Fourth Circuit Protects Right of Religious Institutions to Make Faith-Based Employment Decisions

​Generally speaking, terminating someone’s employment because of their sexual orientation is a gross violation of the law – and it should be. But that doesn’t apply in every instance, particularly when the employer is a religious institution engaged in guiding the spiritual development of others according to the tenets of their faith.
 
Lonnie Billard served as a teacher of English and drama at Charlotte Catholic High School (CCHS). After CCHS fired him for planning to marry his same-sex partner, Billard brought suit for sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted Billard’s motion for summary judgment, rejecting the school’s argument that religious exceptions inoculated them against Billard’s claim. Now, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has weighed in, reversing the district court’s decision, and entering judgment for the school.
 
This is a tricky and emotional situation, and one would be forgiven for an impassioned reaction – no matter which side of the issue you’re on. Yet, from both a policy and practicality standpoint, you cannot be a teacher charged with imparting a given set of spiritual values while acting in public violation of them. Religious institutions must be able to restrict their staff positions – particularly teaching positions – to those who hold their same beliefs. Otherwise, religion would cease to mean much at all. A Methodist could teach at a mosque, an atheist at a Baptist church school, or an evangelical Christian at a high school atheist club.

CCHS describes itself as “an educational community centered in the Roman Catholic faith that teaches individuals to serve as Christians in our changing world.” It posits that “individuals should model and integrate the teachings of Jesus in all areas of conduct in order to nurture faith and inspire action,” and that “prayer, worship and reflection are essential elements which foster spiritual and moral development of [CCHS’s] students, faculty and staff.”
 
Indeed, all members of the teaching staff are expected to play a part in promoting the Christian faith. This includes leading prayers, attending Mass, and ensuring the “catholicity” of their classrooms. As such, the Fourth Circuit found that CCHS’ employment decision fell under a “ministerial exception” to Title VII. We think a better term today is a “religious mission exception,” one that covers all the positions in which those who work in a particular faith are expected to model it for others.
 
As the Court wrote, “settled doctrine tailored to facts like these – the ministerial exception – already immunizes CCHS’s decision to fire Billard.” Drawing from the Supreme Court’s 2020 ruling in Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, the Fourth Circuit concluded that CCHS tasked Billard with “vital religious duties,” effectively making him a “messenger” of the faith. Thus, related employment decisions require the courts to stay out.
 
The CCHS/Billard controversy is not an ideal situation for anyone, and an employer’s similar actions in nearly any other scenario would constitute illegal discrimination. The long-established ministerial exception, however, requires the courts to abstain from weighing in on ecclesiastical employment matters – and for good reason: the First Amendment requires it, and it protects the beliefs of everyone.