converting the most quintessential of traditional public fora into a limited forum allowing suppression.”
 
Protect The 1st is hopeful the Court will take this chance to resolve a split in the courts and uphold the traditional right of Americans to use public property for expression and speech.

​Observers of the U.S. Supreme Court have long wondered if Justice Clarence Thomas would lead his colleagues to hold internet companies that post users’ content to the same liability standard as a publisher.
 
In a concurrence last year, Justice Thomas questioned Section 230 – a statute that provides immunity for internet companies that post user content. Justice Thomas noted that the “right to cut off speech lies most powerfully in the hands of private digital platforms. The extent to which that power matters for purposes of the First Amendment and the extent to which that power could lawfully be modified raise interesting and important questions.”
 
In the case heard today, Gonzalez v. Google, the family of a woman murdered by terrorists in Paris is suing Google not for a direct post, but for a YouTube algorithm that temporarily “recommended” ISIS material after the crime. In oral argument, Justice Thomas posed a more skeptical note.
 
“If you call information and ask for al-Baghdadi’s number and they give it to you, I don’t see how that’s aiding and abetting,” he said. Justices returned to precedents about lending libraries and bookstores not being held accountable for the content in their books. 
 
Protect The 1st joined with former Sen. Rick Santorum in an amici brief before the Court arguing that Section 230 protections are absolutely needed to sustain a thriving online marketplace of ideas. Social media companies make a good faith effort to screen out dangerous content, but with billions of messages, perfection is impossible.
 
Google attorney Lisa Blatt brought this point home in a colorful way, noting that a negative ruling would “either force sites to take down any content that was remotely problematic or to allow all content no matter how vile. You’d have ‘The Truman Show’ versus a horror show.”


The tone and direction of today’s oral argument suggests that the Justices appreciate the potential for an opinion that could have negative unforeseen consequences for free speech. Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh added that the court should not “crash the digital economy.”
 
Protect The 1st looks forward to reading the Court’s opinion and seeing its reasoning.

​Protect The 1st filed a brief on Friday in favor of a Supreme Court petition from 21 current and former lifeguards who are being forced to remain for years against their will as dues-paying members of a public employee union.
 
In September 2019, these California Department of Parks and Recreation lifeguards signed forms that authorized a public union, the California State Law Enforcement Agency, to enroll them as members and deduct union dues from their wages.
 
On the form was a vaguely worded statement that there were limitations to withdrawal from the union. This may have seemed like boilerplate since a Supreme Court opinion in June 2018, Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, held that public-sector unions cannot require non-member employees to pay agency fees covering the costs of even non-political union activities.
 
The form did not explain that if members wished to resign their union membership, they could only do so during a single thirty-day period every four years. This means the lifeguards who signed the form will be forced to remain union members until July 2023. Over this time, any political stance or activity taken by the union will be done in the name, and with the money, of these unwilling members.
 
The lifeguards sued to protect their First Amendment rights. In April, the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against them.
 
In our brief before the Supreme Court, Protect The 1st informs the Court:
​
“The front page of the California State Law Enforcement Agency (‘CSLEA’) website currently sports a banner reading ‘My Union, My Choice!’ But when Petitioners asserted their choice to leave that union, the union and the state of California sang a different tune. California has a ‘maintenance of membership’ agreement with CSLEA, which forces employees to remain union members and pay full union dues for four years, all the while subsidizing union speech they no longer wish to support.
 
“Compelled speech and association—especially of a political nature—is not permissible under the First Amendment. And it is particularly shocking in this case, where the State seizes money from Petitioners’ paychecks and gives it to the union, which in turn supports political candidates and legislation through multiple election cycles.”
 
Our brief demonstrates three reasons why the Court should take up this case.
 
The “Member Maintenance” Agreement Compels Political Speech
California is forcing these government employees to support union speech, including political speech and candidates supported by the union, for up to four years. The repeated injuries to First Amendment rights over such a long period of time are especially egregious.

Even De Minimis Violations of the First Amendment Are Illegal
Compelling speech from American citizens for four years is unconscionable, but any compelled speech or association that violates the First Amendment, even if that compulsion includes only a few words or lasts for a few moments, is objectionable. As the Supreme Court held in 1976, “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”
 
The Lower Courts Are Eviscerating Janus’s Protections
Before the Ninth Circuit’s ruling against the lifeguards in April, the Third and Seventh Circuits had also imposed improper limits on the Supreme Court’s Janus decision. The Court had made it clear that “compelled subsidization of private speech seriously impinges on First Amendment rights.” Yet lower courts continue to allow such violations.
 
“This petition gives the high Court the means by which to reinforce the plain meaning of its ruling in Janus to the lower courts,” said Gene Schaerr, general counsel of Protect The 1st. “It upholds the obvious principle that the erosion of our First Amendment rights for even a minute is unacceptable – and the maintenance of that violation for years is obscene.”